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CHAPTJ~H

1

"THE \J l::fY J\ND HOIJJ OF COLL E:C1.'1 VE 13ECUHI 'l'Y "1

Fe•• terms are more popular today than "Collective
security," <i.nd :fevJ aro used 1r1ith such d:i.verse Iueaning;s.
The ;Collo<•ing tltatements by tli.:;h-ranl>.ing 11merican o:f.ficials

are typical:
The path of collective semuity is our only sure
defense against the dangers that thr6aten us.
(President Harry s. Truman; address of JYlay 7, HJ51.)

• • • thti prj.nciple o.f collective security • , , i<>
the only principle that v:a ttllnk can cm:'ry us to peace.
(;:?ecretary of Defense George c. Marshall; t<mtimcmy to
the Sonata Armed Dervices and F·oreign Helations
Commit tee, tJiay 12, 19 51. )
(The concept of collective sccurlty is) tlte most
single concept affocting international life.
(Under Decreta:ry oi' state Jamtls !~. V;ebb; ado.Hws in
Nontreal, l'iay z,l, 1951.)
i.u.por·t;tc~nt

The core of our program this year is ac,«in collective security. 'c;e are concentrating on collective
security becatl:oe it ll; tkle greatest Xliled of the ;;orld
today •• , it is ttlo responsible and rsalistic road.
to world peuce. (Jotm D. Hicl-cerson, 1M>si<;t1:mt ~~ecretary
of State fox United Nutions ii1'fuirs; widress in i~e\·i
York, uctobe:r 21, 1\il'il.)

meeting uf the Sixth Gession of the General Mlsembly <)f' th•;

-----lFrom the book by Joseph Huri;t Ball, Collective
1ili! ::ili;t and l!2!£!. (Boston: viorld pu:we F':unc!ation,

lli!£\:!t.:.h~:

194<.1).

2

{Jnitad Nations on September 20, 1950.

And 0 of' course,

Secretary of state John JPostEJX Dulles had as trHJ main
purpose in

negoti~tting

the soutt1east Asia Collective

Defense Treaty "to estublisll a collect;ive secm:ity <>:rran;;oment for soutlleast L\sia and th" \.estern Pacific."
(statem<lnt made by Gecretar.)l of .SiilitJ>_l,_ulles_b_t-lf_or_e_the______
Op<ming session of ttle Coni'erence at Manila on Geptember 6,
1954.)
I •

DEFINI l'ION

'l'o assess the true significance and ponsibilit:Les o;e
collective security in international affairs, the qu<Js tion
must first be ans.vered:

\ihat does "collective sacuri ty"

mean?

The concept uprears to be simple alii lHJlf-explanatory.
It has been defined by Geoii:\ t3clxLvarz<Jnberc:,er as "machinery
for joint act.ion in oxder to prevent or counter any attack
against <U1 establl;,hed irrternational order. •• 2 It clearly
implies collecltive m<Jasures for dealirt, with threats to
peace.

In a sem;e ErnE:JSt

A.

Gross, United states Deputy

Representative to the united Nations. stuted a truism when

2aeorg schvJar zenberger, PovJei Politics (N<fvJ York:
Frederick A. Praegex, Inc., l95rr;-p. 494. -

he declared: "There is no alternative to collective action
for the act1ievoment of security.

The opposite of

collective secu:r ity :l.s complete insecurity. " 3
.

But not ull collectivo action .Ls collectiv<:> security.
F'o:r in reality • th.e concept .ts a

CQlllpl~lX

and elusive one.

1'he very fev; ven tu:rcs in collective action have been limi i;ed
by the vague and goneral natUHl of' tho commitments, and by
the UUJ;Iillin.!;n<;ss of tho states concerned to take adequhte
vigorous action.

Collective security :Ls clearly incompat-

ible with neutrality o.nd with a balance of po>Ver policy, ns
C;!uincy :• risht explains. 4
be:

The decisive tests v;ould seem to

First. 'loJbether the systerr.' is strong •:moue:;h.

Collective secmrity '•1111 .never 1tJO:rk unless t'cll the n!lt:i.ons
that take part in it are pr epured to ca:rry :Lt on to a
de:t'initive concltlsion.

The second test appE;ars ·to l.Je

\lihethor tll<> states associatud in i·c abide by '!;heir

obliga~
..

t1ons to the i\1llest extent necassa:ry in crisis si.tuatlons.
As ProJessor Friedrn<:mn explains:
A successful system of collective secul'i ty does not
necassar:tly presuppose "'- complete abandonment of
nationccl :Lnclepond.enoe or individuality. It do<Js,
hovJever, require the submi<Js:ton of tile :i.nctividual

3 MdreSi3 at the Unive:rsity of Vi:rg1nia, ,July 1<5, 191:',1;
in the l}epartme.n~ of Gtate Bulli_t:.,~11 1 XXV (July <)0, 1951),

183.

· 4Quinoy ! richt, !
of Chicago Press, 1942),

stugz of ~ (Chil1ago:
II, p.~81.

University

4

national 1dll to collective decisions • • • and in
order to be ef'fectiv<> it requires the intHrnational
control o:f. military forces <>nd vital weapons, '<Jhic!l is
certainly not uossible Hit:hout a severe restriction of'
nat .tonal saver eignty. 5
Third, such a system must l)e fa.x more tl:ian an
It must be open to tt1ose stt1tes wl1ici:l hie

alliance.
~~illing

to accept 1 ts obllga tions in ,sood faith..

I_t_llJUsJ;,_ _ _ __

not be directed against &.ny specific pmH;r or combinaticm

consistent lvitll the Charter of t.rHl unit6d Nationf;.

Also,

especially <lo fer as collective security in southeast

,~sia

is concerrlud ~ it must embody t;hose principle::; given by

Laster B. Pm.J.nwn, canac1ian Minister fox n:xternal Aff'<t:l.rs:
(1)

it must contain no taint of coloniali.sru and im:wt not be

dasi.,;ned to !JIOp up XGgime5, colonial or national, 1;ha:t; tu:J.Vc

little o:r no populHr support; (2) since military .:·"ggression
of the continental so:rt is not li!>:el.y to be tl1e main f'utu:re
~anga:r

so much as Conunun:tst :lnfilt:rati.on for exploi tat :ton

of forces 1vithin a ste.te, no mere military agreement 1rJill
be satisfactory; und (3) the solution cannot be a ptttely
Western ona l:mt stwuld be b:rowny ba<H>d on the 1\Bia.n °:;

particlpation eith,:r actlvely or through their coopeiation

ana

advice. 6

------5w. Friedmann, h.n
(New York:

l,~acmillan

~.fillroc1uct:ton ~o t~

Comp,my, H5l), p. b7.

Politics

6naymotil DaniEll, dispatch f:rom Ottuv;a elated J[;ay 26,
1954; ill ttle N€1\11 X(>rk ',CimE:S, May L9, 1954 •
.

----

5
H.

PHOVlSIOND OF :Cllrl UNXl'i',D I'IA'riONS CHAH1'i1H

'l'he student of collective secu.:rity vlill p:rolJably say
that it is a statement of perJ.action to argue tbat the
p:rioe of thB .failm:e to provide

oolleotiv~'

security aftGl'

order whicll would establish a ganu:l.ne peace and for an
organization >vhictl vwuld preserve tha·t peace.

At first glance lt seems thr:;t tile foundations
well laid..

\"Jete

Tho provisions of the Charter of thli Unitc;d

Nations for collective action axe more extensive and
appa:r en tly mo:rlil far-rlilachirli_, trmn those of the Covammt
of' the; League of Nations.

,l<'I.U:th~irmore~

the United Nations

system has been butt:rossed by regional a:nangements and
agreements, <>ome of

which~

notably those existl..ng :l.n

\lleste:cn gurope, tilEl J.\tle.ntic Community, ancl the Vies tern
Hemisphere,---il&tablish strol:li;; regional seolU:ity syst.ems
Which are presumably consistent \<!ttl, and supplementary to,
the United Nat:tons

sy~:tem.

Art.tcle I of the Gl:larter calls f'or "effecUve
collective

m~;asLues

fol'

th(~

prevention and removal of th.roats

to the peace, and for the suppression of' ucts of agc;ression
or other breacl1t1S of thB peace.••

C.:hapter VII of the

6

Charter poi.<lts olrt in

~reat

collective measures" may be.

detail

~illat thest:~

"·efi'actlve

If 'the Semu:ity Gounci.l finds

that an uct of abgresslon or other ttueat to th•; peace has

such maasur es as the council Sh!:lll deem necessary, the
United .Nations may call llpon tll8 nHil!ub<n· stateB to taltE:i Hny
of a number of non-military and • if necessary, military

Article 421 'novides timt
'

All members of the United ~lations , •• unc1ertal-ce to
make available to the De cur i ty COill'lcil, Oil its <:!.ill or
in accordance with a speoi<.tl agream<mt oJ: ae;reements,
armed forces, assistance • and fa(~:lli ties • • • necessar:
for the purpose of maintainin;, :l.nte:mattontcl poace and
security.
ArtJ.clo 45 stipulates tr1at "Mombers shall llold

illllllediately available natiomU. air-force C<.m tingents for
comb :tned interna Uonal enf'orc ement action."

Article 47 provides for a Mili t•1ry staff Committ!J(J
•• , to advise and a.ssist the Security Council on
all questions relating to the security ConneLl •s
military rtlquirements for the maintenance of international peace ond secur;t ty • the> employment anCi command
of forces placed at its disposul, ·th<J ret.;ulation of
armaments • and poss j_ble disarmaments.
Article 49 states that "'l'he i\>1embers of tile un1 ted
Nations snall join in affording, mutual assistanc:e in
carrying out oi1o meastlHJs decidod upon b,\' the Deou:ri ty
CounciJ.."

7

Th.e famous A:rticl'l 51 specifically l'ccognizes "the
inherent right of indi vidqal or collective self -de:f.'ense if
<l.n armed attack occurs a,;a:!.nst u 1·\omber of th!J UnltHd
Nations." but it also pla:l.nly stat.ad ttlht
geasu:res tcJ.ken by Members in too exercise of hhl.s
right • • • shal.l not in any \vay affect the authority
and rospontJibility of the Cecu:rlty Council •• , to
1--------·take-a t-(uJ.y tlme-su cf.!-a.ct:t-on-&s-1. t-u ees.ns !lid ces ~ary iu.------====
order to maintai-n or rccJsto.N:l lnt;e:rnc:,tiomil p(cJflCf.l and
seouri ty.
Chapter \HI oi' tbe Charter thus clearly envisions
collective action of a i'ar-reachirJt<, natura, tmu the

Members of tllH United Natiom;,by adher:i.il., to thf.l Cl1<u;ter,
accepted a corm:nitment to abide by and e;:l.ve full suppo.rt to
the decisions of' tl1f.l Security Council.

Until the Korean crisis of 1950, the pote'.l tial.i t:l.ElS

of' the United nations :for collective actlon against
aggression ,,1ere untested.

it could. not become

m1

But because of the very nature

ef'fective .ins.t:rument of collective

security v•i thou t radical. rev j,s ion of the Crtar ter.

1\.ltiloL<t;h

he supported and voted f'o.r the Jn;Lted Nations Charter. even
Senator Hobe:rt A. Taft, for instance, confesses tru1t hfl
;;as "never satisfied."

\f.ihile at the same timo expressing

his belief' in int;ernational

la<~

as

H

basin 1\'r endu:r :ing

peace, he contended t!mt the '1m to poi!Je:r in the secu:ri ty

Council of the United Nations "completely dispels the idea
that any syf;tem of universal law is b<Jir)b e:otalJlic:hed, for
sur.ely nothing ':an be

I

I

J.W;J

if five of tho la:rg<;;st nat:i.ons

can automaticCilly exempt th.emselvas f:r<llil its ap:licat:l.on." 7
Because of ·ttw constant use of the veto by the
Soviet Union th6 UnHed States and othm: mejo:r pmvers of
the t.'estern ;.;o:rld are placing first cJmphs,sis on regional
security p;r:oe;;:rwns and arrangements.

They

~?,re

relylns more

defense and for r<ag:l.onnl measures for "individual or
collective self'-defEmse," to use the langlwge o:f 11rticle 51
of the United Nations Charter. than they are upon tho .mo:r·e
<!,eneral sai'eguards provided ;for in trw 0t1artu:r..

In the

field of security tilElY seem to attach more sigxlificance to
individual anc\ regional than to collective secuxity in its

true and broadax moaning. 8

Port1aps thl" situation has developed because c:f th<l

8 carlos p. Homulo, "1'he United Nations is Dy1ng "
1
Collie:r.'t;,
LXIV
(JLllY
23,
1%4);
~?0-2 •
....
--~

~

9

very nature and limitations of international la~J.9
Whe:reaH

:!.n~m:rwtional

1<1\v

:represents

(J.

posj;tive at·tempt to

build an into:rna ttonal le,;al Ol'der, ia tho absence of' wtlioh

peace and san:U;y in the intarnal:.ioual G<lJI'll1H:<n:i.ty are in
constant ji!opard.y, :Lnternati.onal J.. avJ "•Jill never play a
really e.ffootiv<> part 1n international :relo:t;ions," u!L_.[,,_______====

L. Brierly, nn English autl1o:ri ty declares, "until it can
annex. to its own

ent lie

~~:!.thin

!rpt.w:n~

some of the

matte1~s

which at pres-

the •ctoli'.estic ,iurisdictio.n' of' the sevt';:tal

• • • as X<lgt~:rds :i.ts irmtitlltions and procedures of
adjustment the htlrl of nations has been £.. ,junc,l.u law
imperfectly mrwl:lo:rated by a fragmentary nnd hesitant
progress in the d i:rection of legal order .11
l!ihile H .i.s true .that rules of pJ:ocedure called

internatlonecl J.m.J h!i.Ve grm•n cons:lfterabJ.y durir•s the past
fe;v hundred years, the modern \Vorld "' tlll is composed
primarily of a group of polit:l.cally indHpendent, selfgovernin~;

statmJ each of

\~hJ.ch

clai.:m; ove:ry sovereign x igrtt.

------Ssulo Eng<Jl 0 "On "cl.lo l>tatus of Internutiorwl Legislation," .!tl!i ill[!eric~ ,Jotlt[J.a;l. of !fl!:.!nna t~on~ ;t,a~. XLIV
(October, 19fi0) 11 '/39.
~0,;. L. Brierly • ~ 1"av1 Q.f Nutiolli?_ (London: oxford
UniversJ.ty Press, 1949) 9 pp.~-6.

,
lloowin D. Dlckens on • Lal'l .ill!Si. geaq§. ( P<mnsyl V<miu:
university or Pennsylvania Pres", 1951), p. 76.

10

Consequently, tne resort 'Go :l.nt.e:rnat:l.cmU. law
purely voluntary.

h~•s

been

\\!tlen nr1t:i.onal honor, sec,.:u:ity, or ottlm:
.

vital in'torest<J are at stake, nations have placed their

.

particular· :l.nt;>J:ests above t:1e :restraints o.f lnte:rnational
..

national polioy t:md cannot be

l<'~ft

out of account in any

kind of lntG:matlonal xel:l tions.

security in a lJitdly d:Lvided vJorld, :rq;:Lonu.l lo\J:r8.XlQeme.nt£J
for co1l"ct:i.ve defense and for other pLtrpor:Hl£ 11ave become
useful a.ncl even

<~ssential.

'l'he Chartex of tlle.: United

Nations, as pointc.d out. not only ClO<JS not place impediments :tn

1~il<>

1vay of' th.e J:'ormation of regional ulliances,

but under i\rticl.;;

f)l

it actually mekos prov1s1on for the

forming of regional groapings.
Collective D6f0:nse T:rsaty,
~~anila

The Goatheast Hsia

popl~larly

known as B.'"ATO, or the

Pact, is onH of severHl rogional arrangements set up

There are some 1fiho holt! that rcg:i.onu1 security pacts
add to international tensions, and may even hasten the

catastrophe they are designed to prevent.

It does not.

follow, ho>•ever • tilat i'ailure to tako sac!'! steps may
incttlase tb.e

pro~Jpects

of peace,

In fact, failt:IH:l to

...

-

.

·-

11

provide :reg:lonal security may add to ·t;lle dangers and, in
addition, may gravely ,jeopa:rd:tze tile secu:r ity or even the
national e1ziDtenc:e of

tl1u

statss 1rlh:lcti are so foolhardy as

to trust c:l"t.;ocetl.wr "t;o tl"le lhivicen of p<i.aCt:;ful Bet·tJ.eriient

in a \Jorld vvl:J.e:re even the fain"test sil:!,n of
decmH:y 111:e cast aside by nati.on;;c,

~~llo

mo:ra.lH;~;

and

u.re not scrupulo•Js as

to thf.l mo"ttlods by \·Jhich ttleix matexial:l.stic sJ.tds are
attained.

Tho s4;n.Htor:l.<>S to sr:ATO :rega.rd their O:t't:Hniza-

tiOll a neoessit;.

In t;tw :fa.oe of present dangers in

SouthGast ftsia 'thE.iy soc no alt.e:o."la t.:tve.

r

CHAP'l'ER II

\'lh.il;;; the SE:ATO sys tom of :r eg1on~;~l colla cti ve

secu:ri ty in Asia is tt1e most recent, it tU:ts had several

predecessors.

Five of' these lrlill be discussed bri€lfly,_.•.___ _ _ __

Japan appealed to the idoa of :regionalism Nh<m
Nippon's leaders attempted to disguise their program of

conquest in East Asi11 by declaring tt1ei:r objactiva was the
creation of a "Greater
Begun cautiously

1~ast

fifty~fi ve

ilsi<; Co-Prosperity L3phere."

years ago

v~hen

Korea and

Formosa <Jere detached from China. the process of turning

tt'lis :rantustic scheme into reality proceeded systl.lllHiticully
and >1itt1 increasilli;; rutl1lessness until it ent,ulf'ed most of

China and soutrll.mstern Asia--an empire \vhicll.• at its cxest 0
• • • spl'awlc:d over 3 0 000, ooo squrire miles, controlled more than h~;lf' a billion people, and contained
the \'lor ld •s best sources of' natural rubber and tin, us
v•ell as rich resel'ves o.f arrtimotJy • tungsten. chrome l
iron ore, coal. petroleum, vege'tablCJ oil, and l:leJap.

------1 "Liqllidating Japan's Co-Prosperity 6pt1ere,••
Business V.'eelrl!. No. 1177 (August 15 • 194()), 18.
'
:,_
~----

13

The program of' a Greater !!last Asia Co-Prosperity
Spl;tera hHd been proclaimed in 1938 tvhen "Juptm 1 s fasclsts"
had succeeded in capturing control of the government. 2

But it was not untn ,July 1940, that the Tojo cabinet
.formulated the construction of a "N<M Order" in ii;at>t Asia
as basic in Jap<>n's foreign policy.

'rrle "llletoJ Order" w:>s

to comprise un area centered around Japan, China

flfiU

Manchuko and to incltlde the mandated islands, Fr enc!l IndoChina, Ti:lailun6. llfiulaya, Borneo, Netherlands li:ast Indies,

Australia, Ne" Zeala.'1d, !:lnd Ind.ia.

'£he sphere was created

to be an economically sHlf-sufflcient a:rea uncer Japanese
political hegemony • ,)"'

r·rofessor Francis C. ,Jones of

Harvard Unlve:rsi ty explains Japan 1 s ''New Order" in tt1is
manner:
The general Japanese concept of G:reate:r East Asia
was one in vJhicl1 Japan herself steM fol'th as ttle lGade:r
in all walks of' life--military, political& economlc,
and cultural. Aroulld her lve:re to be grouped the
satellite States, varying in degree of political subordination to Tokyo, but all iu common looking to Jhpa}l
a;, .t11e sup<lX io:r cotmtry • vJhcs e vi<>.ys they should. endeavon:r
to imHut<J and With ~~hom they should ull f'aitn:tully
cooperate. For the Japanese tt1e successftll establishment of Greater Etl.st Asil:l meant not only tile attainment
of tlla long-desired goal of ~:~conomic seli'•sufflcienoy 9

0

.

"'.Leland D. Bald~Jin, Uecent ilmeriCB{l History (New
York: Ame:r :Lean Book Company, 1954), p, 321.

~\.il.liam H. liJ.sb:ree, Japan's Hol<.:: in :Joutheast Asia
Nationalist Movements, !21Q.-~ (BoS't"On:li.Urval'd University
Press, 1953), p. 16,
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but also of somethirlib else which ~Jould satisfy a
psychological craving--the recognition of Japan's
ethical and cultural superiority, the acceptunce of
~rapan at ller mm valuation as the oliGht of 1\sia. '
Indea(J • vihoth<>r consciously or not • tha Japanese
aspi:r: ad "to play th<i:l ra.rt wnicl:l ttle Chinaso nad once
played :Ln 'GlHl g;rec.: t days of the Cales tial !.l:!ilpirtl 0 "hen
t;tHJ Don of Heaven in Peking • swayed the \vide tvo:t:ld,"
and •>hen Ct1inu ~Vas regarded by J:wr ne.igl:J.bours as the
exempla:r and fountainhead of' civilized lii'e.4
·

Japanese occupation policies of the count:das o:f southeast
Asiu or t;hc; contr:lbution of those policies to latar developments~

suffice it to say that tlleir tllinly veiled

complete failur<l.
histol'Y•

This fact is novJ part of

oontemport~:ry

;rupan 1'1d.lod because of the cruelty meted out to

the native population

~Jl;on

total. \!ollaboration has not

fo:rthcom1ng 0 and because o:f tlle privation due to the
economic <lislocilition M1ich a.ccompani<'ld '1:!18 vm:r.

In t;he

former, t;tle;:re \vera m.any instances i"ill<Jre tl:u::' Jupaneso
:received oonsid6rably support from nationalisr!; parties and
succeeded in attractinG U:lG cooperation, sometimes nomlno.l,
but of'ten activ<> t of naticn<,,list leaders who E;r.urnecl (and

war a s pu:rned by) tile previous colonial regime;;.

HovJ<JVEl r,

there neve:r devoloped a :real unity of :i.nte:re sts betweEm

15
·the two par 'ties; there \-J!lS no ove:r\;belmill<s despair on th(l
pa.rt of the Asiam: v.t; Japan •::. defeat, no feeling that they
must have Japan's support to stand on trwir feet.

lrl

l
The idea of linking forces wi til the nati.onal movo~
\HlS a sound uno.
It 111as by no means or igimil
witlJ the Japanese but the ciroumsttmoes under \·Jh5.ctl
they la,.mc:hed their effort gave them ll unique opportc;mity. :rn''Y fumbled it. and one basic cause \•ias tt1oir
mm .fat<lty conception of the nationali>:t movements in
Asia. The v:i.e\v C<:Jme dangerously clo;;.e to bs J.r~:;; one
accordint, to wt1ich the 11 nativo blolnas" IHJ.re givmi a
.fe~; trappin~;;,s of autl10ri·ty :rcrth.:::r as pluythings to
keep them aJnw.;ed wh.Ue the Japanose d<lVotet! tm;mselv<Js
to essenti8l m&tters. The idea oi' Japanese suporiority
v;as implic;i. t in tile ir actions dt.uir!Q the o ccu p~:<tion.
The notiorJ of ,;qidance 1,11as 1.i!lv1ays tt1u t oi lendinb tJ
li-ttle child by the hund. ti1ere l>as no inkling of
r<Uutionship in which mutual probl<>ms viould be discussed
on equ.ul terms , • • (After till) tho p:o ce:m b~ vJhich
one nation t:ranc,mits to anotllor the !'ru:J:t s of its mm
experience is 8l1 axceecl.tn 1;ly compl<JX one, particularly
if some respects must bi.i paid to elmm.mts of tile old
society of tbe :recipient • • • • 'l'he Japawase violated
most of tile rudimentary principles of' su en u :r ela:t;ionship. !!ley savJ 'Wf!Ht a WHlful j.ns t;:rument nationalism
could be in ·~heir plans fox u co-P:rosperi ty .Sphere~ but
tl'ley :failed to d:ravl all tho necesstuy consequences fnna

ments

this :reali:~:ation.5

B:rie.fly then, because the Japanese fallecl to
identify

th~;

int•J:rests of the p<>Oples of 3outtH>Us't ;,siu, <m

attempt to Lmify a geographic portion of Ilsia unde:r thEi

______

glJise of a "Co-P:ror; peri ty Sphere" t111.s fn:Ued.
,
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At the end of' ·l'.it)Ild Viar II, as the \<J:I.nds of
political <lnd social

ctwn~:,e

begun to blow over Asia the

leaders of' many Asiatic countries have frequently voiced
the commt.mity of interests cf all .. sian people"'•

represents potentially the waste:r:y of t'>::te world in
power and re<;ou:rces. 110

Of this <JVent, P.

c.

This is

JI1an~

C.p<mder,

Australia's Minister :!.'or External .Relations, observed,
"In all. mor<1 than one billion people have been cau@t up
in political and economic tranef·ormation in
••everyvll:l<~Ie t!11~

Asi~t,"

moreover,

dynamic gxovlti1 of ne1> politicul and economic

policies, and nm; institutions, "ill continue ctnder the
impulse of the nationalist idea and the demand fox econom:lc
and

soci~:tl reform.•• 7
Pe:r.haps the most concrete evidence of this tendency

v1as the Asitm Hela tions Conference held in Ne1.v IJ(clhl :tn the

spring of 1947.

Delegates from tvJenty-ci;;b.t i\shm

countries ,,nd uther pol.ttical

6

entities~

Hobert Payne, I!le Hevolj! .Qf

Day, 1947), p. 290.

such as some of trw

Mhli

{Nelri Yorl': Joiln

7p. c. Spender, "Partnership with M;io. 0 " !M~!im.
#},f'fa1rs 1 XXVIII (~ramlm~y,l95J.), B05.

1"/

Republics of the

u.s.;;.n. •

ence.

hl~;tory

"\"!hen the

ati;ended tll:Ls histor1c confer-

of our pr esen·i; times is

1tJJ:i t

ten,"

declared tr1e Prim<J .Mlnisto:r of' India ln his address of
vlelcome B:t theopr:ming session, "thi.s event may WH11 stand
out as a landmark
future. '1

the

nei~

.'~hich

dj.v.tdes tr1e past of hSia f:rorn the

Tl1e Indian leader ·ctlUs exrrcssed tl1o lll<Janing of

era for Mlia:

A change is comine; over t!Je scene no1r1 and Asia is
again fincling herself. VH3 live in a t:r:>Jl<Hln<lot!S age
of transition and already the next [.t"ge takes iciiluJJEi
Vjbil n Asia tatces lw:r rightf11l pla.(Je wl th. ttw otno:r
continents • • • • In this crisis in world llis tory
Asia •i:l.ll .nace:lfHlXily play a vitnl r ,J.e. The countries
of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by oth.er<:; tlu;y
are bound to l1ave their 011Jn JlOlicies in l>o:rld ai'fa:L:w. 8
11ihile giving due credit to the ',vest for its contri•
btltions to h:.mmn

pro,,~:re~;s, ~1ohru al~:o

pointed to the

apparent inability of th•J Wentern lvcrld to prevent reounent
<oars.

Delegate after delegE;to follovled the Indian Prime

:1/Jinister to t.h.<; rostrum to voice the identity of :i.nterests
of tho countries of Asia and to emptmsize tho impoi tan co
of close collabo:ratlon among them.

After more than a

1;;~ok

of' round ta.blc: discus;: ions t thc Gonfereru:J<j voted to establish
an Asian Helutions O:rganiza:tion, to bs composed o:t' a Gena:ral

Council ood non·governmental national units in each of tlH.l

8,,/lsian Relations " A Henort of the l'xoccHldin"S and
;
---_'#
Docum~;mtatiml .9! :!:ill.!!! First {l~;J.an l1DlatioruL ~&renee,~
Delhi, March~AritlJ..9 121.1 (Ne<l Delhi, India, 1H48), p. 19.
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part:l.cipat:l.rl(,'; count:des.

Uah:ru vias later chosen P.resid ent

of th€; new Cot1ncil.
The Organization. 111hich has nomiro.lly been in

existenc<l since 1947 • j.s hardly more t;hnn

<J.

skeleton.

It

is a far cry from such olhbo:rate :reg:Lorml arrangements as
the O.rzanization o.f American Stateu or th't North Atlantic
Treaty O:rgttnh:atlon.

True tl:lough this evaltlation might be.

the :l.li<portance of it 1Jll is to be found in tl1e .role play<,Hl
by the As:i.an I\Glations Conference :i.tseli'• part;icipa1;ed by

no less than

tt~enty-ei:.;l:lt

Asian states,

t.he first real

!W

experience :fo.r the nevily-i'raed count r ifl s of

hSia

to oonfa.r,

coliimune, and oovi:>e on problems common to 1;t1em •

.Ano·t;her confElrooce in .Ne111 J:l'e.lhi• held in January,
1949, also.tw.d broo1d ililplications fox ftrclUG M>ian unity,

tion.

DGl'dt><'t·:>S :f'rom ninate(cln countrietl, mostly from ,'clcmtn

and .Sottthnas·t t>sla b11t :i.ncllldlnt::. also .sus tralia • N!Hv ;"ea1and,
and Ethiopia, called fo:r the v;i thdrmJal of Dutctl troops from

the arcas under the control of th<J Indorwsian Hep1blic ancl
.:Cor u t:.:nnsfe:r of sovereignty to a

Unit~:;d

states of Indones.i.a

They decided not to establish a

:_ --
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permanent organization, but ug:uwd to consult mo:r e
0

frequently and to cooperate more closely in ti1e f'uture.w
i'\
stat<J~3

resolut:l.on adopted ummimOltsly by the nirwteen

r.•spr.esfmted at th!l Gonfe:renco HJCOlrun<::rr.!ed trwt the

'

pa:rticl.patin:;; rwtions e::r.ploJ.'e the pOSf>ilJHit :Los for
:regionul arrang,vments Mlti'lin ·their areas, and tl1.at they
establish appropriate machinery to carry out such an
i.nvestigat:l.on.

.since

Austruli~J.•

areas" vJas none t;oo clear.

Ne•1

:~ealann,

Ghiiw., and

Prime Mini<; ·ter Noh:ru :revealed

tions When, in a speech to the Indian Parliament on

We i.1aven 1t ;vet d.ecided as to v;lw.t :region ttw.t
coonerat:i.on shonld ;r (~late to. Ind ta is in·tero steJd in
several regions of Asia and vlbether all of tiJEi so should
be groLlped tor;ether or dElalt Hi tt1 soparatel~: i<l still
to be (:ons5.L!erect.10
·
At that t:l.me Neh:r:u L:.id do•Jn

11

t11o conditions for any kind

9 "Delhi ConferE-mct'l o:f At;iutic Gountr i<1 s," Nation,
CLVll (,Tanuary 29, 1949), 113.

...
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(l) it must be

~Jttolly

'o'llthin the scope und spirit of the

Charter of tllc: Unltod rJat.i,orw;

~md

{2) i t nmst be largely

confined to consultation Bnd cooperation ;;ith "no blnding
covenant in it."
fi.:tlf:il.lsd

Obviom;J.y,

second of

tl1d

ttHiEO

fi

J::(,;gional ttfJt:ociation

1t~hich

eonditlom; ia doomed to

fo.ilu:re.
1i~ilereas

:lt

i};

significant that lndta took tl;e

initiative in calling tile Asian Relations Conf<:lrence of'
1947 tmd

tt1e

Conference·

011

Indonesia of 1949, both of 1Jihicn

leaders took a prmllinm1t part ir.\ th!:we conferences and

obviously

a~ta.ct1ed

great in:.J:J;:\xtance to them, it is mora

signi:l:'i<.H:lnt to note thut c·l though ImHa r,spire to leader-

champion cf iiSien caunes, she does not lQOk vJith. favor
upon propo;::aJ. s to establish a peX!Pllt1ont organization of
iwiun states,
tl:l~l

iliiihru ho.s flatly refused to .Join or support

proposal fox a Pacif'lc Pact.

Th<l

pro~;ram

for t.he

~Jconomic

development of south

and Sou.thoast Asi<A j.nitiated by the gc:.vernrwonts of Great

and. Ceylon, kno1:l!l as the Colombo Plan,. is described in a
\~11itc,

paper publl:>tl.B6 bj' the seven Gonw,on\vealth Govorrunents

concerned.

1'he Plan J:w.s bean much ••rittan about and i'ts
It poses blun·tly thtl

history is nm; lwown qui ta well.

question of how fax the Vltls tern peoples are ready to d.i vert
their resources to a vast region o1' i\.sia.

started in 191.)0

as a bold new venture of tll<> British Common>:H:Hilth to

Asia, its scope has since

•~idened

and the area or its

operation includes most of :oouth Asia.

Pakistan 1 Ceylon,

Nalaya~

tries ha.ve(•;been add<ld.

~l'o

lts orit;inal

and British Borneo--ot!Je:r coun-

The Uni tocl stat!w becruae a full

Indonesia. Jupan. Thailand, and the Pl:lilippin<JS nave also
joined, the last three only in 1954. 11

'Ctle Colombo

~erence.

J~.mu<tr;u_, ~QQ.

The

Ccnferenoe itself, held at Colombo, Ceylon, Januar·y 9-1•>,
l9bO, was unique in several respects.

In the first place

it oJas the first conference of all ti10 Commoll\18alth l'oreig;n
Ministers convened for the expressed pcu:pose of revie>1ing
"the international situation, including the broad economic

aspects" of the region.

11

2f

Second,

Robert Ivlu:rphy, "The Defense of Asia," Department
State Bullet:l.n, XXXI (November 29 0 1954) • 501.

• • • :i. t was tile :first occasion on Which representatives :from the IHM Asian Dominions of !ndia~
Pakistan ano Ceylon were admitted to th<~ inner (.:ouno:l.ls
of thiil Comwon~rJetilth and given an oppot,tunit:>· to express
trHlir _ vi(n>s on F'<tr gaster n problems .1::::

'l't1ird 1 the choice of meeting place I"JaS Si!;nif5.cnnt.

Held

in the capitaJ. city of' the youngest of tb.e independent;,

self-governin!;'; Dom:l.nions, it

1

~Jas

the fin;t Gommomvealth

conf<ll:ence ever convenod ln i;sia.
The main theme of the Colombo Confererwe Has probably
ex·:cresscd by D.

s.

Senanaya.ke, then Prime V4in:i.ster of

Ceylon, :i.n his kceynate address to the opening session.

~rt1e

fundamental problem of Asia, he said, I<Jas a.conomic, not

political.

It was tl1erefore n<Jcessury that positl va steps

be taken to attack 11sian poverty m:il improve tlw stt,ndt,rd

,,

of living • ] .a

To be suro 1 several strategic and eoon01nic issues
threatened any liltelillood o:r agreement on joint notion at
the ini tia.l pil.B!HiS of th"' conf.enmce.

·rha diSIJtrte bet<ieen

India tmd Pukil.!tan ovor Kashmir \vas one of many con troversias among members of 1;he Ccmmlonwealth.

The s11a:rp

differences in outlook: on such issues as th<J recognition of

l2John H. g, Cctr:t:-G.reg,~, '1'Jhe Colombo Plan."
Internatlomq,. QoncUiat!sm.t No. 490 (January, 1951). 16.

13Lo nd on TimeB • Jam:mry 10, 1950,

the Mao T:HJ-tune; regime in China or th" Buo Dai government
in Indochina showed ho>1 remota ware ·!;he possibilities of a

more or lsss unified Commomvealth fo:reign policy.
nu·t p:robalJly the most constructive :result to come

out of the Colombo meeting

~Jas

t11e Spender nesolution,

JTL_----~==~~~~~~~~~~~~~1~~~~~---------=====
named after its sponsor, percy c. :Spender, Australia s
1

Minister f'or

n;~te:rnal

conference.

In general, t,J-w Spende:r· nesolution :cecommende(,

ilffairs, at thtl latter stages of the

that the Corwnon•Jealth governments consider a pl'Oject of
economic coordination >Vlloreby each contributing mewbex

1~ould

provide material help to tne count;:r ies of t;outrwast Asia,
and proposed thut a Gorll!lloWrJ(Hll th Consultative Cotmui ttee be
set . UP to \-Jo:rk out practical measures for the developmG.nt

It has ooen allBged tlwt credit for takint, trw

initiative 1;<,s due "almost entirely to tlll> 1\Ustralian
Dep<ntmen t of

1 xte rnul

Affairs at C:anberx a. tvl'lere ton ·t;a tive

plans had l;eon formulated several months before the conf~>:r
ence opened," 14 Ho,.eve:r, one of th<J very first proposals

to renovate tha economic structure of the region came :from
sarda:r K. M. Pa.nikka:r, Indiun dir,lomat.

------

BGfore becoming

~I'he Htei·A)J:f.itldttm. tHin .fQ;cv;ardad. b,',l' tJ;1e, Co.rru:1VtHJeo.lt;.t1
,,Jnb~:tsii:\~;,don; to tl'll>i:r Govoxnm.onts us <t ;Joint p::cr·<lSill ..

A copy vJas al.:;Cf sent. it:t.t'ormally to .flfllt.:olm l',fa(;dor~;zd,d t
thi.:1 B:r ibiSt1 COI>l!t..iB.oiO!H>X G~!tlibl!<l. in iilir.l0 <1pO:l:£'i, t()
unttblo nJ.m to disct~ss it. at au~ inructttHtlt. confa:r~n4't~ t..Jt:·
th"' heads of British rdat:~ions wld.ch ~;as <lue to meet :!.n
flinga::o:r'"· I ~>iat3 told 1at;r;,.r l>hat t!l&J 1·toT:osal.o in ·t;iH:l
momo :i.'o:rm<Hl tl1~ bas:l.iJ of' disor.lssicms '"''hioh l.ed to thG
O"bO J:'.,
,.,.l..Q.
"f' 1,;
v
G~)
~

;i.tJ;

;r

~It

lG'.~LlOt!ld in Guy l;,int;, "Eot~tn hfrJ:l.&.: Unit~l o:t Vistmit~'•"
Intg!_[)J'"t:iJ;,lw.l Gonc~JJ,~ction. No. \196 Ciovombe:t: • l\!b4) 9 17'/o
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might involve poll tical strin.;s or oondi tions.

virtue of tt1:::

ne~J

But tilt;

plan v1as · that it c1id not envisuge simply

two sides or a contract, consistir)6 of ttlOse \vho v1ould ;:,ive
and of thosrcJ who vwuld recoiva.

It. \•isely recognized the

danger cf such <> rel,,tionstlip, Which sometimBB gives tile
recipient coun·tr:tes a sense o:f humiliation and the aid ing_____---c====
countries a feeling th:c:t they are being exploited.

Quite

the contrary, the Australian proposal introC:t1oed the
principle of mutual a:ld.

'rile aim t<as rathm:: to

spret~d

the

finanoii:Ll bur dan amono all the inttJrested cotmt ri<Os.
Finally • because the r eso LU:Cas !lHeded for tho
development of the region tvere likely to be cons1del'ab1y
moxe than ttJ.e Cotllfl!OmJealth itself could provide, th•> Spemder
Resolution pointf.ld Ol.lt that it 1r1ould be necessary to seek

the cooperation of otner atlvanc<:Jd industrial countries
outside the Camliiom;ea1 th.

'.rh:ls paved trw >·<ay for possible

United states partic:lpation.l6
in the proposed plan.

There vJas nothing exclu~live

It contemplated from the outset that

the non-ComB\On'<leal·ttl countries of BoutluHlS t Asia should also

be invited to join in ;Jhatever project could be devised for
joint action in the a:raa•

16r.ondon Times, January 6 • 1950.
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Viewed in the context of the entire Conference then.

ttw Spender Hesolution stands out as an act of s t;atesman~
ship that is rare in con·temponu·y history.

lind as for the

Colombo meeti.ng; itself, an editor i.al comment of t11e J:LQ!!!,_

i
I

York :;t:imes revievJing tile Conteren;;:e at that time v1as

reas sur i 11£ •

"The

N<H'~

Conmto n111 eal t; h, " it said ,,_'_.'i..,s.._.a....n.._"'l'"n""t"er..._-______====

member wants it to worlt ami because they all have common
interests and ideaJ.D in spite of disputes·on spacific
{ "'"' " " " 1 7
.,~...,)q.....,o,.;~.

'£l:le Colombo deliberations themselves were nighly

signiflcant f'or tt•o 1nain roasons;

First, it :reco.;nized

that '11\sie. is "'t the mo1;;en·t the main focus of into rest and

an a:c ea of special urgency."
~las

iiocorctingly • th<• Colombo Plan

evol VEld fox poolint;:; the resou:rc es of lllEmtber nut ions in

a project of mutual aid in \1ihich each 11'JOt:tlt1 give according
to its abil:l.ty.

secondly, to support trLts aid project, H

estublis hed e standing consultative n1echanism, the Plnn • s
"Consultative Committee rep:cesenting ths Gommont'Hoalth
Governments."

This piece of international macilirwry, once

dubbed "tllf3 pivotal body in the entire venturo,"

17~ York Time!!.• Ja!lU<il'Y 9. 1950.
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• • • is a gathel·ing of representatives, sometimes
ministers, sometimes officials, o:t: tho govermnents
taking part in the Plan. It weets at irregular
intervals 0 v;hanever the need f'o:c consultntion is i'elt,
and :t·t su.rveys tlkJ prot.;r•>s1; in the area as a vJhole,
discusses tllt~ relc.,tions of' one plan \'lith :,mothor 9 ani
debates questions of' economic and politicul nntura tV!lich
may be of interest to soma or all thEi oocmtries. It is
a very use!'ul £1. ,lliJc body .18

Government agreed to convene the f'ixst u.eeting of tl'le
Cons Jl tu ti ve Gomrni ttee in Aus·trb-lia VJhen the :reconwmnda tions
adopted at Colombo <Jere accepted by

th<o~

c;ova:rruuents

con.cerneil.

COllimittee met in Sydney on May 16. 1950, · That t.ll<'l conference should te neld in i<llt>tralia vms appropr.il.> t:e.
h<rve seen.

:tt

•1JUS

l~ust:ralian

~Je

the Gpende:r Resolution at Golombo >vl'l:l.ch

the idea f'or joint act:ton in the region.

la\~nched

As

'f.ile

Government llad "speci.nl· reasons fo:r t1lshi.n2; to

preserve pl:la.ce anti_ sti:Cbili ty araong tt11:; co<mt:r:tes of' th.l.s
area,"

In th6 f'irst

pla.ce~

llustreliao;; long-tjerm :tndust:rittl

expansion is closely linked 'lvith the future proqwn:.tlt.y of
Southeast b.sia.

--------

........----~-~·

Her natural markets a:r.e ti:J.ose close to 11ome,
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and as Petey Spender told the Austl'!';lian House of Representativas • "no nation can escape its geography ... 19
Moreover, s:l.noe >:orltl War II,

DUS t:ralia

has em<Jrged as ·b.he

most advanced indllstrial collntry :i.n t;tmt part of the 1tJo:r lu•
anct her comme:rd.ul :r elutions 111ith Asiun countries lw.ve

;['ar-:reaching st:rate.;;ic: inte;rosts in 'tile a;rea.
1:1'<1!

II tho country

Pearl Harbor.

\H:IS

During tiorld

in mortal peril after tlle attack on

Sinca Bo!ltheast &sia is tl1'" '1frontier" of

"a.bove all, :Lt is in

Ollr

interest to foster cmmnercial and

oth<':r contacts" with neighbo:rtng Asian cmunt:ries and

h~llp

maintain "stable ciemocratj,c governments in povu;:r. • • 1~20
The deliberations of tho Sydney conference fell into
three parts: sl1.ort-te:rm aid; long·· term aid; Hnd technical
assistance.

that the p:robJ.enu; of the
east M;ia

~~ould

Commom<~oalth

cot.1ntries :i.n :;;outtl-

no·t be considered apart; f;rom those of othsr

countl'ies in til" area.

19uc:u:r:rent Not;es on Interm.~tiom;l Aff'airs~"
9J: Exte:rm:q,_ Affairs J?ubl:i.c<'tions $ No. ::, (CanboJrr a~
February, 19!:\0), lito.
20~.

~pa:rtme11t

oQ
..,,,

could bll made mora svJ if'tly :i.f tlle initial steps """re ·i;alHm
by tllose ootmtries irJl1ich had a col1l!rwn bond and i:onm!on

interests,

lit the same tim.;; it v;as decided to invest:l.t;ate

immediately the polH;ibility of' Nider collaboration, ani the
committee therefore rocornmsnded

!:,_______"

trv,t

A toxmul upp:roac!1 sl10t:tld be made to Governments of
non.,.GommuJ<lartn cccm.trias ln sot1tl1 art! souttwast Iwi~ai".'---------cc===
informing 'cl1em of' ttHJ Committee • s dalibe:rat:tons and of
the cotuse of action no1rJ contemplated • These Governments should be inf'ormed ttw.t their full association
in the <mterur.ise woclld be welcomed by tho Cormncm:Joaltl'l

'

Governments. <:;t

Ttw:re v;as no time at Dydn<Jy to work out the deta:ns

of sucil p.xojsct and proposals lflere Hmd tted to a standil'lb
COI!Illlittee vlhich met in Colombo in July • 1950,

1'his meeting

was attended by representati vas of' all Commom,eal th govern·

ptupose 11Jas to plau practical
jll'Ol:)X!l.m

for the tndning of

rrH>IlSUXes t,o

,,;:;ian

oa.r:r:y out a

toCJl1nicians in more

advanced cotmtrier;, tl1a sanding of tochn:lcnl adv:tsers to
Asia and tha oquipm<mt or endowment o.f Asien scientific
and technical ins ti tq·t;ions. ~;2

2L:uoted :tn th•;J ;!,.onq££ ~..!• W1y 20, 3.950.
''2

!!!!!l!!.

485.

.

.

'"' "Gm:rent, Notes on. International Af:i:'a:tl:sa" D<Jg~u:t.2£ Ext•n'nal Affairs E.!aE1f~~. No. 7 (,July, 1 5o),
.
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k'lll9.2Jl

Q9nf.C!!~££.•

~:j,pten~. l9f&.

On

fleptomber 6• 1950, a team of expert;s f:rom d:l.r:eerent commonwealth countries met :ln London to ntudy the 1ndlvidcWl
stlitement;s

~.:ubm:i. t

ted by the

~·,:outh

!\nj.un government1; and

aor:rela:to them :i.nto a slngle s:i.x-year p1•og:ram of develop-

mont.

)Prom this comprGhensive data tl1o Nin:Lsten; of tho

Cowmltative C:mnu1lttee t10Ulci determine hovu much of t.l1;s

developmunt VJOX k

bo f'inancea by the i\d.ttn

cot~ld

from thoLr j_ntornal

l'~>soLu:ees;

how

rru~etl

cocmt:ri<~

s

£rom the ma.;jor

Commonwealth countries; and hovJ much from count.rles outside
the C'J!l4'1lonweal th or from inttJ:rest<ld .intetnaticnaJ. 1i(';(>nc:ls s.
:fil6 f'lnal prod;rams 1·1e;re .frr>liKKi in the lic;b.t of t~Jo

sets of consi.derations.

The f':i.rst involved t,l:J12l hcUniHl an:l

nw.tex iril pot <ontJ.l'lJ.i t:t<. s and tne second, the availatd.J.i ty of

financial r<JciOLl.rces.

'Jlw other determining factors >1ere,

first and foremost, thG available domestic :r<lt;ou.roes, then
·tllfil

sterlir.ig bulum.:es mi.i cont:ributi<lllS from the mon,

highly developed Connnonwenlth coun-tries, end finally,
probabhl 'Jxtenlctl f:lnance from pxivate, govexnmental, Bnd
intez:gove:mmental SOlttces.

!n this (;onnection, t>vo

highly significant statenwnts voe:re nw.de, one by tiw

J?re;;ident. of' t;£1<" International nnnk for

Heconst:n~ction

and

Developm<mt, nue;ene Black, before the London Conferen(:e

be<>an; and the other by the then Unit;ad i:Jtat<>s Gecretaxy ot
State • D<lan G. Acheson, after the close of the eon:f'arence.
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Eugene Black Ha£1 reported as :1aying on septombe:r 8 in Paris
that the bank vw.s

11

vi tally interested" in the Comwon»ealth

•>'3
program.'""

Cec:r<Jtary Aeheson pled,;ed full United staten;
at.ion vlhBn ha spolte at
October 11 1 1950.

1.1.

\-'lashington

ne•~s

coop~Jr-

conferance on

·:r11e fo:rmer · .ecretary oi' state tvas

reported as say:L'1g tl:wt the United states was in •1completEJ
sympathy" >-Jith tl'Hl proposal :for a six~yea:r p:ros:raw.24

He

ttlii; same objec-tive tn ScluthcH1St Asia s.nd expressed tlle

hope ttw.t it; Nould bEl possible to

dove~tan

the eiTort:s of

botll.25

I

1
I

London mo0tir]c, had to base i1;s dec.tsions.

One deals

~Jith

technical as>::Lstance; the otffi r witr1 economic development.
Both. are 5.nt<lrdspendent.

For any major development in the

Xl'lgion \•Jas likely to r<squi:rt': a very considerable arllOLUl'G of

technical aid and tr1e:r: ,;foHl

th<~

cooparati ve employment of

teclmical abll:i.tiiJS vJould have t.o ple.y «n :lndispem;al:le
part in tlH; over-tell prog:ram.

TiHl formulation of' a

23~choster Q:lardiau. September 9. 1950.

24N.m:!. X£~ .:t!Jl!~, OctobGr 12, 1%0,
2"0 A similar sta ternent was made by George c. Iv!cGheo;
in the Dera:rtm(:jnt of Stat<J Bulleti-n, XXIII (October ;::;o$

1950)~

698-7or:--- - -

:regional twon.om:tc pol:tcy f'o:r Douttwast; Asla >ms 1 the:refor e,
ach:teved •
. In tlHs last analysis • ·t11e Co1mllbo Plan created a

bet\veen them and the WEwtern count:ties Ntl:l.cll can provi.dEl
· capital o:r loam; vo:Ld o:f any poli t:i.<:<D- condi tlons.

This

would allay any f'oa:r that Western Gccnom:l.c aid v;a:J a means
of :revlvins '·:"storn imperialism.

Yet it meant also the

imposing a political un:l.ty ''mong tl::td

''"monc, th.t:

hm gover'.lmen·ts.

dif.ferllnt connt:r iGJS tu.J.dng pa:r t in tl'l.s plan, by

sendin,1 /Wib.ns ub:roud for training, it
technic tans

~<litiJ.

cJ:eat<~d

a supply or

a comnopoli ·tan outlooh: who :l.n t;u:rn lJJill

influanc<> publ:\.q opinion on partic1Har quest:!.ons 1.n tlwir
respective

cow11un.iti~::s.

1'oo rnuo11 cannot be c.xpectec\ of the Colombo PJ.an, and

the consoqcbncnr.l :i.n promol;iue::; a lastinb unity 1tJitl1in the

re[S:l.on cnn he

ex.r~t;c,exated.

HovJcver • i.n the op1.nion of Guy

Th<l sign:l:t'icant ach.tevement oi' th!5 Golowbo Plan has
been to strem~.th'' n tlle count:r ie.s of the r. eg:ton
indivldm:~.lly.
He:nl, of course. it tmr:l had an effect
upon trw stability of th~ vJl.1ole nrEJa. For the economic
collapse of any Bin;_;le uount:ry, or revolutit>n iu any of
them duo to economic cau:ccs, t<~ould have d<leply d.5.s·tu:rb~
ing consequences throtl(ShGUt ttte region. 'l'he 'Iagl:'f!S of'
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success o.f the Plan • • • may decide wheth<:~r or not
South !isia is to go Communist.
The parcaption o.f this
has led Communists every<ihere to attack the Plan
bitterly.26

activities of' ttle Unl ted Nut :lons, in scope, achievement •
and perhaps ln

Llltimt~te

sit;rliflcance, are its operations in

economic and social fields.

As stated in k\rticle I of the

Charter. the third um.jor purpose o.f the United Nations is
the achievemont of'
• • • int;ernational cooperation in solving intel'national pxoblems oi' an economic, sociol • cultural, or
humanitarian character • ana in promoting and encouraging respect for human rigilts and fundamental freedoms.
The Unitetl Nations ls thus concerned n()t only vlith the
maintenance of peace but also vJi th promoting ·tl18
tions under 1rJilich genuine peace v<ill be possible.

condi~

As

c.

Virt;ually all regional activity of.' ·the inte:rnld.tional
agenci"s bears directly or indizactly upon the problem of
planning for tr1e economic develOl)l!Hmt o:f the t(3gion of
Southeast Asia. Indeed. in th6ir conferences and in
the studies of their Bec:retariats. tt1ls is tl1e l1eart

25v in t. !lli..

ill• •

p. l<lO.
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and marrow of their \~ork~-to arranoe for the exchange
of vie>;,~i, i;o assemble information, to prepare analyses,
the central Qbjeative of vJhich is to facilitate the
planning for the econoinio development of th<:• region.27
Accordingly then, .'•ith ''unprecedenten qnanimity,"

th~:;

fifty-

nine me:ubers of Lilo United Nations approved • on November 16,
1949, un "expanded pro;;ramme of t;;;ctmicul

as~istance

for

l------a-eane-m-1-c-d-e-v-e-1o-pmen-t-o-f-'------u-nd-e-.r--d-ev-e:lo-p-ed-c-o-utrt:t.r-i-es-~!-th.r-ou6~h-------'-

the United N&tions and the specinl.ized ageno;i,es.

action by the General Assembly

~;as

This

heralded by its P:nn;iden·t,

carlos P. Romulo, as "one of the most constructive a<rts of
international statesmanship ever undertak<m unde:r the
auspices o.f the UnHed Nations." 28

Tho objective of tt1is program vJas mo6est and realistic.
In a report prep1ued by the 13ecretary-Clenarru on teclmical
assi:>tance to under-developed countries it said:

••The basic

aim of outside technical assistance to under-developed countries must be to help themselves, am< to diminish tt1eir
dependence on external a1ct.ot29
'l'here are 'three advantages of a proo:am of technicul

27G. Har Sclmaf, 11 Bconomic Coopera·tion in Asi& •"
!gte:r national .iliill.~ilia tion 9 No. 4B9 (April; 1\'i50), 224.
2BQuotocl in ••Technical As,.> is tunoe :!.'or Bconmuic D<lVelopment; P:ro,":ramme of' til.a United Nations and the ~lpooialized
Agenc io s," :rntern<•.tio!!!1l, Conciliation, Ho. 489 (Jammry •
1950)' 3.

29uni ted Nations Docum<mi; B/1327 dat<~d ];Jay, UJ49.

c====

assistanc<J developed under .:.ntern<i'tiotwl auspices.

:First,

such a program allays the fears or unda:r,.developed countries tha.t attempts vJill be mnda to dominate them.

There

will exist • ttleiHfore, a receptive atmot>phare essential to
accomplishment.

A

second reason is 1mccinctly expressed

in the preamble to the Economic end Social Council Hesolu-

tion on EJconomic Development of Under-developed Cormtries:
1\ so1.md ;ln terna tionel probrarrune of' this character
must oombine and make use of tho experience of many
nations .vith different soci'-'1 patterns und. cultural
tradi ti<Jns and at different sta,;as of development, so
as to facili ta:t;e proc_.ress in the less advanced countr i<lS and to help solve ·ttwi:r technical and <<~~orwmic
p:ro bl0uu;. 30

A thi1•d HHJ.son \why an inte:rnationt<l prot;;:ram may be more

ef:tactiVti liss in the nature of meny of the problems 1n Vltliuh
interm,tional action is essential.
?pidemics and insect pes 'Cs • such as loeus ts • do not
respect national frontiers. Th<lir control must be
organized on an internat:lonal basis. sonHl otl1er
problems are :regional. in character, traru.H:ending national
lines us, :for example, tha technical control and use of'
:rlve.-u; flovJing throug;h more tl:1an one country w1d the
eftic:iant organization of' ce:t:tain transportation systems.

In other fields inter national stand axdization and
uniformity are :i.mpo:rtant • as for example, in the
facilities and regulations of inte.rna tionv.l aix transport and in th<J c;o11!i!9tion and classification of certain
types of statistics."l.

30"Technical Assistance for E:conomic Development,"

.!2£.. cit •

-

31Ibi_a_.
,
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ECAFT:.

A 1no:re determi.ooa. affo:ct to treat ttle south

Economic Commission for AS:l.!i !ind tho Far East--S<lt up by
r~cosoc

\~or kind

Is

aSi~:t

Group for

and trw Far East mea tin;;

at Lake i3ucaess in February, 194 7 • to parallel similar
bodies for Bu.rop;a (EC!O and Lutin Au1erica (EGL!<).
ECfiFI>, like the Consultative CoJ;;m:J.ttce of tile
Colombo Plan, is interested in all plans for economic
development in the area.

ever, be understood.

•n·
. n·t:ltu.~.ne
. 1 e o·"
._~,.

·t t

~.-.
'•"'1''
'"'
.t'.;'...~J:'!...!'
.-::. Mh.otS

It is not an executive body.

Its

primary func t:t on is to g:!.ve counsel, to cond uc·t rosear cil,
and to sugg<wt policies to goV<lrnments, but not t;o takB

act:!.on.

I.t cunnot itself execute >•Jhat j,t may :recow.llumd.

It. is a

Cormnittoe.

llWX o iornml body tl1an

t llo Com;ul t~;t ti ve

!t possesses a permanent secr<;,ta;d.at, elabou,to

!ind fairly otlstly, »hich ensures conti11uity of activity
inte:r<;Ert,

llecausa of the na turo c1f its very funcl;ion

l'll'tl

ECiiF!~

has cause\1 tl1e problems of tlle t<Jg:ton to be consicleted as a
>·<hole.

In 1949 ~ for exarnpl<> • EC.w::;, t.mde:r its Executive

secretary, one P. u. Lokom•than, made u survey oi' the

.f'aoto:r s and problems underlying
ment of tho region.

llli!. surve,Y,,

pases pub15.tlhed on June

~17,

post-1.~a:r

econoro.ic develop-

a book of over five hundred

1 9•1~; • VJilich t;i ves a :f'Llll

analysis of tile s:ti;uation in 1949• was pro-.luced in collaboration amon.s ttlu 1!:CtiFE neoreta:riat at Bangkok, th<l

I
'·
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Secxetariat :1t Lal;:e success, and the specialized agencies.
Goverr'Jnents i.n the region supplied published mat<Jrial and
some appointed correspondents to co-ordinat&l info:rmation.

The ECAFh: necreta:riat visited most c:ount:rief; of the region

I

to collect datH

t~nd

consult with i!,OVermnent :officers.

-.

Of

Bulletin the follo>·iir)€; year carried an article l:Jt1:tctl hncl

as its ttlesis and title: ugconomic nurvey of' 1\c>ia and

ti:~<;

Far E;ast Faces Healiti<:~s of' Hegional S:l.tt:tation,"Z>2

It
ECAF'P~.

1110 uld

be foolish to under -rate the infltlence ol:' .

lt c:reates a climate of opiniont and gove:rnmen'ts in

their o1rJn actions havo; bean increasingly
It fosters a sense o:f :regional tlnity.

influ~mced

by lt.

ECJ\F.f has b<3eU

called the "ecouomic }Ja.:rliament of Asltt."

J:±l:ti• Though

JJ;Ci\1'1~

:l.s .not an executive o:r gan • thG

United NaUons does possese in the •rectmical l\S;>istance

Board an executive a:rm.
Asia.

This too has been actlve in South

Its ei'foxts nad been very much lilre thon" of the

Colombo !?l1m.

'!he individual ,:.;ove:rruuents have been aided.

The nurnbel' of technicians in the area 11as b<HJU increased.

"''"
w;;.,
gconomic

Bu:rvey of' ASiH and. ttw Far E:ast Faces
I'Jat:l.om1 nulletin
Realities of Hegional Situation," United
;;.,;;;;;:.;.;;.;:;;;
~----·-'
IX (July 0 1~150). 9-lO.
;")

-
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Ideas have

b~en

in trod tw<;d.

popuJ.a:r. :tzed.

Ne>1 conct~pts have be~m

.'

l\ntl the Board has helped in m: <Jatin[£ a new
.....

climate o.f' op:J.nion in I'Jllich all the countries of tile reg:l.on
urgently demire to employ up-·to-date kno1riledge in tho

'

I

solution of

~~i.l<lil'

problems..

'f.o tile extent that tl1o coun-

..

txies t1ave b<oGn encoi.J.:rag<cJd to believe ttw,t; the vJay to
proe;res;; l:hls in thfiir wotl.(in;;, togetile:r, and to the extent

that tt1e strel}6thEm:l.ng oi' ttwir economies has reduced dis-

factor.
To be sure, the cmc\oxlying dit:"J:'icultier> oi' Elconomic

But many of ttl'S dlff:tculties con-

cooperation are leg.l.on.

.frontlne; eoonOJnic cooperation themselves oonta.in ml.tlcating
or balancing :f'ac tors.

outs tanding grounds for op tim.isrn

~&r~~:

(1) th<~t problmns con.froni;:lng the region are quite similar

from country to cotmtry.

Since

~d.mil1u

pioblems usually
-

require similar solutions, tho countr:!.ofJ of th,,

ragim~

will increa,;ingly ttu:n to ono anot.h,Jr i.n tl1<1 GVo1ution of

concert<id ef:tor ts tov,,uxd zc;o(;nomic development.

(i~)

Of'

even t;HiatGr. nisn:tficanc<l tl1.<l.l1 the poverty of I;s:ta is the
fact that ti1e people of Asia are b<':lcomine:, avJar<J of :tt.
FNerywtwre tlltiie is an awal;:en:i.ne:; to tl1H possibility of

improvement.

If r<Jg:l.onul. economic efforts to date 11ava

uniformly been directed t;o'""rd tile problems of economic

...

'

--

-

unreasonable to suppose ttlut governments and people

~<Jill

wish to incr <H:J.se and accelerate thBse cooper atJ.v<' ei'.fox ts.
(3) The economies of' the .region are complem<Jt1ta:ry tvi tl:l one

another, and complementary t:rade
industrializu tion procemds.

:l~J

likeJ.y· to it1crease us

Pos t-Har

J~,pan,

India» unci

th"' countries of tho '<:estern pacHic cot).lt\ be o:<'Gstandln"
examples.

(4) the rise of' nationalJ,sm hau ud V<'ltlthg;es as

tvell as ciic.adwmtHges.

1-unong the

advmrt;a~ses

is the

probable impxovemt'lnt of goven1m<mt efficicmcy, notably ;Ln

thoo e officall

affairs.

de~:tlint: ~lith

:Lnt<l:tr!tltional and regtonal

(5) Lvst but not least, the Un:tt.od N'J.t:i.ons and

its :c;p,:; ci.nlized .a,:,eneies h<.wa been inc:r"asi.ng t(;ei:r

emph<u>is on ec<Jnomic pxobl<'Jms in !lsia. the ix :regional
<Jrgans pr<Jmot;ing rcJgio.nal me<Jtings and confe:Nmces 0 and
their

Secreturi<~ts

1snrvlng the coun·t;ries of til<;; a;rea.

result is tn.z,t countries of tlw region

~~hose

'£he

rUre(lt

relations are nlal'Ied by dist:ru.,;·t -and SUi:ipicion are m<Hlting
at :r.egionl:ll coni\Jrences and di:;icuss

·~o

tf16it

mutual advan-

tage, common p:oblums upon 1rll1ici1 they vlot:tld not otlm :n11lse
consult.

The United Nations and th<J specialized agcncJ.es-ECiiFR, ttl<::J Interno.t:i.on<ll Banl<: fox Hr1oons tn1otion and

Development (.the Bank)» International Hei.'ugee Organization
(!HO), thG :Food and Agricultural or,~anizatiun (FJ\0), the

-~~-------

-
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World Health O:rganization (1JIHO), Irrliermrtional L(-lbor
Organization (lLO), International IifJonetary J!'und (the Fund),
International C:!.vil Aviation Organization (CAO) & international t:ra.inirw; centers provided

UJJ,icex

LJN,o;sco--in their

regional organs and efforts, ,,;:, ,,, pOt>J€ll'ful force for

..

economic cooperation.

Since muHncipH tion in South liBia r:ame at a time
¥ltl6ll

economic conditions in most of the countries of

ttH:l

area \oiere worsening rath,lr than improving, t!Hll'e 111as bound
to be d :tfJillusJ.onment about the ne\ll poli tloal institution:;
111hich lvould tend to

some.

Jll~;:J,ke Goinmunism

appear attractiVC'I to

After ttl<; victo:rv• of the Communists in China the

declaxed Under !C:ec:reta:r;y of Sta·te Hobert Nuxphy, "is the
.faet that

t;hG

fall of China

!.11MJ

provided tho Collllmmist

movemsnt throughout Asi&• for the first tim.e, oJlth a firm
Asian base." ::0

All of South Asi>.1 • because of th<J des per at€

poverty of

of thu region, se<Jllled at that tim•'

nm<:h

tc~

be
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exposed to the Cowmunist advance.

The Western potiers,

thert3f'ore, in their. ovm interest, developed plans to
increase their ass is tanco to th<J new governmen·ts o:i' LhiJ
South Asia region and to J:wlp them in tile reform of their
economic system.

Besides their. participation in thB Colombo

Plan and tho United Natj.ons agEmcles. Western gov"rnments
have given considerable aid on a bilateral basis; otll<JI

nations outside the area have also sought to participc' te
in its economic developmE<nt.
In his rnauglual. Address of J<:tnuary 20, 1949,

President :rrum.:.n outlined four courses of il!lla:ricaxl foreign
policy.

l'hG fi.ts t course ill thd continued un.tal te ring

support of l;i1u lJn1ted Nations und its :relf>ted agencie::;.

The second course is tt1e continuinG. of programs for 1.io:t:1(1
economic rscovory.

The tr1ird is tbt': strengtheninG of

;f';rer>dom-lovlng nations against tl1e dal'lgers of aggression "by

providing mil:ll;a:ry (l.(lvice and eqtlipment to trwse nations
VJhich v; ill 0oope:c ate vii th us in the maintenance of peace

and security •"

'£tie foLuth course of action is found in the

portion of thu President 1 s Inuugural.hcld:ress co!llich reads:
We mu"' t •am bark on a bold ne1rJ program for niUkit~g. the
benefits of our scientific advances and our industrial
proc;res:o available fo:r the .i.mprovement and ~:,:ro<Jth of
under-developed a:reas • , • 1.ve should maJse available
"to peace-lovin>G peoples ttl<> bGnt,fits of our store of
technical lmowledge in ordex oo twl.p ttl<Jm :roaJ.ize
their aspirations for a b<Ott<:~:r. 1Ue. And, in ccopexation "ith 0 t;ll<>r nat.ions, VJC should foe, ter c:api tal
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investn1611t. in areas nc<c1aJ.ne, development. Our aim
should be to help tho .free peuples o:f' too world,
tluotlgh their mvn efforts, to pxod uc e more food 9 more
clothing, more materials for housing. and more mecillin
ical pmve:r 1;o lie;h ten their burdens.
Apparently :ttH> chief reason for announcement of vJhat

has siuce been knovm as the Point I•'oLu Proc;ram Mls ·t;J:lat the

as the anHvHJr to a searcl1 for som<J dramatic highlie,ht.

Certainly, it soon bacam<rJ clear that, as ,:rarnc;s Heston
once said, "tht; speech pr<:cede6, the policy.••34
President T:ruman•s call for a "bold new

pr%:r~lllt"

But
of aid

to under-devolop<Jd areas aroused grc:a't interest and

Gnthusiasm

tl"u:ougl:w~

t tile non-Communist

~>'Orld.

!laid

on Point Fou:r Leg;ielation before the Fo:roign A.f'f'airs

CoaunittoG:
• • • the President • s ch~:,llon~ing pn;po1ml for
h<Jlpj_ng trw masses of people of the world to improve
ttteir livine; comil.tions nas aruused grE;at in·t<JJ:'i:Jst,
great enthusi<lSl!l 1 and (·>reat hope throclghotlt thr.o vJorld.
Ther<d already is evidence tbat mc,ny poopl~J in many
countries l:wve been~Q.uiok to grasp its implications and
its poteni;ialiti(>s.c'5

35

"Point 1rour l~eg1slation," ..Qj:lpartment:_
Bulletin, )i:Y.I (October 10, 1949), 5:12.

.£!.£ Stt;.ta

--~·------·

-

.

!.11 a speech in New Yor !\. in

~Iay,

l'iHSO$ George v.

fl11an. Ml:;istLm·t Decreta:::y for Puhlio .Affaira in t!HJ

:.it~:>.t.e

J.?:as obv.i.oLtsl;! bott1 :-JfJl.:f'1!3hnBS~I ~-j.,n£1 Et.lt:ruin:m 1n
·rrmmm •t; TJropot\Sil. It \•iUS sel!ish boaau!:H'l •
thfi p<mae of
t~or1d <J.nd th1:1 :Jamu$.ty <>i' t.t<e Unit,ld
1'be:r.t:~

~~r.

#

c--------.:E_:-t-a:rt-~:r~_,:-tltJ]~·:-(:rntlS11J.fO:n-tl'1fi::-1.'H.'fl-1-i:rt·rlrl60f'-t:;11t)

op~ld

tffl1f<?rt ... tiT~VGli-;__;;--------=====

naL.l'.ons.

en tho t<;th-&;;r hhnd, tllis plan

ttl<l

•

unUod 3t<•tes

.,,~;s

ltHi~.~ fJltrtli;~rti<t b<~oa.LlSG

not aoel>:1nt, tmy politV•al favors.

It VHJS ~iski:ng no .I:Jl'i vilai._1eS for: imH~rric~t~n tn:uslnes~:.
e;riilat~,;r Lli<JJl thosa accorded to bus1n.ess111en
any
othGr CGtU1try~ And t-.l'H~ United St;att1S WUS VJll1iil,b to

i'rorr1

<:ont:d.buj;;~;J
"'"'!}

·1¥1'"': ,-,.~,
,:JD
]. .. .r..vqJ..<A.u""•

mox e tt-.;Jn :i. ts proport:Lom1 ta <lha.re in thi:.;
bv

"

said:
~
~ JJJJ~t,tjc,x emx.J:&nsls 1~~ to be pltH.::ed upc.n th:U-3 ty})<i
of ncl:iv5.t;y. \dhat hO.VB he<m th<.> scattcl!G(i ~>.ctivit:l.ldS
of bm.iin<::;s nnd t,~ove:r.nmnnt ttl1B t«> bH br<H.1;c;ht tou;ethu:
It

and

m~dlli:l

import~trJ'tt

,a

me~lo.r pn:r·t <lf om: i'GXIidgn pol1c:1es.
:tt is
tc fttte.ek t.t.tt:: p:robJ.·,·,:-u;. f~~J a \ihoJ~~~ ··:;.ncl tQ

tlndnrf1ttuld ·that toohn1cn1
d(-3\i(tlc;nmt3nt~

:;~s~·d.. st;nrH~I.3·

c:;.nd

O\l\1:XBBt.lS

vJllJ have. connttJ.ntly inc;rtoag1ng :lrn_po.rt.ancls

for Jndiu:s to

QtJltte,.'::S""/

Do iJ o Gthr!d

(auly 4,
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• • • Hid tllu effor·t;s or thH peoples of economically
areas to develop their resources and
improve tt1t1ir ;,;or kin:; (mel l:Lv:ln3 condi ti.ons by encouraging trH; exclmr~ge of technical kHOvlledge and slcills ali\
the floN of investmant o<:l]jit;(tl to count:r:ies \1ll1.ch
provide conditions under vlW.oh such technical assistance
&nCi C!.ipl tal can effectively and oonstructiv,sly eon tribute to rais :l.ng standards of living, creatine nev;
sour cas of' vJoal t h, incr· c;asing J,JXoduc tiv:t ty lJnd expand ...
ing purchasing povH>r.
unda:rdevelop~;d

laterul "technical cooperation" pro5rams, and dlrected the
President to set up macl1inery for uiministre:t;.ion and
coordination. including
tives of' private

1:irl

advisOIJ' boar(l

\~it,

h :r.apresunta-

indt~stry.

In November, 1950 0 Gordon Gray, vJho had been aslwd by

President Trumtifl "to study l;ho vJhole complex of' om: :foreign
l'<lltJ

tio:Js," I<upo:rted thut aid to under-developed

0lHlas \~as

"more impo:ctant than ever to tho seom:ity and Vlell-beinb of

"formulated some promising economic measures •1i til

respect

to these areas," they '1l1ave not been pressed 11ith the vigor
th.at thG sttuHtion requires, arxl tl:wy have r!Ot yet been
fused into a sufficlontly effecti.ve program. 1140
President Trumar; next asked tha Internutional Develop-

40Goxdon Gray, !iGport to th" President on Foreign
Economic Policies (I ashin,,:, ton, D.C. : Go vermuent Pr inti no
Ofi'ice, 1950), PP• ti, 9.
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citizcms headed by Nelson Rockefeller, to consider G:ray•s
proposal" "as its first task."

In March, 1951. th0 :Board

issued a s:l,;nii'immt repol't Which ;vas as bold in its concaption as tile Gray Heport and WcliCh

Bpell~lll

recO!lllllEmdations in much greater deta:tl,

out its

The Hockef'eJJ.er

Board v;as careful to ernplu.owize that trw prot::;tarJ! of aid to
under-developed ar0as vms an ef;sential contribution to the
promoti-on of

LUOH:I

stable economic conditions i.n t.ile

vlorlct.4l

of Senator Taft that it ;,iould become a kind of global \!Pi>

pro,;:ram and "a pormunent policy of givln12, our X11oney a<,Jay. "42
The Executive continued to tallo:r. its :requests fox }'oint
Fou:r to the d lmG.nslons Ntllch Con.:s:r(>SS WOLUd tolerate.

Both

1>Jithtn am1 <Jith.out the Government there tms st:ron;;; feeli11g
that the United BttJtes should raise its stghts in this area
o.f' its foreign policy, bottl because I\merican na:tionel
interests vwu1d btJSt bfJ served by a t:rr11y bold prot;ram oi'

4l"PEtl:·tne:rs h1 Pro 2,HlSo.;&" R8po:;:t o.f' M1o President 1 s
Irrtern6.ti.onal LcveloplJlent Advisc;ry Board (l;astlington, D.C.;
Gov,n•nment P:rintirg Office. l95l), p. 63.
42~ York ',Ci!J!!lll, June

e,

19fJO.

43,JIJmes f, Vial'CUXg, Ji:Oint Four: Our Gllanca to itchieve
Peace v:ithout Fear (\,·i&shingtoo_; D.c.: ilutllor 1 s Publication,
1949). p. 98.

4'7

:Foreign Holat:Lc:ns on tho Point Four Leg;:i.slat;ion, SccJ:etary

of state Dean G. Acheson tee; tif:l.ed as follolh;;
We c:re spending billlons :for military defense-as vle must. ','Ja axe spend irJL other billions for economic reconstn<ction ln Europe a.tYc vl'tal po:.tnts in tl1e
l"ar Bast-··as we must. v;e are or,;aniz:.tns jo1nt defense
·through tlw North Atlatltic Treaty Organization Hnd the
r--------ll1:t.L:tt-arp>ssist.unce J?:ro,;ram. l~e are organizinc:, jointo------c---====
action to removo trade barriers through ·tar:lfi' and
.reclprocal trade aii;re<Jments and t;hroug;h thr.; International Trade Org<cnization. U3 Ul'll attempting to Xffi1tOVa
the CG!UE,es of intsrnatton;,l friction and .misuuderstandLng by playinc; <Ul active rol"' in thD United Nations.

All thiJSs tl'linc,s >ve do a:r <:, in the lust; annlysiz •
measure of nation~cl security • • •
The legislation th!it ts before you, this ''Act fo:r
Int.:.:u:nutionu.l DDvelopmentn has tl:.t.:J same b.road }.iU.tposo.
In a very real sense, it lEi' a security mel;sure. And
as a sect:t.rity maasn:re. it is un i.:J:nlenti::~l uru cf ou.:c
foreit,n rctJlicy. • • 44
.

Pres:i.den t •rruman, f'or ·his part, also declared in an
address before the annuaJ. convention of the

paper Gu:tld in \'Jashingtonf D.

c,,

on June

icllH.l!

~.6.

lean

NevJs~

1950:

• , • >Ve must not b<> misled in't;o tl1inking tl:J.ut our
only ta2:>l:t: ls to cteate de.fennrJ:~~ t:tt~uinst. a . . ;<~rasnlon.
Our l·llwle ptupo~H:J in c:ceatillL a r:trong defonse is to

ptirm:l.t o1S to carry on ti:Hl gr0at construct:tve tast-es of

Behind the shield of a strong dei'ense, we
bring aboqt battEn' living
conclitlons in 'btle free nations • • • • In a Norld dark
111itll amu:etwnsion, th<J Po:tnt Fonr idea offers ne>J
hope ,4!5"
peace.

ml\st contimle to Norlc k

. CHAPTJm III

"Asia is conscious of' herself,

Century h<J.s begun."

Witti these

t~ords

~~nd

the Asiatic

Robert pay no, an

.lims:r icun jourrwlis t and teacl1e:t, clot;es llis book on the
Revolt .2[ i;slan an event vlhich he describes in 11j.s opening
senten;;e as "the gr(;latest singlH event in hUman history. 111
\rirites !,in Yutang in a book titl<ld, Bettveen

I!!~

.!l:llii

Laug,htor, "The enleXgence of i;sia--and I think of' Hussia
as half-1\siatic--is the one gxeakst single fact of tllis

tmr," a ph(>.nomenon tvhich

rHl

----

of tl1a ere of emperialism.

descrlbes as "simply iG£_ !i!Jl\1
Nothing is going to stop it. u2

HovieV<.>r much one may quo,;tion th"se am ottwr
'

similar intc;rp:r:etations, tr& fact is, as OvJen Lattimore
emphasized in .IB§. §ituatiou.J.!!

~.

that the greatest of

the continents is nm• "out of control, 110

Another Ilsian

observer, ''lt appears to me, 11 decl<u:ed Pxime Minister
Kotela~mla

o.t' Ceylon in l9f>5 before the 'ilorlti Affairs Council

·----lnotert Pa"ne,
Day, 1947), p, 1, "'

·.rne
--

--

nevolt of Asi~;~ (New York: Jbtln

2Lin Yutan.g, Betvw<m Tears ancl l,.aughte:r (NHifl York:
John Day Company, 1943), p. 20.
'7.

.

QvJen Lattimore, Ih!!. Situatio!) 1!1Mia
Little, .B:rown and Company, 1949), r p, 3-lz-:---0

(Ne\~

York:
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of l\1orttl6Xn Californi<t, "that t!le social revolution in Asia
has not s·till. been fully grasped by the majority of people.

partioulDrly. may I submit. in this paxt of the world. , ,"4
Asia is assuming a nevi ond more significant role in world

1~•
~

politics.

James A. M.iohana:r dasc:ribes the voice of Asia

a~s------.--.--.--o_n_e <_lf- -ti-l~- ,-n_n_o_"_t

v_o_i_c_~-~s--5-.-n--th--e---------------======

__s_i_g_·n_if
__i_c_a_n_t__

__

___________

l~orJ.d today.

On \>hat happens in J",s:la rnay depend \>hat
happens a fEnJ y<m:rs from no111 to p6ople in Frunce and
So11th ilfrica and ttlc; United States.t>
'l'tuJ "revolt of M:iia" llWl.Y provo t;o b€ ttH> most signi-

ficant event of tile

forces

t~nich

t~amtieth

century.

F·or events and

aro absorbing th<J at"t;ention of thB .:es·be:m

tVorld tQday, 1r1tum compared in :retrospect, may c;ppear ·to

British ilistorian [md

cat~tions

prophet, in nls monumental

volu.m01 ventures the pn;diction that evcm the chullongo of

Communism
• • • may come to se0m a small af'.t'air t;hcm the
proLu.bly far more potent civilizations of India and
Cld.n"' respond in their tt1:rn to oLu Wes'cern challen._;e,

--·----4!\ddre<Js of Sir John Kot€la\1aJ.a. Pl'ime Minist,er of
Ceylon, before the Vio:rld Affairs Coum:il of Norttwrn
Califonda;
.
4 printed in 'J,'he Couno:ll Q.P.~li,~ht, (January,
1 ,,,.,.,
.:!.lO • .P•
•

Bantam

5James 11. ~~lichsnex,
l'looks~ l95l)g P• l.

l:lli!

Voice.£!',~ (Ne\!J York:
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In the lol'JG .run tl:l<JY seem li::ely to produce much
deeper effects on our \':estern life ghan Russia ann ever·
hope to produce \vith h<:r Communism.
After indicating in a brief and slretch.'· manner .the
shlfting scene in M>ia, 1116 shall next conside:r the Mlian

background of SE:iiTO starting with "The l\1ew H<lgionalism."
I--------------~1

•.

TIHi}-N-EV:-H-BGl-0N-;.tb-:X-8-Mi·-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - = = = =

There are both centrif'tlgal and centl'ipetal fo:rces
to flsian regionalism.

Of the centripetal forces--those

that tend to facilitate cooperation among the countries of
Southeast Afiia--particular note should be given to thG
peculiarly

St;tpra~nntional,

almost non-national. character

of nationalist movements in tt10se countries, th<> imperative
of common action to obtain neces sa.ry outside ass is tnnce,
someti1ing a]')J,lroaclling a common standard of living, the
absence of a, singlc1 dominant

po~Jer,

and thEi rapid march of'

totalitarianism.

_..._
___
Pacific Union.

Pe:rllaps tho clettl:est exalliple of

r<1gionalisJJJ in the Pacif'ic area j,n the

proposed Pacii'ic Union.

po~;rt-wa:r lrHiS

·tlw

Users of' tho te:rm "Pacific Union,"

6Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilizati£9. .QB Trial (London:
Oxford Un:!.vers:tty Press, 1948) 0 p. 221.

Unit-ed r:ttJ:.H;, 0

CHrl(-_;,da.D

bustr.tJ.litlo

N~.n~

z.stll\'j_!}d t

tht~'i

Philip...-

pines .• Great l'lr:tt6il1~ the !S.atb~Jlclt:ctldl'l• Jap<tt1 <md 'l'hn1l<HKl ... 7

l:ums:lve treatwmrts o! t!K' pos<;ibiliti(Jf> of re,;i"m'l:!.s1;; ir;
ttl.e Pacific L'<X<icla <mLi :tn !\mill i",Sl'le:r~llly .~:~

li. y,;. J.\,b(md tl{Jltls

of
7l.,..H6.

l;,s~-:~o,,i~:_tt~lcn

1~142)?

Nt~.t~ic~nr B n
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desire to p:resent a more uni tod front to

tl1~ gro~>Jing

menace

of Communi.sm in J\sia ~ to establish a common defanse plan Bnd
organization, and to. associate the United .states in such an
undertaking,

This idea is suggestec\ in X6Jnt.otrks vJhich

President Elpidio Quixino of the Philippines addressed to
'the United States Senat,e on August 9• 1949:

~~~----------------=====

• • • today the most urgent pxobl8lll thn t confronts
the Ph1lipp:ines and the otl'lfJ!' free countries o.f ll.sia
is the problmn of seou:rity •• , • No one ••ho realizes
the extent of the ID€mace to v;hi.ch :isia is exposed • • •
can ~Jell afford to :rest at ease no'" that tllo North
Atlantlc Pact is in full force and affect. u.s:ta With
its vo.st population • • • and ~rlith its l.ncalcula'ble
resources, cannot and out not to be lost; t<J com;:,unism
by default.lO
1\>Jo other outstanding advocates of

Pac1fit~

Union,

reasons emphasized the importance of "Orgr;.nizincs

obviO\~S

the Pacific P"Wples in t!1eir fight agt"<inst commt.:misrh," to

Zealand, 'l'twiland, and J apl:ln Jmve also favm: ed some ld.nd of

a Pacific dBfense

pact~

In July, J.9f)O,

th~J

comm:tttee on

I''ore ign Affairs of tile United Btates House of Hepresenta-

tivas ~ in a volcuninous report on tbe Hlil1ta:ry assb tance
program~

unanimously emoxsod proposals for a

mut~:~l

de.f<mse

109.2fJ&r;:_ssional. flo cord --f3enate, .i,ugu st 9, 1949,

p. 11032.

~=~=~------

-- --
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pact for tl>:; Pacific area, patte:cnad after tile North
-

Atlantic 'rreaty • in

>~hioh

'l:h!:J United i3tates 'i!Jould partici-

In Januax;y ~ 1952, Governor :l.'homas g. Dewey of Ne~J

pate .11

York, aftGr a tour of the Far

~East, publiul~'

-

advocated "an

agreement now vii th as many of the Paclf:l.c n.s. t}.ons aml our
other allies ciS

~Vill

join fer the mutm\l defense o:t' the far

PacH'ic. nl2

Southeast
Union.
most specific and geo------most
proposal i'or P<owific Union is
The

l>Sia

graphically tl1e

limited

for a Southeast _;,sia Union to promote tllr.J common political,
economic. aud cul'!;ural interests of tho stat;cc;s of' th<:.'t;
area.

In

1946~

K. ::anth&nan wrote on "A H<Jgiont:.l Authority

!'or 13outh-Eas t L1;;;ia 9 '' \vhloh Stt::, 1;0st1ld an outline of' a
regional organization for Sou the:ast llsia ,13 Presumably suctl
a union >1oulc1 att(1mpt ·to assist the peopl!ls of. southeast

Asi.a to bett<Jr their condit:i.ons of life and to prepare
themselves f'oJ: greater f:r.eedonl and greater :responsibiliti.<Js,
thereby, :lt is tloped. bolstEJ:ring thG :rogion alih:e t.gs.irwt

--·-----

---

llN;:n~ Xorlt ':rilllHS, July 12, l%0.

l3:tn K, 1•'l. Plmiklmr, et al. , Hegiowelinm ~
Securit;t (J"onilon: Oxford University Pross, 1949) 0 p. 25.

...

.

..
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bottl the; menac<l of persistent colonialism and the threat of
mountint& Communist pressures.
Probably, the cl1ief' sponsor of a f}OllthGast Asia
Union >·Jas President. Jllpidj.o quir :Lno of' the !?.hilippines, \'Jho
~Jas

also the Jl'ey mover in most otho:r projects relating to

Pacific Union.

He lost no opportunity to promote this idea.

He entrusted G<>rlos p. Homulo with the tasll: of visiting th<>
otll.,r countri<:s of South<>ast Asia to attempt to e;ain support
for trw

pxopo~;ed

union.

In the sruu6 address he made to the

belief' that
• • • trw free countries of southeast hsia and the
PacLfic must tt1emselves start ttw movemcmt for closer.
cooperation in :t'urtl1<3rance of tllo:lJ: common interasts in
the political. • economic • and cul ttual fields;
but he is <.<lE;o stressed the need for outside encouragement
and aid • spocif:tcally endorsing President

TILlman'~'

Point

Four program and the United Nation•s p:ro,.;nun of' tecimic:al
assi<' tance to under-deVE::loped c ount:r:ies ~ and expr <;ssing
ttto hope t;he;t v;hen a paci:f'ic Union was orom:tzed• ''the

United st;at<JS a nil tixl otho:r democracies sl:lotJld desire to
offer such help as shotlld lie in their po\·Je:r to give."
President Quirino also :l.nvited countries of souti1 Asia
inte:reBtecl in formin_; <mch a union to a co.nfe:rence at Bae;uio
Ci.ty to take

"~I"ll>

necessary first steps.

ti6

Daguio Confer,moe.

May,

l:W•

'l'he :res>.:tlts of the

Dabuio Conference held in the Philippines in lute Nay, 1950,

I

Philippinas, t:no Thuil"'-nd--.ag:reed ou

of r esolut:i.ons

for r<.>g1ona1 coopel·ation in economic, soc:ial, and culttu•al
. prog:ram:J, and exchanged vievJS informally in closed SI2S:oions

on matters of mutual interest; but largely on the irlsis-

tenoe of India and Indonesia • the Conference avoided
public decla:ratiorw or commitments of a political nature
a1 togettlGl: .1 4

1'hus the :Saguio Conf<nence tends to confirm

l1/oxner Levi 1s assertion that the aim of the sta t';s :tn t.ilis
area "has been to demonst;rate the degree of ;,\sian solida:rit.Y xattwr tt1an to point lAP ttlo many di1f:i.c11lties t>till
cont.rontin2, "th6 establishment of an Asian Union.ul5

F'o:r

political r<11asons no ofi'ioid represen·tatives from IndoChina. Chine•• o:r Korea

~un:e

invited to the Conference.

:Bu:rma ace opted the invitation to at tend, but beet: use of
cilli.ng<:w

in th<J goVElrnment did not send a dele,;ation.

Tile

conferentJe J'uilod to accept a Philippine proposal fox a
permanent

o:rganiz~:.-tion;

instBad, i t cw:rely decided ttlB.t

-------

14•t Sitting :tt ot~t; Baguio Confexence, •• .CoiUI£Omvsal, LI
(June Hi.• 1950), 237.

15vJe:ms:r Levi, "Union in
XIX (Augcwt 16, 1950) 1 148.

Jwi<:~?" ~}~astern

Surve:r:;,

-

.

Carlos P. homulo• the President of the Conference and then
Foreign l!!inister of tlc Pililippines, st1ould sxplore the

II

ros,; ibiliti<J" of action of' this so:r t.

President Quirino ntated in a press intexvh;VJ that
tl18

feoiin~ oi' t.he dslegat"s• :representing n part oi' the

~~----------w_o~r_l_d__w_h_1_.c_·r_l_v_Ja_s__a_"1_r_e_-_c_tl_y~·-J_n_e_n_a_c_e_d__b~y__c_.o_m_w_·•u_r_li_s_m~•-'_"a_-_s___t_h_<,_t______________ =======
"by getting

to~;<,th.;;r

<md cooperating in mu·tually improving

economic <:Y.ld social condition!:> ''"' eontribute to solution

of the Communist problems of 0aoh nation. ,;16
book, grusa.da

J...u ~.

In his latest

I\OL1Ulo 1r1rota that the mee·titl£; closed

\•lith the tldoption of t;his p:r inciple:
That ln the conslderation of tile spGcinl probh;ms of
foutheast Lsie ttw point of' vis<i of HJB peoples of thi.s
area be p:romlmmtly kept in mind, by any ccnf<nences
dealinG \·Jitll such problems, so ·ttJ.at better unde:rstanuin~>
end eorc:U.&l relations may subsist between ·the cguntrios
in the :reglon il.tKi ocher oountritJs of t.rle <JOrld.:t.'7

In s urnmin,c; Llp tl1e results of the Baguio conferencli.l, a
friencU:1 lunerican couespondent 1rJXote:
Perhaps the most important aspect of t.llu Con:L'e:renoe
was its m~H1ifest;ations of IE;gional solidarity and. its
vaunting of ptueJ.y .1-ls:!.atj_c vi.et;s f;nc\ lntcJ:rests.

--

---16quoted 'in the ~York Times, l\1ay 28, 1950.

l7carlos P. Romulo, Cru~ in £;§.1!' (NeloJ Yorl-'c:
John Day Company, 1955), Chapter VIIY.
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Delegat;BS all emphasize that the free informaL closed
session exchanges of opinion on many matters decic•ively
promot.(>d mutual understanding and f'utllre cooperation.18

Vlo:rld \:Jur II ended

111 itt!

the compl Hte sliH,ina tion of'

a groat povier alliance--thE• Thixd Heicil, Italy • and

..

,Japan-~

and. the serious ;;e<Jkening of components of anotner 0 notably

Franca ami Great Britain.

\:orld leadersnip thUs la.rgely

devolved upon the United Dtatos and the Union of [;oviet

\'Iittwut uttemptins 'the discustiion of

Social:ts t H<apilblic s.

that the very nature of' Soviet polic:!.es md
consistently

pu:rsuad~

on the ''cold ••ar."

st:rat~;gy. ~~hen

1•as largely respousiblG for bringing

Consequ<mtly • forms of cooperation in

the international community of necessity began to take

shape in agresm<mts and pacts of :regiorml nature.
Pl.'obably more than any other, t;he man most instru-

I

I
!

mental in laying d.ovm thd

ml~l

:t.'oundatiorm of secuxity in

southeast ,,s:ta is ttK' preSG!lt .Secretary of state--John
Foster Dull<:Js.

~Chase

efforts took him four

y~;a:rs

and f!is

--·---18Tillman Durdin. dispatch from btl.anila, da'ted Nay

-

31, 1950; in the t\fe"W York Times. June 1, 1950.
'

I

.
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m:l.s,;ions

11

:l.nvolve<l. crossing the Pacific tvJelve times,ul9

Concer nine; his efforts • Secretary Dulles has sait1 :

The position of the United Btat~as tmw.:rd collective
security in southtiast Asia has been knol•lt1 basi.c!illy for
quite a 10116 <lhiJ.e. In fact, it really 6 oes back to
the time VJ11(;Jn l t<fmt out to the Far E:ast in Janwuy,
1951, on a mis:.-ion to try to c:reatt~ a collective
c;ecur i ty pact in thht area. Ttlut ef':fvl: t fccd.lf:ld at trwt
time in ctle Sf:lnse that vie vle.re not able to ,,nut to.<:.ether
-

IC--------·a-co-1-1-e-c-t-1-Ve-s-ecu-r:_'l--t-v-a-r_:_l~at:t~emen-t-o-i~u-ny-1a-I,_g-e-px-opor--·-----===
tions e.nd we ended with a series of ~;eparate pacts, one

with ,Japan, one vlith Australia and NEn> Zealand, and
another lvith tkle Philippines.20

On March 20, 1952, the Senate of tlliii United

~.>tates

approved th" adherence of ttle UnHed Sta'tGS Governnwnt to
f'Olll' treaties • namely: the :rroaty of Peace with Japan;

Security 1'x eaty bet;vem1 tho UnJ.ted stat!ls and ,Japan; b·tltual
Defense l'rc&ty

pines;

~:rnd

bet1~een

the United States and tiH,; Phi.lip-

the becurity Treaty bet',Je<m

Zealand, and the United .St<'<tes.

Australia~

Ne>u

These four 'treaties

provide ttw ne.v i'oumations for seecu: ity ttuou.,,i:10ut an

important sector of t.he free ••or ld

cou~rn.unity.

"They con-

----

l9m1dress of J'ohn Foster Dulles on 11 [lecurity in the
Paoi:fic •" bef'or e th~a Los Anc;elrHJ v:orld Affairs Council,
Los .1\ncolr>s, California, June 11, 19~)4; printed in trw
Q!lnartmrmt, 2.£ State Publications No. 20 (\HiShington, D.C.:
June, l954), p. 1.

20Radio and television address to the nation o.f ,John
Foster Dlllles on "TtHl Xc1anna pact m1d the Pacific Charter";
printed in ttw Department of St~:l't;e Illllletin, XXX (April 26,
.,..,,
t 8"'"'
1 °"4)

~h)e

..
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important link in the collective secLtrity of the treG
nations of southeast <Win and the Pacific. "21
in the woxds of the

~lena te

They also •

Committee on For ej.gn Helat:tons

• • • cormtitute an impoxtant contribution tovmrd
lihe position o.f the United states in the
Pacific. They are logical and das:l.xable stGps in ·
liquid£rtirJg ttw old war and strengt;henirlii, th<J fabric
of pe~ce in the Far East against the dan 6 er of a ne,;
clarifyina~

}----------"Jat-•-""2"'•.__------------~----------- - - - - - - = = = =

:rhe four closely :related Pacif':i.c treaties are b'3tter
understood if they are viovJed as one nmlt;ilate:ral peat1e

settle!;H;nt and three supportinG. mutual d<J.fense p<,cts.
main ;..urpose of

tre

The

Japanese Peace Treaty c;<W, as thcl

E'tiln<i

,_Senate Gom..mit.tee :repo:ct stated;

• • , the; termination of' the ·•w:r in the J1'a:r Last tend
·the restoration of Jar.lUn to th4 Gt1;1tus of an ind€.pendant
sovereiun nation, 'I:lla treaty contains prov:ts:i.ons for
such matters as secux:tty and territorial au:.<:~.nbem.srrts,
trade and CO!lllll<arce, :rephrations and pxopsrty rights ••
• • i\ccompany:tne; the peace traaty are,' tJ:u:ee col.lM.te:ral
racts 1·mich provide collect:!. ve SEHHlr ity a:c.rangements
.for the Pacj.fic • • • 'l'll<1sa three pacts constitute an
inte~ral part of' the peace settla1n<mt in the Far .:~ast.

r·leusur ed aguinst the need for collective secr.u:tty
throughout the vast areas of non-Gowmunist Asia, the

security waasu:res

wt1:tct1

accompanied the J'apancsa

piWCe

21LEJtter of transmit;tal of President J~isonhO\rler to
the United States fl<mate on ti1<> Eoutheast Asiu Goll<H.:tive
Defense Trc;aty. and th0 Protocol to SF:AGDT: :!.n tho lff:.P"tl~ .9£1?.~~ Bulloti.!h XXXI (November 29, 1954), '9.
"'"'Qu.oted
in "Background, 11 Department of St<:ite
licationei, No. 4~)56 (ViashirJciton.
April7""19t32),

JJ.c·.:

Pu b ~

2.
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txeaty are far from pexfeot.

As Gec:wto.:ry Dulles .himself'

stated,
, • • these treaties also recoJnize, and were cited,
that they 1·1e:re only a beg:l.nntng-~only initial st<lpS
toNard tho development of a more~.(!O!llprehensive system
of' security in tiw Pacific a:rea.;;;.3
And senator vialter F. George of Georgia, Chaiman of tho

sentiiDent

~:hen llo

declared in congressional debntes over

the 'Whole ques1;ion oi' collect:!.ve security in 'trw pacific.

that ttwse ·t.roaty &rrangoments ''rJere 11ot :ragaxded as dei'ini-

tive solutions of the racific defEHme problem."

And <tdded,

'Xhey exp:nkc.;ly contempluted the dev&lopn!ent oi a moxa

•1

comp:rehens i ve collective· security sys t<Jru 11<hen d.rcl1mstances
made that feasible."24

g:reu tly

~;idoned

HO\iGVer~ these treaty a:rrange1nents

tt1e area of united uction fo:r def<mse in the

Pacific and u,av<1 rise to th•J hope that "they
t•lay for a ne1r1 era in tho

Pacific~"

~iill

open the

to Llf!e former necr otary

'rhos story of vlhat trJElse ue;JCessities are 1 and hovJ
these anan:.:,em<mts

ihS~lt

them, ls :revealed in ttw

~;volution

of the four tre£t'ties anci a study of the lHM :relationships
which VJil1 result f:rolll them.

2-4cot1f:,r<Jssio!li\1 Eecord--Senate, February 1, 1955,
P• 693.
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Pacifio <;actui t:z and ,lliJ?an.
Japan occLrpitiS a st.rntegiz;o pos tt:ton in the Far J:;&st;
1 t has a large, energetic, and skilled pOpl.llation; it
:J.s .tho only industrial rmt:con in tt1e F~:r E<ist; and i t
lias athM:t:r:t the />mexican defense line in the pacific.
• • • A free, pxo spe:r:our:. ~ ~:md domoc:ra·t:tc Japcn (JOtlld
exert un important stabil:tzirt.; influence in the Far
B{lSi;~~~

So stated the Senate F'oreign Helatlons Commlttee to the main
QM.

"Russia \Jill Lose PoHer as Germany

body of the E;enate."'"

and Japan Gain," is tlw th<Jm<l of an r,dclress made by ;;snator

with China fo:t' control of

\iill come the day

11

th,~

tvealth of Hanclmria 11

\·ihen our R11ssian f':r.lends

~<ill

;

t!l<m

c;,o back. to

will be :r.e-establisl1o<J a pm>er g:r.oup in th'" Far Et,si; ttwt
Will ,:;iva somo stabi1lty to that a:rea~n26
geopolitictan, ",Japan

!101>\1

In the eyes of a

connt:ttutes tile las·!; link :tn the

chain to be drawn around ttuJ Glliua and Giberian cou:o:ts ln

- ..---·-

25Qtwted in "Background •"

!2£• cit.

26t;ddress of' Senator Halter F. GE10rge on "Rus,,ia i!lill
I,ose POVlSl' as Ge:nnany &'1d Japan Gain, 11 to tl1e Awe:r:l.can Society
of New~;paper i!ilitors in I;Jash:l.ngton, D. G.; in the Jl!li.~
Stateo> Ne»s uml V.iorld ,Hc""o""n"'o:::.r.;;.t, XLIII (Wlay 6, 1955). 78, .

--------

.,

Japan the soviet Union ''iou.1d b.o

~nvincible.

'I'he return of Japan to tho world community as u fxee
:,.;;:,,:r···:, ..:.

and sovereign nation 1ms an (W<imt \\ikich v;as long awaited.

United statecl Government had begun to phm for th:: occupation of Japan.26

Even then the H:!:m of the Unit.ed States

its full :r esponsiblli tics as a m<!imber of the commll.nity of

natio'ns.

Tho occupation plnns

~tJt,ue

developed to facili.tate

this aim.2 9

tion mission l1t\d been la:r gely accouJplisherJ..

In i'!.!l:r cil~ lHL17 •

·General l'll<"cArthur l:innounc;;d that it vias time fm: tl pGtHHJ
treaty to Le uoncl•lded, 3 0 In the :mmu year the United
Sto.tl:ls had propos ad a confe:rence to d iscm,s the prermration
of a pea<:e

settlern~mt

vlitl1 Jap6.tl but tl'te proposal f£til<ld

because of Sov:l.ot non-Gooperat:!.on. 31
By S<lp't·amber, 1950 0 the pos:!.tion o.f the \Jn:Lted states

in :regard to ttlB p:r Gposed treaty had been sati:,factorily
established.

Jol1n F'oro ter Dulles, ti1en consultant to

-----30Tb'
Q
~·~
p. 6"0
o

31~~~·• PP• 631-32.

lit

~he
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secretary of ;;'tate, vJas place :i.n clla:rge of the project or
.. :

---------

negotiatinG a peace treaty ;;ith Japan.
Tht' net;rJtiations that followed lire not wlth:ln tho
scope of thi.s paper.

.

But 14hat 15 of' interest Nill be the

attitude of tho countries in the Pacific area--the fact

.....

that it vHiS natural i'or them to have :reserva.tions about

Japanese seli'-def'ense privileges.

The PhUippines xecallod

vividly the t!u:ee long years or brutal occupation.
Australia and Nevi Zealand had rw desire to rlsk. !'-gain the
anxious moments of 1942 VJhen the1J: very existance as

independent nations 111as in grav10 peril.

lrihen th1> Dulles

Nission visited th<Jse count:r.i<JS in £Elr1y 1951 0 tt1e concern

over a possible rebirth o.f' a militaristic Japan

fully expressed to the l'liSfiion.3E

fo:r1rJaru the

Sc1~:>g<:H;tions

>vlttl 'tlle United Stutes.

Mh>sion that

lfJas

fol:ce-

It was at ttlis time

\vllic t1 led to 'ttwi:r s10our 1 ty t:r eaty
They sugges·ted to the Dulles

at1 ar:rangetu<.mt

be made be tHe en th<>rli:Jel vos and

the United states vJh<sreby each of th<J three nations t·wuld
agree to act to meet any common dangox i.n the Pacific.

~'l'Ofesso:r

•••:rtte

o:f Pol.i.tlc;; at the UnivE;rs:t ty of .Melbou:r.ne, and
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author of Nationalism and Communism

1!.!

aast

.!wi~.::.,

\;as then presented as a safeguard against tlw :risks
inherent in tiw peace treaty w:tttl Japan. 11lh:Lch put no

....

restrictions on l1er. armament. But bafo:re long ;t·t
Nas rep:es!(lnted as a safeguard aga:i.nst Communist
expanBion )$3

:rt

c;as ·the feelirJ;.;, of theee nations, expxossed at

that time, tha'G their capacity to continuo to accept

----------------------=====

commitments f'o:r th;; preDervation of psace anywtun:e in

t.rHJ

world vJOuld necessarily be conditioned by the existence of

rela tlonships in tile Pocif';Lc comwu.ni ty af.!:'o:rdsd by t.cw
mnerg;ence of a ,Japan desi:rons of' assumtng u :responsible
security r o1<1 in the area presented several oppolituni tics
for arrangements

i~tl

ieh v;ould nultually benef'i t all nations

summation, it cm•ld be conclllded i;htd; the

'!;XtJttty

of Peace
-

-

and tile United f>·tates, are at ·i;tw heart of tt1e EJJ::i:st.l.ng
a:r:ran<,T,6lll0nts for th8 soclH 1ty of' tlle Pacific.

------...

.

..

-
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.~ecul!ity ~

pacific
Philippines~"

!h<::

Plll.liUJ?ines.

"In the

said President T.:ruman in his statement of

April 18. lB51, on Pacific security,

• • • th6 United States is accorded certain mili tu:ry
operating rights and .facilities pursuant to an agreement w.:l.ttl the Qpverruu•mt of the Phllj,ppines, and tile
whole ~JOl'ld knovJs that th<J United States recot;nizefi that
an armed attack on the Philippines \Hmld be looked upon
b,Y tho United st;atcJS as_d!J,XJ:,;:Iil:r_uus_to_its_o_\llU_p_eac_e_and _ _ _ _ _ = = =
!-------~safety and that--it-\"louid act accordingly.34
·

l
I

This is tlH' principle <Jhich >·Jas incorporated in the
new Imltual defense 'treaty bet\VE:H;n the t.vo Governments.

In

a sense, :i.t can be said i>hat i.l1e treuty m<J:rely formalizes
a HJlationsh:lp that has been in existence for som<o tilua.
After tt1e E;;oanish-American \Var of 18913 the United States
established railita:r.y bases in th<J Pililipp:Lnes

~md,

m1.de:r

the terms of the Jvlil:Lta:ry ASt' is tancil Agreement; of 194/7 •
contim1es to maintain t:hmn.

expr1assion on Aut;ust

~)0,

:l'his concept was given formHl

1\i'l'il.,

~<it£1

Mut;;l Defense '.l.'r ea ty bet111een thtJ

·t;~Jo

tlle signing of tl.le
coun tx i

•; r.·
GS. "'J

l"tl

Eaol1 Party :recognizes ti:lat an armod attack in the
Pacif:l.c area on eith<Or of tll<t parti<o:J 1:lot.!ld. be d<J.fl60:t'•
ous to :J.ts ovm paace and safoty 1111d <'lc,clm:es that it
----~

34 statom<;nt

o:· P:residcnt Truman on "Samuity in tho
Paci:t'ic"; tn t;ne J2r:>r:::Jrtm.ent of ~3tL<tG lJUJ.ltltin, XXIV (April

lt, 1951), '165.

----------

::;s'rhe text of' the .Hutual Dd'ense Treaty bot•o~een the
Unlted S1:ates and the Pl1i11p;::incs is printed in th<J Qe•)Hrt!l!ent of state llli!ill!ll 1 XKV (September 27, J.%1) • 464-f\5.
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"10 :Jld act to !i\(1Gt l;[ll;l COllliL0!1 dlil!g<il::S :tn · HCGOXdmu:e 111 itl!
its eon~>ti tut1,mn.1 lniOOli!oH><ilS. (.M:t.icla IV) •

:n:;gaxdlr.tg tho 1n,;.pl~~u~-;.nt.tJ.'tit.).!l ~J..f:' t(J,1[1 t,);,~tzty
and :cJhttksvz~x in tt1;:;1 cplnlon o::: c~:Lthe.r. o.t th~·er:~ thtJ
tHX'Xi to:rt~).1 :tnt~~g;.r5." t.y ~ poli ttor:ll :trtd'l~prn~d$i106 cr t'JWCUI"""
lty Cif o l tlt~.l1X of t~£1,:.} Pt~rt:t<j ~.~ ls t~h:r\~at~.;nud by ~:;:xtaJ:nul
ax~ed ~::.ttc.c::h: in ·~tH-; l)6.ciflo$
(i~:,r-t.i.Gl~s
)
.,

(I

~

G
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established.

"This group will EH:l.rve as

t'l

continuing body

in cha.rge of the ove.r-all implementation of tho
mentioned pact," tile statement added.36

above~

Tilis consUltation

was in accord<d1Ce l·i.ith "'rticle III of tt1e J:kHlt Which called

for such measures ••henever 11 in the oplnion of ei.ttle:r of trlelil

the tH:rritorial in·tog:rity, politicaJ. independence or
sectuity of el.tt10r .of tt1e parties ir:: threatened by external
armed attack in the Pacific.''
llt;;ain, on september '', 195<1 0 EJec:r.etary of State
Dull.es declared that "if' trw Philippines vJore attacked• t;tle

United Stutes t·;ould act immediately,"

He made tkw plede,e

in a stat<lment at th€ opcmin;;; of United DtatHs-Fhilippine
mutual defense tall<s in !vlanila,

••:r

Hish to :;tate in most

emphatic te.rms that the United Stnt.es Nill honor f'ully :l.ts
commitments under· tho mutual defense treat;y."

He added

that the IJni ted ::;tates in tended to maintain nnd use Hs air
and naval bases in th;; islands and

11

tlwse provide

conc:r,~te

evidence of the United States' abUity and intention to
take count;er-weasuree."

Tl~e

Secretary pointed Oclt tl1t.t

Pl'elsident !Usenhol!Jer held ordered t!11j United

~,ltut,,ls

Seventl1

Float to protect Fol'mosa from invasion by tho Communists.

36

~.!1 ::t;ork Times, May 26, 1954.
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"In th<i case of the Philippines, no bpeci:t'ic orders are
a~.rtomatically

required •" hu said • "Our forces vJould
0
l'eaot ." "'7

Pacif;!,c Secqr ity: Au!,jtralia .!Rill. New Zealand.
people of Australia and No111

Ze~;;land

side by side during the v;orlti

share vJi th Americans

Helations amof16 tlleir

~;a:rs.

.nations have nl>m;ys been amicable.

The

There could be little

doubt in any quarter ttla'C a(l;!!;ression against eitJ:wr of
them would seriously involved tlw United Stat<ss.
It 1·1as, ttJS refore, deemed ur;eful to put trw vJorld
on notiC<J of' 'Ctlis relationship by formaliz:i.ng it.

Accord-

ingly, the ll!IXttlal defense security pact signed by Australia,
Net1 zealanct, aml. the United ,states (J\NZ\H3).38 contains trw

recognitioi.l of each pa:rty tl1at armed attack in the
Pacific area on the to:rr'itories, a:cmoc1 forces, publio
vessels, or aircraft of any of the pa:rt:ic s
oils to tile peace and security of all.

t~ould

be dan.;;er-

E:ach purty pledges

itself' to tal-co action in accordtmce with lt.s constitutional
processes in ttl<l event of sucl1 a;ttaok.

----·--37~ York Times 0 S<'ptember 4, 1954.
381'he t"xt of this treaty is printE;d in the DcJ?artGtate Bulletin, Xx:l (JtllY 2Z•, 1951), 148..49.
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In liddit;ion, ttw parties are to establi&h "' council,

cons is tin0 of their F·oreign Ministers, to cons1c:ter mattE>XS
conce:rnint; ttle implementation of the; treaty.

This councH

is to be so ore,ctnlzed as to be able to meet at any time.
The treaty provides that,
Pendilli.~

the cievelopment of a moro comp:ehensivc

t----------S(;~y-D-tem-of~IG-g-icn-al-s-acu;r-i-ty-1-n-tile-p~:rcd:f-rc-tr:r.-et.:r-a-nr.1-tl1.G

development by thG United tiations of' more effective
means to maintuin :tnterna tional peace and sectu;i ty,
the Council • • • is authorized to maintain a consul tat iva :relationship ;·;ith 1:1t11tes ~ Regional Associa·t;ions $
Ascwciations of" states, or other at;ttwritles in the
Pac.:tfic <IX!8H in a position to furtl1ar the purposes of
this treaty and. to oontribtJtH to the security of that
area.

Later$ in MELy, 195<1,

Hich~ird

G. casey, Hinl.st;er of

Foreign Affairs, in ennouncirlfs Australi& 1 <> X<ladiness to

Staff also had made an assessment of thG 1nilitary probl<Hns
~nvolved)•

saicl that bearing in mind th<> mtmr;oum:, resources,

ami terri cor ial ambitions ol :ted Chinh,

tt. vms doubtful

that an inqividual sou'thc;ast dlian country could resist

Comznunist ir1f:U tration and
resources.

at;~];ression

solely on 1 ts

ot~n

ln th0 modern t>orld no country .myv;h<Yre can

depend for its

securit~·

on its

o>~n

una:l.ded efforts, ile said.

'1'h.is means the indep3ndenufl and liberty of' the

~loutheast

Asian cotmt:ries ·w111 need to be supported and helped by

7l

otllGr free countries in position to do so 1 he added. 39
These bilatarul and t:rilo.teral troaties of mutual
defense. born out of a post-war policy to :r<Jbu1ld and rearru
Japan 1 vJere
'i

11

desie;rwd to serve as a point of depar·ture

toward the devHlopluent of a more compx•ahensive system of
secur1 ty in "thB P<H}ific area.''

,1ohn Foster Dullos, th""c''---------c====

chtef arch:l.tect of these t:Vmlt:les, has said:
'!'he four tnlatiGs do not, of course, ma:rk the

outex bocmda;des of our concern in "sia and t!1e Pacific.
'l'he United states has a deep interest in the peace,

security and ,,;aJ.fare of many Asian nations \•Jtlich are
not partiGS to thi.:i &ec~\rity t:reatiBs. :rna eed, each of
the ·CHH:iti<lS indicat<JS the ~~X};octation of th0 pa:rtio::;
that thero will be fu.rther d.avalopments.
Tho stops for peace and security novi pr•oposed are
only a beginning.. Thexe ~~ill l1e a continuil:J<;; need for
the Unit<>d States, in coope:ration Viith otl:l>Jr f':ree
nations, to sustain an ever-mounting initiutive in /H3LJ
and to dave:Lop ever-grov1ine, fe:LlOI>~tlip vU.t11 t;he people£>
of Asia who woLlld be free. It is • ho\Veve:r, necessary
to consolidate our present position be;t'o:re \1e move on,
and. ttlat 28nso1idat1on involves eni;1U'int; into ttlesc
treatim>.

------

'l'ho seige and fall of Dienbienphu caused u terrif'lc
reaction against Communist expansion in 13outheast Asia.
l!':rom thE•t moment ttw steps leadlng to the negotia:tions on
SBA'rO came :l.n fairly xapid stJccession.

I.
~Phomas

lNDOCHUli~

Barman. th<J B.B.C, diplomat;ic correspondent

---

t1as stated in an article in T'ne Listener:
1'he immediate cause to the discussions in Hanilu
arose as a HJfJUlt of the; contirwed expans:Lon of

Gommunis t potveJ: in southeast Asi.a a;.n6 esp<: c:l.ally in
lndochl.na , •• rt tllreat \vtlich sec!cJta:cy of' ~>tate
Dulles said, extended to the vi tal int<or fsts of' tile
Philirpine~; • I\Ustntlic', anCl New zealand.
Ctcrlos .P. Homulo in a .Ne,vember, 1954, article

conceded

th~tt,

"Indochina gave CommL1nism its

loma tic victory since tho Bolshevik

~;:;reat~;;st dip~
<>

rovolut~.on.""'

HoHever much one may qu<nltion ·tho va.lidlty of' these

statements, it :remains that
big--if the Commun:tsts 11:1n.

tl1e

stakes in Indochina

21'8

Briefly, (1) once in command

-·----·--·
lThomas Harman, ''The Background to ti1H Discuss5.ons
in Manila," :~r1e Listenei, LII (September 9, 1954), 380.
2 C<ll'los p. Romulo. "Three Ytoa:rs to
Weak !vlagaz:l.w:l, (November 7 • l9tJ4) • p. 7.

.

.

expuns1on \vest, south. and east.

(2)

Communist

11/est~:;a:rd

drive \Wuld sCJbdtle 1'hailand and Btu•ma, bringing external

Corrununia't expansion to ·t;he aide dor,:,r of' India and Pakistan,
(3) soutmva:rd drive would &.xmex Halaya and Indonesia.
(4) sastvw:rd drive 'd<mld be aimed at tlm Philippines, tied·

in vJi th a pustl nor thl•lard from Indonesia, and ( 5) ,lhp<U1 9
'

.

7<

stu:rmmded, mi;;l:lt falJ.. ,J

lidded to those J.s the

psychologicul effect of it all to 'Gilc people in tl.wt
section of tile globe

•~hexe

"savin<c> fac.s" is a very

important; factor in ttl+.: eold ws:r.

:ct

big p:rize involved that the United

:~tatas

is becm1se of the
hns piclmd

Indochina as the place t;o stop tho Communists in Southeast

\~hat

tJ.as been sat forth here is tho so-called

"domino thao:rv. '1
'

P:r esident Els e.nil0\1e:r subscribed to the

"falling domino" principle on at least

1954.

t\'iO

occasicras in

In f'aat, he £;<.we that narne to the theory Ht his

nevis conf<'rence of hpril 7, 1954, i·lllen he outlined his

concep·t of Llvo strategic value of Indoei:llna.

Fix,;t, lle

said, there is the strategic value of tll(J cotmtry in terms
of its mata:rials; then, the probl(;!Jl! of so ml'my additional

-

.

-

- -

--

'""Stoi<es in IndoctJ.ina," United titates l'ic-,\'is and
~-- --...,.
Re po :r!i, XX.XVIl (July 30, 1954), 21 •...

~;o:rld
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human beinc;s coming unde:r a dictatorship; !Uld, finally,

ttle d'f'ects of the; "i'l:llling domino" principl6.

He said

that us th(;l last domino in a line fells inevitably :from
the topplir:e; of ·t;hcl

first~

ttw loss of Inc\oGt1ina vJould lead

to the loss of Du:rma • of Ttmilund, GrJC\ Indonesia; it
vwuld turn

;JO-called islund uefenses' ctJain o:f Japan,

th~l

Fo····noo" t ••,·oc'
l-'1''·
l)'t·lJ.·L'
·oDine"
../. .t
vi.
. 1. ,r.,
• ,.,
J,;
,;:> 9
and to tt1e sotltrn;a:rd it 1rJould

_

J.. !-.;,.,

~-'

,_J C.!.

\;~

1\ga:l.n. a·t; the Gove:mo:r 's Conference i.n Seattle on

lmgw>t 4, 19!l4, tne J?xecddent said that

"s•;~ve:ral

things

peninsula, tl1'.3 last littlG bit of land Mng:lng out tr1ore
( soqtha.rn 1'hailand and r.::alaya), vJOL1ld be "care ely defensible,"

tt1e Prcs:ki ent

illfl! ned.

And he added thc;t "Bu:rn1a v1ould be in

Approx;tmately a yaa:r before 0 in .his "Peace in the
vro:rld" addrGss on April 16, 1953, President

ttucats to til<J

~~orld

Eisenho~Je:r

free comm.lm:tt;y to be met by uni·ced

--~

4

"President KKplains Value of J.ndocl1ina," Unit<J\!_
StatEJf;t NevJS fU'& World Heno:r1;_, XXlCITI (.April 16, 1954), 21.
5

Qtloted in tho

l:iro:!. xork

_Iirues, May 12, 1954.
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actlon." 6

1'heu. on Mm:ol1 29, 1(154, after the seise of
'

Dienbi10nphu had begu::1, ::ecretary of St<J.ta Dulles, in a
major foreign policy i-peech approved in advance by the

President; for Ci eli very to th<3 Overseas Press Club of
America, Hll1eL·Jed President Eisenhovler •s proposal for

~~----------"_u_n_i_t_e_d__a_c_'t_i_o_·r_l_•_"___I_n__w_h_a_t__~_·a_s_·_p_r_o_b_t_ol_)l_Y___th_,_1__k_e_y__p_e_.r_a_g_·r_e_.p_h_____________=======
of t11at Dpeech. delivered in mea:::ured tcm:s and thrice
punctuated by applause, Dulles declared:
Ur~Jer the conditions of today, the imposition on
Soutr1east l>sia of the political system of Cormmmist
1'\ussia and its Chinese ally • by \vlwtever mtJails, Nould
be a sxave ·~hr eat to tt1e \~hole fr-e·'.• cO!m!ll.mity. 'fhe
United Eltat<.w feels that ti:lat poss:lbility should not
be pas£;iv<lly aceepted, but should be mat by ctni'ted
action. :J.'hls might have ser 1ous r ishs, Lut ttHJse risl~:s
are fa:~.· lesc> tllan vJot:tld fuoo us a fevJ Jlioars from now •
if we dare not be resolute today. 7
.

In other portions of the speech, Dulles cited "that such a
tragic event us the fall of Dienbienptm vJill llardel;l, and
not v;eaken our rurpose t;o stay united,"

He also declal'ed

Today the United States ami other countries immediately concerned a.:re givint; careful corts:i.c:e:rat~:i.ons to
the establishment of a collective defense. Conversations are tuk:'i.n;;.; pluae among tr10m. • • • Tl1is common
defense nmy involve serious commitments by us f~ll.
Elrt; fH;e peoples vJUl never remain i'r<Je if they are not
tv illing, if need be • to fight for thd:r vi tal interests.

---- -

81\dd.:ress by President F;isenl:lolve:r on "Peace in the
v:m:ld •" Vital 13peecl1EJS 0 XIX (May 1 9 195:-S), 420.
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Furthermoret vit:al inter<1sts can
tected merely by local defense.
defense and the ll'ey to dete:r:r:l.l'lG
vJith others fox mutuul d.efense.
Uni.ted ~--tates seeks in Southeast

~·
I

II.

VIE\tiS OF PHE1iE;NT

E:J:c3R~IHO\",;EH

not longer be proThe key to successful
attack is association
1'hat is wl1at the

Asia.

AF'l'JSH TliC GEi'ili!:\l[t

c_o_N_F_li_.n_E_N_c_r_:_o_·~_l_K_·o_1_1J-~l_'_'_'l_~_'~:-L-Nu-''C_'_c_ii_l_N_.A------~----------------c======

_________________________

On Jul;y ~.o, 1054, i'G vJas annoLmced .from Gon<wa that
a c:ease-fi:r.e in Indochina hud been
reprE:senta·~i vos

~::tgreed

bet1·wen the

of the F'renctl ant! tlw CommuniF t Vie trnh1h

fore es in terms thut l.e:f't CambcJdin and Laos as indeoend ent
'

stat\iS, and vJ:l.th V:l.etnum split into tvJo.

'!.'he agreement;

that convened AprH :?;6, 1954.
E:ven >vh:l.le thtl negotiations :l.n (!,_,neva lflere still in
progress .President Bim.mho•mr isstHld a w:ri tten statement on
the Indochina situa.ti<)n.

He said s in port:

':rhe Un:lted stat<1s beli(wes in assurint; the p<>ace and
.l.ntegrity of nationr; thr,ough collc1ctive action and, in
pur suunee of th<~ Uni.ted Nat ions pr i.nc:lple, has entered
into regional security agreements >~l.tl.1 other ne.t:lons.
The Indochina phase of ttE Gonfer<mce :ts in p:rocess
of being organized and the issues have not yet been
clar if led. l\lieantoihile, plans are proceedi.n:;; for tb.G
realizutio.l:'l of a Southeast i-1si~:•. security arran,;ement.
This v1as publicly sugEasted by Secretary J)llles in his
address o1' March 29. or co<..trlle, our p:rincipal allies
were advised in advance.
nEn~

Ti.lis proposal of' the B<-Jc:r<Jta:ry of l:>tate vn~s not a
one; it 11as merely H r eaffi:rnw.tion of the pr inoiplet;
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that have consistently guided our post~irlal' foreign
policy , • • and a remJ.nder to interested Asian
fr:l.<mds that the Unlted Stottue vm.s prepared to join
Viittl others in the anplication of tttese prlnclples to
the ttu: eatened arEla. 8

~~

p-~-~~

,_ _

111t1en Prime Minister Churnhlll came to confer with

C0](1
l·..n t•1m
""t u
~· .,

w~r
•. a ... "

'l
~.,

t.!'o 4
~ r··t
.t"

Part II of

\·Ie dir.-;cussed .Southcas·t Asia t:lnd, in i:n:·ll:tlcular,
exam:med the situ:cetion l'ii:lici:l VJould c\I ise from the
conclusion of" an agreement on Imioc: hina. rJe also
consldered th,OJ sii;u:.ttion "11hi<:h vJould fo.llOiv :from
fa:Llu:r<:J to reach fiUGh an ~1greement.

1.o will press f'o.nmrd I•Jitl1 plans<fox collect;ive
dafen::.e to mfu.Jt t;;~i't~tH'3:1: eventuality • .1

ma;)or :Lmmodiate goal of his foreie,1:l policy.•tlO
Irm:ued:lately after the cease--fire

occasion be:

a.gr~wownts

~

have

~H:lld_ ~

8nv:hot R:isent:to·i!Jer Said ilbcut Il,dochinu in ;,;_,x:L\, '1
UniteQ_ &_tat'l'i_ ~ iLll!:L \;or1d l\G)20rt, XXXVII (.July :'iO, 1954),
21.

9ustatement of F.:lsenhovier and Ctmrchill on viestexn
Sl>rategy on t.he 1 Cold ',:hlX, '" printed 5.n tl1<& .!m:lt\ld Qtatc::s
flfevJS and l:orld Jl(~port. XXXVII (JuJ.y 9, 1%4). 57-B.

---
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-

-
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lONeal Stanford in the Ghristi<in §.clone~. J'-lonU.Qt.
JViay t! , 1954 •

-
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'rhe United z;t,ut<Js has not bec-m a belll,;m:ant :!.11 this
vmr. 1'he primary responsibility for the toettlement in
Indochtna .rested w:lt.h thosG nations 1'J!lic:h participu.ted
in l;hu i'lgtlting. Our role nt Geneva has been at all
time» to try to be helpful vJhere desired and to aid
France and Cambodia. Laos and Vietnam to obtain a ,just
and honorBb1<3 settlemorrt 1rJll1ch viill ·take into f.!lH:ount
the needs of tll€ intorestf:ld peopl~J • • •
:rhe TJni'ted States is actively ptusuing disCLw:,ion
with other fre(~ naM.ons Ni th a v:LevJ to the rapid orcan-

________ tz_;_·LtJo_n-of~~l-CO-l-1-e-c-t-i-vc-d-afens-H-i-n-sout-h.e~.tfrt-b:s1:;:;.-tn:-----o:rrlo:r tc pl'CV<mt f'n:rtl1<n di:reot .o:c in<lirec'G Communist
ag r0 Sc' ion in the t general area.l1

Tho vie·v;s of Secretary DqllElS eoncexninc tt1a ludo-

china truce Ne:re contained in a s'GGt<:lmont ts:::uec1 by him or1
July 23.

:r.n thut s·tatoment he r;aid, ln part,:

M'·te:r nearly ei?ollt years of vm:r the forces of the.;•
J.i':r.ench Union i1ad lost cont:rol o:f nca:r.ly o.t1<:H1alf oX
Vi•stnam, thd.r hold. on tho balance ~;as precarious~ aru
the Frenoll people did not dasixe to p:r.olong the cmr •
Those basi(J
·o'1''~'·' of
ment 1tJh:l.ch. as
features Hhlcl:1
n'·l1' '"'·•
1,~(..,
X..l

V'::l
,·>:;O

,l L

.~,.,,.)

...,

rrt·:-,·-~~111
,,;lt;.•.i~
,_,

facts in<Jv:ltubly dominated tile Indo•
the Geneva Gonfel'enco and led to settlePresid•mt F;isenhol·Jer saicz, contain max\}~
we do not like • , •

!10\~':.t(""!
,....::;,,,

)~:·e'!::-)'·-·
ti,,. __ ..,,,IJ~

~-l'lC 1.
'--1

r:-n•1Al
,_·a~u

..~,.,.1"1'
,rl-, u, '~

'l"
..!...4

o;,,nr~Q'"t't'';~nn~
<;;.<......,.._,
J. .c._,~.;,vV

VJlth the; Unl.ted Nations Gharter, we •Jo>.lld not seok by

force to ove:cth:ro11: theix sGtt.J.CJHttant; •

~

"

ThE> important tlll.ng from novJ on :Lcl not t;o l.llOLU:n the
past bt~t to He:i.ze \;ilo futuro opportunity to prevent the
loss in t-Jo.1:t.hon1 'l:l.totnn.;a from h1adlnt::; to t;tHJ 0Xter1~l~.on
of Gommtmi:sm thJ:<l\J.[;hout ;:c.outheast Asia nn::I the Bouthtvest :t\::tc:Lfic., It1 ttt.ts effo:r·~ t::a.l oi' the fxee netlons
concexnc>CI shoql.d p:rofii:; by the, losuJUS of. ttw past.

c===
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One lesson is that resistance to Communism nfleds
popular s ilpport , • • the people s.hould feel that they
are defending ·their own national institutions. , , ,
Prime Mini,;ter Menaes-France said yGsterduy that
instructions had ll!.li:Ul given to the French representatives in Vietnum to complete by ,J;Jly 30 precise projects for the transfer of authority~ vJhich \~ill give
reality to ttlliJ independence 1tihlch France had promised.
• • • The <:volution from colonialism to national
independence is thus about to be completed in Indochina, and t;he free govexrnnents of tt1is areH should
.f--------:tr_oJn_n.oJrJ_o_n_be_able-to-<::I-t-11-i-:-'-t--the-1-o-ya-l-ty-of~tric-i-x--------====

people to maintaln tlleir indapendew:e as agaim;t
Communist c:.:oloniul imn.
A second leslJon "'t1ich ''hould be learned is that
arrangements for <Jollectlva defense need to be made in
advar1ce of aggression, not after it is uncier v1ay, The
United States :for over a year advocated united action
in tha area. but tl1:ls proved not to ba practicul under
the cond 1 tions ~1.t1ich existed. V'ie beli<3Ve, hmvever, ttmt
no1i'J it vJill be pr:actiu~:ll to bring about. coll<:Jctive
arraflbG/Il<.;tlts to promote tll<' GeGur I ty of tJ1e free
peoples of .souttH?ast As1H. Prompt <J"Ceps toJ:i.ll he ta.ltel'!
in tt1is dinlction. In this connection we sl10uld bear
in mind that. ·cl1e protllem is not merely one <lf' d{1t<Jrring
open armed aggression, but of' preventing Communist
subversion 1rJilich, tt1kin:;; H.dvantage of economic dislocations and social ln,justive, might \1eaken and finally
overthrmi the non-Communist (!,overnrnents.
If tiN f'ree nations vlhich have a stake in t;tlis area
t-1111 nmv l'or!t to,,. ether to avail of present oppor tuni ties in the; light of )JBSt experience, th<m tbe loss ot·
th<J prec;ent may lead to a gain for the futurG.l2
'rhus • lndoohina and all tht' t l t slg;nif':l.ed brout;ht
about an "aGonizirll!, .reapprais<>l," to usa diplomatic parlance

recently made populal', o:t' the

------

po1~er

position in Asia.

on

12nvJhat /ill Sides ~'ay £\bout Indochin<± 1'ruca," lfnited
~!.!..§. ~!i ang ~lOf#L ljeJX>It, XXXVII (July 30, 1954), 21.
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the one hand, Communists, once mo:r.e, are tak:!.ns over ne1•
territories and are maneuvering into a position to get
more territory, more people • more o1'

everytning~

On the

other hand, the United states r:md its allies <n:e m<:cl-cing
one more e.ffor t to ralJ.y non-Communists in defense of >1lwt

is ld't in Boutheast

l

Asia~

Actual conversutions on the formulation of a
collective defense treaty in the Pacific area began even
before the Geneva Conforence ;vas evel' p:rojectod,

At that

time the CommLmist advance 1.n lndocilina 111as still

proposed security treaty to come into e:rtect at once so

that it could be invoked aga:lnr;i; t!HJ forces of Ho Ci:1:l-mint1
in !ndocbin<'l.

M:

too

~

XQU. Times put it:

fiecxetary of' State Dull!::lS wanted the ,sllies to
"negotiate frol!l strength" at tho G<m~lva confiilHmce on
Korea and Indochina. It 1r1as his idea tJ:la·t tlle l'jestern
l1llies stwuld agree befOJ:e tho confexence s'Cartod on
the ldnd of ••uni ted. ucUon" ~hey would tak~ to rt;otect
southeast .llsla if tile Chmeva contorence i<nled ,lo
At tr1e same time, President Eisenhovii:Jr again GtHted in l:l
news conference that trw .Secreta:r.y had his "tmquulified
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support" :l.n thu iidminis.trution •s efforts to create a
security axranbement for Southeast Asia.14
To rally t;nu strength of collective security,
Secretary Dulles t.lu:ougtwut the second

~veck:

of April

consulted <.;itl:l diplomatic repJ: :e;Hntati.ves of frien,Hy

governments J.n both fJ;u:ror;e bnd M;ia.l5

The purp(.)$6 ~tlhen •

before going to London and P<::risa he had llis tulks 1c1ith a
number of' h!!lbnssadors 1>1as twofold:

to €;et some; colll!lJOn

declarution f'rom tha governments di:rec·tly conoern0ci 1rii'ti1
the

Com~,un:i.st

threat to Soctth<Jar;t Asia that 1/Ja•..:tld

their solidarity in ternw \1hi.ch tho

Ch.in~'se

exp:es~·

r::ommunists

could not ml.stah12J; and to impress those gove:rn.ments

sense of m::e;enoy

~:.~bout

the

P~'lip:!.n:~-mounted

~Jith

'th<c

Vietminl1

military act1on in Indochina that they did not yet saom to
share with the Unlted States l:tt that timl!l.

lt app•Jared

obvious to Dulles tl1at the fury of trw Vietminh assault on
Dienbienphu Vias a matHmver to strength<:n ttl<J posj.tion of
Communist China vis-a-vis France nt the; Gomlng Geneve<
con:fer<ance:

it ;ws eqm.tlly obviom' that a strone; counter

mamll1ve:r sl10tl.Ld be made by the non-Conmtmist m;tions before

14,James Heston in the ~l£:tl!;_'l':i.nleS 0 Jvlay 6, l95t1.
1 5 vial tor H. ha 6gon<:):r in th" N!!'''· X,Q.12Ji ,I~. April J.O,
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th<l conference met.

united decliiiHtion

This should take tho form of some
~lith

Whlch nc-.tions in the Far am

vieste:rn .Pacific 1IJOUld !Je as:oociated.
In his

\·Jashinz~ ton

•

talks v;i th the h.rnbassado:rs t !>lr.

Dulles rUd noi; issue an ult,imatl1Jn.

''His accent vms on a

sho<J of unity in a :form ,,Jhich woulc1 be poli tiea11y possible

for all tl1c signatories. "16

Vihen thE; nq::crts of' th; se

conw;rs::.ttions by the Ambas;,ado:rs :reached th<i
lo~;

~;md

of the

relay from.,,,.,,the (lecri':ltaxy to thl:i .Fc.rei.c;n Office

spokesman in London and Paris, tl1e "ultimatum" idea h:1cl

rc:,jacticn in advance of formal p.ropo:All.

,,nd since stJch a

declaration at nny time t>as impossible o:f survival in French
politics, a similar leak- viaS muda in Paris fm: th" same
"l""PO''
'

1-'' 4-J.

n
,~. ~"

1 '1

'J?ha ole d avelopl!lents coni'ix med thfl gr ovJ ins bEl lief' of
Dulles t;hat ttw genoral ideu c:ould not bEl vJorked out by
relay bt1t must bro discussed at first htmd.

And since Big

Tlu:ee unity is by fa:r the most j,mportant factor in ·the
16ttrthu:r Krock in the ~ Jo:rk ~tl• April 18, 1954,
17,\feal s·tanf'ord in the Chris ti&n Science Monitor.
Apr i1 10. 1954.
- - - - - -

'#'

internationel tug-oi'-'""H, there v;as mwessi ty of •Jerking
out a common attitude before they faced the Communist

powers at GBneva.

So Dulles

f1e~1

to London &nd P<tris in

mid -J>pr :l.l to explain to the foreign ministers and their
most influerrt:iul advisers in persor! what h<! had in mind-one ttling being that he i1ad no intention, as chareed

abroad, t;o ·txy to "torpedo" the Geneva oonf<Honce in
advance.l8
In a stutem(mt read to mn>sman outside tho

\~est

\iing

of th<> v;llito House, Dulles dowc:dbed such a unit,Jd front as
••obviously deairable,"

1'llis lei't little or no room for

questionin,; the administrat:l.on 1 c; decision t;o proceed as
speedily as possible c.Ji tll

area.

11

unit;ed action" in tt11.1 trueatened

Before Dclllas could lGave Washington by plane this

message VJas already in tho tk<tnds of the officials J1e VJas to

meet in London and Pari".

In his statemBnt t;he .'cec:r etary

again called attention, as he and President l!:isenhovJer havG
done at frequant intervals, to tll'.l threat o.f GoJrununist
aggression to tho ••entire area" of Soutl1east Asia..

Hecall-

ing trw unity achieved by the th:rtHJ hestern powers at the
July

11

summ:t t" conference in Berlin which

l!,b.Ve

birth to th0

18chicattQ JJ§:ilOL: Tribune, September 1. 19f:i4.

1--
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a~:p!:lement

for tlle Geneva

meetin~&

Ni th the Communists on

Koxea and Indochina, Dulles declell'ed;
Now the t!l!fJe of us need to join otu stxength and add
to it the strength of others in order to cr eats the
ncndi tions needed to a::;cure that the conference lf.lill no-t
lead to u loss of f.'reedom in .Southeast Atlia, but \-Jill
preserve that freedom in peace and. justice.
His trip to London and Paris • lw said, is ••a mission of
pe£iC6

thro Uoh
lit

S trelliSth.

nl9

tlle conclusion of ttwir meetings in London on

Mril 13~ secretary of State Dull<lS and B:rHisr1 Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden issued this joint statement:
~le hawr had a full exchanse of vie1vs with ref~Jnmce
to Souttwas t &dJia. v:e deplorol the fact tt~ t on the
eve of the Geneva conference the Communist forces in

Indocblnn ~ua :i.nc:roa~;ingly developing their activities
into a large-scale \Val' against the forces of the
French Union. They seek to ove:rtt1ra111 the la111f'ul an:I
friendly government of V1Gtneul 0 111hich 1r1e recognize. and
they have invaded Laos and. Cm!lbodia.

·,.a J:.saJ.lze that. thuse !'lctivities not only thr0atBn
those nmv directly :lnvolved. but also endanger the
peace and EJeourity of the entire area of' Southeast Asia
and tt10 Vlestern Pacific, where our two nations and
other friendly Allied nations t1rlve vi tal interests,
Accordine;ly t'ia are read.y to taka part ~Ji th thf:;
otiler cotmtries primarily (10nce:med in an examination
of tha poc;sl bili ty o:f ostabllstlin~:; a uolleetive
defense within tile framevlork of thG Ghart~H of tb:; Unit<ld
Nations Organi;mtion to assure thH peace, security and
freedom of Southeast i>sia and the \~est;er n pa.cific.

----·--19quoted in the ~ Xo.rlr Times, Jlpr:U 10, l9fl4.

8b

• • • We believe that tlle prospect of es tabl5.sil.lng
a unity of dei'<msiV<J purpose throughout souttH1ast Asia
and thr; Vies tern Pacific will contribute to an t10norable
peace in Indochina.
Like1·1is.e • on lipr i l 14, Secretary Dulles ani .Foreign 111nis-

ter (Jeorges Bidault of France

i.SUHld

a joint cormmmique in

Par is; mccer pts from the text f'ollo":
I<'or nearly tt>o centuries it 11as_hEJeD-the-'j:J:t:act.tce-------===
Jl---------.fo-r---x<rprfJSenM.tives of our tvw na tlons to meet to~
gether ·to dlsm~ss the grave lsc:.ues 1•htch from time to
time i1ave confronted us.

In p1XnJuance af' this custom, ~<hich ~'" t1.0pe to contirl~
ue for thr; benefit of ourselves and. others, ~Je have had
an e.x<:tlcn1.ce of VievJ:;.- on Indoch:lna and ;:~out.h~;::ast i~eia"
• . , • 1'ie deplore thG fact that on tl1G eve of tl1e
Geneva conference this aggression has r>!la(:rwd a new
clima;; in V:lutn&m, pc.rt:i.Gularly <.'.t .Dienbi<mpl1u, and
h~;~.s been rene;;;ed in Laos and extended to Cambodia.

The ind<Jpundem:e of the tttX'M As so cia tmi Gtates
\d thin the }rench Union, Vll:.ictl ne'<i t'I.G,:r.eemmYts are to
complete, is at stnkGI in these battles. l':e recognize
that tc10 prolonge;tion oi' tlHi t;a:r ln I.ndoeh:tna • • •
D.lso threatens thG entire area of' Sm:~theast hsiu und of
·the U<lstern Pacific. In close arwociation ••ith other
interestot! nations, t-ie will examlne tile posc>ibility of
<JstablL~rll.ng, Vlithin tile frr:illHltwrk of tl:w United Nations
Charter, <> collective defeuse to <U\\Sl!Xe the peace,
secu.ri·t;y anu fxsedom of this nx·ea.

recogni;:e that our basic ob;joctive at the (;,;n-:wa
conference t1ill be to seek the re-establishment of a
peace in Indoctlina vJhic;!l \·Jill ~:afegnard the freedom of
its people and the independenee of the "ssoci.a ted
states. 1'ie are ocmvincad tha-t the po~>sibHity of.'
obtuintng th:l.::> obje1ctive depends l1pon our solidarity.
111e

Th<:; United states dalegation considered these a
concrete 1ldvanee t01ntrd tl1'> oxgani.zation of

commun:!. ty in southeast 1\Eda.

tt

defensive

F'nrtl'l2 rmore • the prospect of'

,_'
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defensive unity in the ·c:roubled area "'as regarded by the
United Dtatas as a contribution toc·:a:rd an

peace settlement in Indochina becULlse it;

11

honorab1(>"

pre~:or.ted

to the

Communbt bloc a "stronc; alternutive" to ttle failure of

----------~A~p_r_i_l~1~.5~·~u~p~·o_J_1_r_l1_s__r_v_c_t_ur_·_n__f_r_o_m__s_''_l_·c~•p_o~·~f_,e_''_:r_·e_-t_e_tr_y~•--Du_·_l_l_e_s______--------======

JL,

1

himself said:
1 returned well satisf'ied With "the :resL1lts of my
trip • • • • That ande:rstanding has been greatly
enhnnced by tbe tallf;s >Villch I h<,vo l:Jnd in London '•<i th
Prime HinistGr GhurohilJ. and For<dgn oec:reta:ry Eden 9
am: thB tall{"; I have rlad in paris vii th Pr0micr Laniel
Hnd F'orsign ~·1inister Bidault, our common pu:q:>oses tH;re
v""ll'"'"~•··~cl
... :. . .>.~_..~,.').~'""·

'r. jo4l1''
c··rat· ""'t•·t''·•·
'·I''~~~.,
·;c '-"'''<.\' on
.,..,.v ....,u
'-'.HH-o~V.,J
'<L~.t.UJ. '·'"'
ijliv
-.~•;;:.lV\'4
.\..I.

.t.~A

Tuesday in London and ylisto:rday in Pa:ris.20
HovJeve.r, there 1vas difficulty in reconciling the
of:l.'iciul United s·tates interpretation with Eden's descrlp-

tion in tho House of Com1nons.

For extilllplb,

~::~fto:r

tr1e

havinJ; told the left..:wine; Labo:rite leader, Jmuerin Bevan.

that Be v~m vJould Lo "cornple te ly

inaccu:n~ to"

in CiHlil16 the

ag:ree••H:mt "a defin:l.te commitment to trnc<B certain action in
certain cir<:ums tances."

1954.

1'o th6 "' Qcompanlr;,ent of OppoEJi tion
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that the ag:ceoment ''Will be unive:rsally regarded as a
.surrender to American pressure" and might "jeopardize all
llopes of negotiatill(, 1111 th t.he Co.mrn<m1<st bloc and settlement

in Korea and Indoc!llna."
v;as ·that he

-~·

terms as

w:.

k.l1S1rl

Eden's retort, it was reportedt

Dull0s vJould be criticized ''in the same

01
Devan· has used <,;bout me.""'

----~~~~~~~~--~=
'rtw UnHed litates attitude v·;as t;rmt the concexrc of

· L .

Asian collective defense had been accepted in principle by
the British.

J.J<mce, it <Vas argued a working party could

be set up irmaod:l.a.te1y in Viashington to cUscuss details for
a more or lc1E;,s

Southeast Ar:J.a.

p~1xmanent

Ol'ganization of' 'l;l:le ro tions of

This I'Jork:ng party, :tt trJas sa:td. conld

star·t its prooeedir""s durine; thEJ Geneva oonfercmcE:• appa.rently on tho theory that ·trlis vJol.l.ld r eruind ·t;lle Comwunis t
bloc nati.ons of tho conseql.l.ences of a fuilu:re to negotiate

honestly.
:Ch<':l United K:tngdom did not ~lhaxe 'Gn.Ht viaw.i~B

1'llo

.British considered that the: organization of a defensive
system must awl shouJd be a thorough 0nct detailed business.

21Benjamin ':elles, dispatch from Lonaon dated
April 14, 1954; in tt1.:1 Nev. Yo~r' Times, Ap:dl 15, 191)4.
2 ZJoseph
April 16, 1954.

c.

Harsch in th<J

Dolence
----·-

Ch:risti<:~n

~'i.Onitol'.

"'
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••must mJait tiw rGe.ctions of the ot;lla:r interested countries

before determining vJhat steps

1110

take next."

told the House that Britain's main
emph!·rtichlly" to obtain vlh!.c t
peace "honorable to a_ll

~~

\;as "most

Labor qw;stionar called a

parti~c~s"

vJas to open Apxil 26., 1954.23

ob~)ective

Moreover, Eden

at tho uonference rltlich

Ftuthe:rmo:rs. as a B.Il.C.

diplomatic correspondent contended;

The United Kingdom Gove:r.nmen:t <lid not vmut to ente:r
into any ne<J ar:ral'l,\;,mnents until tlH; results of the
(kmeva conference v1ere known. lt ~ws argued i.n London
that you COL!ld not draw a security line unless you
first knet" \>here ttl6 sect.t:rity line in Indoc11ina 111as goinc;
to be,24
The

~§.

of London voic1ed a

,~,eneral

vi eM •Jh<m it said:

So long as there is ground. for hoping that the
conference may produce E\OilHJ r;:;sults, it 1;ould
seem both premature and imprudent to m&ke a public
declaration based on the expect(ition tbat 1t ~~ill
fai1.25

Geneva

This 1-1as the British line of reasoning.

Becatlse of

SU(Jh an attitude, P:res:ld ant Eisenhcnver, in his nevis

conference of May .Hi, 1954, hinted at an Asian alliance
wi tt1out Bri tuin.

<.:>k<~d

I•Jhethu:r such a pact t:ould be

fo3Ne'd_ Yofk 'l'imes, ilpril 14, 1954.

~!h

25Quoted by Anne O'lltixe i•icCormick; in the ~ ~
April 10, 1954.
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effective without Britain •s support, tt1e President vJas
reportt•d to have replisd in ai.'fect:

(1) It must be remem-

bered that .hllstralia and Nevi zealand were the members of

the British
\•~itll

Couunon\~ealth

t.hat "ere directly involved.

(2)

the part;icipations of the proper i\f>iatic nations--and

this participation he described as the first indispen;;:.able
--H mi6 ht be possible to create an alliance that. •;nile not
so b:road as one misht lil1::e • nevm~theles<>, coqld be 1>Jorkable."'C>6 The big factor, 1.1oVHlver, was tl1at tt1e Governmerrts
of' 1\.ustralia and Ne1>J Zealand shared 'tile British vlevJpoint.

In the past,
government

,~ustraliun

re;.~arded

sour cas have indica't<Jd that their

a Pacific allhmce as urgent..

mattE;r of' fact, Australia''; Fo:reign

~iinister

• Richard G.

G11sey, t'as NW of the very first to conceive of a
i;o d ef.end sou the as t l-;:,la. n27

As a

"net~

plutl

But once the Geneva conference

betan, 1\ustrttli.a agreed with Britain tll.Ht little could be
done unti-l the talks on an Indocrlina settlement 1•ere

completeo..2B

Similarly. T. Clifton ('.:ebb of i\levJ Zealand

served notice on liiay BO thBt hi<> country 1 s government

1954.
27Jiiohard G. Gasey, "Tela<< Plan to J)efe nd .sou the as t
l:m! \'Jorld Report, XXXVII (July
16, 1954), [)0.

Asia," Unite9_ §.tates JLetvs

1954.
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could not join a Southeast Asia alli<lnce unless Britain

The cause o:f t,he difference in approaches bat111een

the United StntHs and Great Brita:m

~e;as

well explairwd by

President Eisenhov;er himself 1.n a nc;nvs conf'ererwe on May 5 1
1954.

neading from a formal statement the l?res;tdent

se~ :Ld:

It ·,.;as H:t:. Dl~LLes; t:lmino;, not his objective, that
the British opr:osed. They agreed 11 southuast L;sia
pact should riD ve the support of as many As:lan nations
as possible. They insh,ted it Nould take time to l.et
the consent of ti1ose nations an<1 such an agreement
scaxoely could be negoti.ated by Gongres''•
Besides • London argued, thG \'/estern pov1ers stlould not
annourwe in adv;,.nca itJh<ot they we:re going to do militurily
if :tt fulled, The r~Jsult of tt1is ;-;as that secretary
Dulles did not get his united action policy ahead of
GenevH and vms not able to negotiate f':rom strength
there • • •

vn,1a t is now clea:t:ly d eveloplnt.~ is a kind oi compromise. }~ri te.i.il did r:.ct •·mnt to negotiate a Southeast
il.sia nact until ufte:r the Geneva conference and Ne lv<mted
to ar1r1ounce at least t.he beginning of one before tho
start of that conf'e:rence. Instead • the pact actually
is i:>eine; negotiatedp or at lanst di;.,ctwsed during the
Conference.
The fact tl"J&t such an Ol:\,anization is in procesf; of
.fornwtj.on co,Jl.d i1ave an imp or 'cant bearinb tlpon tvt1at
happens at Gewwa dctring the Indocl1ina phase of the
Conference.29
Developments on th;s · other cnmp

bright, either.

------

1rH:Jl'e

not all st:mny und

Diff'e:ren<:es in the political upproacl1

29quotod in tho ~ XQ_rk Times, May 6, 1954.

!_
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bet1r•een the Soviet and Chinese delegations to ttw confer-

ence v;ere described as "deeper than those now separatingn
the Unit<Jd Btates, Britain and France over policy in Indochina and Korea.

Stated a ct:Lspatch from Loudon in the

~

-

York Times:

1

A number of.' hints ~~ere dropped by soviet offlci.<Jls
-------,t,-;i:o;llic;-t~F~o=r~e':ign l'linisJ;_er_Mulo_to_v_&ncLnis-HdY-isor-s--'~!e-re-t;t'-y------c===
ing to restrain the Gt1l.nese deleg<e.tion from imprudent
_·
action at the conferonce tabl<J and elseWh<Jre.

1
ll--11

I

1
I

I

The :British ackno~>Jled,jJCl tho possibility that those
l1ints 1:1ere circulated as part of' a Communist effort to
uis courage l·iestern firmnes;; w:J. tt1 threat;> of resulting
nggres!llon alsevlhere in A:c.ia.

Our infoxm<>nt believed that trw Chinese 9 encouraged
no dot~bt by the :recent d1Bpl<;y of it-! estern dis unity
over air interventj.on in Indochina, no111 conslt\ (;red
that by mainttdninb mlli tary prHssure Communi:3t forces
could ;,Jin the entire country.
Continued tho dis patch.
The Htwsians • on tht; other hand, are said to talre
the ·,teste:rn intention of ostablishing a syotam of
collective defense in Sout.heest Asia much. more "' erioc1s
than their Asian alliElS. But they tJ.:ro pictured as
believitlio; that i f the fie;ilting, but not ·t;he political
infiltration of' ;rndochim; is ended nm~ plhns for the
ree£;t;ablishment of a defense syutom 111i1l not set very
far and • <>t tl:le ;,ame time, a 1•are: that mif:,ht become a
starting JJoint for u l<orld uonflict l<~ould be <Jliminated.30
,
'rile df.lveloping plans for the secuxity of' Southeast

Asia

~JEJHl

beginning to emphasize the need not only i'ol'

30Drevl Middleton, dispatch from r..ondon dated May 7•

1954; in the

!:12.

;cork

I~.

May

a.

1954.
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military ,safeguards but in te:rms of economic devr>lopment as
••ell.

"~·Jith

allied ano friendly nations consulting on

prap,.. :rations for a prosp<lCtive southeast Asian conference,"
wrote ''<lltGr H. 'daggoner of the
Vlashington, D.

c.,

~

Yox·k Times from

"a three-point regional defense p:og:ram

is taking shape hare."

These points are;

creation of an alliance of the

·,~estern

FirHt, the

polrJers and the fr.ee

nations in Sout11oast Asia tind the Facif:!.c that >11ollld
rEJspond in unison to milltary agg:rossion.

B<'lGOfidp

the

strengthening of internal security forces to minimize the
possibility of subversion or inf i1 t:ration. of free governments in tll;o threatened area.
need for a

long~ran.:;e

'L'hi:rdly t xefl<loting tho

progra;r. fox combating Comraunism.

would be th<l enccun;.geraent of economic development ftnd

stubility to eliminate the conditlons on wJtlich Clommunism and

oti}er subversive movements feed.3l

As v;ill be noted shortly

these points actually became the basis for the main provis-

ions of th<:-t 1'reaty.

Although th<J essence of th.e Sl];ATO Pact 11as indicatet:i
to the public almost from the

p:rap~;:rHtion

of the first

93
tentative

drai't~

no actual text was released in advance of

the approval of the first draft by the governments of' tf1e
original pro"pective member states.

By 111ay of' explanation,

the g<lne:ra.l public was given to understand that negotiations
on tho treety were cond:1cted in official secrecy because.

l

appa:Jlf,lntly, the 1id,sl'ws

~:u:ld

interests of the proposed part-

-------cn"'e""·r"'s'-'·~to the treaty needed to b<J understood and ft.tlly

f'--·

~

1

i

considered prior to such commitment as 1t10uld be involved in
the release of even a tm1tative draft.

i>lso. there

appear<Jd to huve been a feelirlb that the

les~;

!mown by

unfriendly po11HlJ:S of the proposed treaty content and the
problems of nogotiation tho more effective the result mi.ght

be.
On Doptember 2, 1954, an advance woxkin£!., party that
inolud ed all the ei;:;ht countries through

th~Jir

technical

experts met in Manila in consultations on draft proposals.

Nobody .vas

goi~;

to the confel'lmce "cold" or unprepared to

cope with the bas.ic suggestions.

MJ a me.tter of fact, the

proposed treaty has already t<Jacrwd ;lts second or trd.rd

draft as ttw resqlts of studies in Wast1ington concerning u

Department •s exchanges of opinion

i>J.'L th

t.he other countries

concerned.

and London th<l <tgreE:ll'i objaotive vw.s to obtain a pact stu tint;;

94

the commitments of the :t-'flrticipants, re,tller than to set

up an organi.zation comparable to ttle North
Tile

1~tlantic

'7: ()-

Treaty.,),_,

'
foresaw tlm main
problem at the conference

diplC~mats

lvatJld be to define the commitments to be 'r;:;quir<.Jd of' each

partie :I. pant.

l

One possibl<l extreme would be a coro:mltrocnt

along 'thG Jines of the Brmssels treaty of

!:-.-------w,m.,ch
1

!
!

111ar

~~arch,

1945,

reqLlill:d Britain, France, and the Benelux to go ·to
i f anyon<a of them !.vas a·l;tacked.

at.rto.mu.tic~'lly

'.l'he

United Stetos Constitution vJOuld noi; pexrnit such a coill.!Uitment.

l'he North ;,tluntic 'I'roaty contfd.ns a slit,rltly less

;

p:t:Elcise ()OJUlllitment,
be considered <m

"s uctl mea sur ~;B

It says an attack on one country shall
on s.11, and ew.:h stwll

att~:wk

1 t deems necessury,

&.b

incle~di.ng

tll<'.ll

·t;ake

the-; use of'

fo:rc1o to restore und maint!iin "ecuri'ty in tile North
AtlantJ.c area,"

Th<J ANZUS treaty a1nong thf,, United States,

Australia und Now .;;,ealsnd is vague in that it; requires each
country to ••act to meet the Communist darle_.er :i.n accordance
with its constitutional processes."
The Un1 ted
tbe

discuss~lons

st~J.tcs

draft >rias accepted as tt:e bHSis for

at the first meeting of c;xperts attondine;
The tlu ee maln sect ions upon

'
"
t·11e
pre 1'.lm j.•'laxy
e>ess' ions.'-''X3

----

""<:>N
~"''lew

v.~.ox 1t

'"i
i. mes

'

' .· ·.
J·•ll><US
.....

t 1·""• l<'"'
,.,14.

z,::J'l'il.lman Durdin, dispatch f':rom Nauilu datGd
september 1, l9f;4; in the ~ York ·:r~, Beptembe:r 23, 19(.>4.
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which the experts had to attem] t to :reach the widest
possibl(i measure of agreement on details before the top
level representati-ves took over vJe:re:

military commit-

ment, mutual aid a1;ainst subversion, aril mutual economic
aict.3 4

On

1~1ue,ust

15, 1954 • it vJas announr;ed that a confer-

ence of tho United St<Ites and seven otl1er nations on t;he
~formul<>tion

ot a Southeast ll<;ian collective securit;y

treaty vJill begin in Nanila September 6.

'l'he other coun-

tries to be repl'0Sented lcJere "Britain, l;'rlmce, J;ustralia,

\

Nevi Zealand, Pakistan • the Ph:llippin<Js, and 'l'llnilans.

I

Annotlncement of the conference was made simultaneously

l

in th€ cai>itals of 'th<il

partidpat.in~

countries.

The United States State Department issued a circtllar

that said briefly:
Thu Government of the United t>tates has agl'<Jed v;ith
other like-minded governments that thiJ situation ln
southeast ,.f.;ia calls for t.he establishment or a collective secu:r:Lty arran,~emont, in accordance 1riith the
purposes and principles of thG Gh!ir te:r of t;he Un1ted
Nations • to <i trengti:lcm the fabric of' peace in tile
general area of' southeast ilcd.a and the southwest Paol;Cic.

--

i\Cle.ms Llabmidt in the Ne~J York 'rirnE;s,
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Accordingly • the Gover nm<Jnt of the Philippines
ha vin(; offered facilities in Baguio, L,rater chanGed to
Hanil~ tile f'meign ministers of 'the govorn.me.nts
concerned hELVe agreed to meet there on September 6 to
consider mt-Jasure~> to further their common objectives in
trw ar(ol.l., This meetin~ follo"s consultations bet;veen
the Uni tcJd sta tas Governmen·t ancl o tiler Gov<Jrnmen ts over
the past four montt1s.

"-----.~o-itli;~-c-n-e-oLJ-t-i.nUo-us-l~y'--s-inc-e--se c.r-t~

ta:ry--o;e--s t-a te--Dullatr ---------·-·------

first broached thG call for ••united action'' ln a speech on
!!;arch 29, 19M, finally took on no\1 dimensions,
VI.
r

1I
I

THl Mi\NILA CONF'EHJ£!NCE OF 1954

'£h.ere vJas no question tlmt the foremost desire of

:resnl ts and to pr<:;ser.ve. thra largest
possible.

m<:;asu:~:e

of' unity

l:lut tills did not ms an that the Conference was all

sweetness and lit:ht.

There

\~ere

debates, --plenty of them.

One of the most controversial issues of the Conference centered on the nature of ·tne militaiy commitment.

t~

number of cielegates, in :par·t;icular the Philippines and
Tl1ailand, 'Z5
'·' advocated tile conclusion of a pact providinG for
m~tomr::.tic

military action

victims of aggression,

a~ainst

pact m<Smbers "kw \Hlre

Sttci1 a prov:Ls:tcm ito contained in
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the North iltlantic 'rreaty,

In this l'egard, Herman Phleger,

United .Stat<Js State Department advisor, explained the
inabUlty of t.he United states Government to sign a
commitment for automatic cu.:tion ut the
exp<>rts

~r;orking

on the drai't.

meetin~

of technimll

He shot1ed conference delegHtes

that congressional sentiment had hardened. against f\trther _ _ __
commitments of the NATO-type.

He explaJ.neet

that the Stat<fJ

va:ote the d:r:af't treaty that v1as used as a
worldn<; document with congressional v5.e;.1s in minct. 36
Depertm~mt

t

I
[

The

draft provides i'or aotion agaj_n,;t aggressors only in
acco:rd~:<noe

1rdth thcJ "constitutional

p:roct~sses"

of each

I'

[
'

]

pact slgnato:ry.
lv!aanwhiJ.a~

the quastion of ivheth'l:r tr10J proposed

i

treaty be protective spaciiicaJ.ly only ugtdnut Gomnumist

IJ

aggression had upp€)ar ed as <!noti1ar conference issue.

i

'l'he

article in the United states draft dealin;;; vJith sanctions
againl't urm0d atttHJk mentions act:l.()!lS only ,,.gains t
Colllmunist aggression.

Most ottler delegations favored a

mora general de.tiniti.on of aggression.

I
i

'

Homnlo 9 in a

public e;ddress in Mallila, Augus·t 30, wanted. to condemn
· a&,ressive impel'lalism a!ld coloniali.sm

~Jlong

vJi·th

35.Benjamin ltiells, dis patch from Manila datod
September z. 1954; itl th~; Ji'!Yl. Yorlr 11!!!2&, September 3, 1954.

---
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Communism. 37

ildvocates of a broude:r description of

agg:ression. incllldj.ng the British CornmomJealth officials,

l
1
1

:felt such a terminolo;;y <Jould 'be more palatable to Indian
flnd

other mmtralist Asian opinion.

particu1ur, had in mind the problem of lU<'lintainirl6 as much

l

C·:ammomvealth <Wlidarity vJith
iL_______________
_

1
IT

The British, in

Indi~.

as posdbl"·

Both ti1a

British and the Pald.stuni delegations took stron" stbnd on
this question; the British contention bei.l16 tt1at to mune
only Communist. agt,):'asslon 1r1ould be unduly p:rovocatj.ve to
Hed China, l;o

~clhich

recognition.

:rho Unitt>d states, on the other hand • vms

government the Bx;tt:lsh

011e

diplomatic

• • • relc~etant to have ctle dascJ:iption of roiggress:lon
so general that i t '>Jould call. for United ctatGs
actior:. in quarrels bet~;een non-Cmmnunist Asi<•n n<.<tiom>t
for example, India and
Paltdstan, (the latte:r a sie;na•;.;: ;l.i
toxy), over .Kaslw1ir •"'"'
In this connection 1 I<luhammed Zafrullatl Kl1an, Pakistani
Foreig,"l Minister and head of his delegation, upon t;he
conclusion of tru> conference said that Pakistan vwulcl h••lp
ht;r neighbor India if lnd.i.a 11lere tlu:eatenod by any kind of
danse r, includiw,c, a Communist at tack,

J:l'ut h€ added ttr; t,

snch support viOL1ld depend on <<he that India >·JOuld pend t
---·--~--

37 Quot<+Jd in

t.tlG

lli!!i XQ.!J£ :fimes, Aug;ust 31 0 1954,

36" nou theast Asia; Cloud of Diff.i.cml ties~" 'J.:.illl<J ~,
LXIII, (SeptEimbe:r l~,, 1954). 32.

.;-o
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fmoth<:r controversy cantered around the questionoi'
>>hethe:r tn\3 t:raaty should mention protection of Cambodia,
Laos, and south Vietnam from ned aggNssion as its aim.

Prince \,'an of' 'l'bailand supported thv Uni.ted Stat<as in
urging th:d; ttl<a__J;rm;H3__ §ta tel,lj:J_e_.l.11_c~gdeg_irl_lr!e__ar,;a_-to
l1e

protact~rd,

taking issc;e 1rJ:!.th British Corrm•on\Hilalth and

Pllilippine delue;ntes ldllo 1.oanted no specific mention of
protection for l;hz Indoci1ina territories.

l'he

Pe~ldstan

pact a ptaely unti-Corwaunist one and against including
speo:!.fic ;;m;1:rant<Je of Cambodia, Laos$ arlil free 1li0tnam.
The reason for tt1is stand by Pakistan as "ell as a similar ·

stand tlJ' tl:le Philipp:tnes "seemingly lies in u :reluctance to
guarantee areas that <>Ie ::rtill

:to~,a:rded

dominated rather than in any lack of'
dete:rmina tion. u40

as colonial l"rench-

anti~Gommunist

Only the UnHGd [;tr;tes and Tba:tland

stood for S[Xicifically inclucUnc; tl1esa ·cnree states in th<1
treaty area.

----,.·--39walter Simlll<ms, ct is patch .from han:I.la dated
September 0• 1954; in the Ghica~ J:?ail.'l, l':r:lbune. tleptembe:r
9 •. 1954.

40Tillman Durdin. dlspatch from W>nilH dated SE>ptmabe:r 7, 1954; in tile f.L~ ill!£ Time:;, boptember 7 • 1954.
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Controversy over com1iu a ration of the article deaJ.it1g \V:i.th

stages

economic measures developed tov,ard tt1e final

0f

t.hu Conference.

to .;et the \\'estern

po~;ers

The lis ian :r. epr esentat:!.vos s ou 6 ht

committed to specific pro;;;rruns,

wh<sreas the Unit4!d States, Britain, Australia, and N(t\>J

Zeal<md --thc; ne:tion<J that would be provid il"JG

I~ he

economic
- - - -

assistance under tho pact--held
gem•ral arnm,;:;ements.

o~>t

for pilnrissive and

It ;·.Jas understood that Britain dld

not lt.'ant to see the Colombo Plan,

~>hich

operates vvith.in

incorporatGd into ttv; economic machinery of.' the 8outhGast
Asia pact,
Chi£!1}1;jO

In a dispatch from Manna .sleamed in the

Qa~J,:,:

l'l:ibune, ':ialter Simmons

:r~::1p0r

ts;

Pakistan delogat•m :'Ho.id Britain had expressed con~
cern over Pakistan's participation in the r::anila
Confererwa >>arning tt1e.n< ttlat India mi,_sht succeed in
gettine; Pakistan kicked out of the eleven-nation
Colombo bloc if she signed any defense c:o!flmi tm<mt at
Manila • • •
The report cont.inued,
British concern ovar ttKI Colombo bloc ~rJas explained
by the de Hire to pr 1went India from completely domin~
atirJc., tlH> group, , • , vii tll pukis tan out, the Hr i t ish
felt thut India ,,;;ould l:iield complete control over tne

weaker nations.41

--

-

4lvialt ex Sinu:wns, dispatch from Maniltc dated
7, 19M; in thH g_hic_£~0 Q§.;!Jz. :!,'!ibune,
September 8, J.954.

Sept~Hnber
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.

The Asian delegates to the conference took the vie"' that
the pact shoulc1 l:lring to them ,;peclal economic aid tile.t
\>O'Jld not

1;,0

to nations outs:W e the pet ct.

'l'i1c fe.ct is that

mL<tual economic assistance provides tlw United r;tates j;Jith
an opportunity to exert its influel1ce in the realm in \'Jhictl
.llmericuns particularly excel.
The last important pxoblom involved in ccmrleting
the pact that bound trw signers to

r~::sist

aggression in the

pres or ibed area vJas reported settled in a cJo:.oci eonfexence
session on the mon1ing of Sept ember

s.

\I'Jhat f'ollovm is the

account given at th!cl last day of the con:fo:re.nc<il b;l Tillman

-

York Times.
.

He said:

-New

Tl1e morning session vJS.O not terminated t.mtil 1:15
.P.M. • rno:re tllun i'cu.r hou.rs after it had began. A round
of c:lappins vJas hcoard fl'Clil the c:losec\ conference twll
before dele,;ates emerged stniling ani x ernarked: "It 1 s
all ovex."
•

lt i:; understood that purely technical details of
draftinb took a t;!<Jat d<lal of tim<l after basic agreement rwd boen r'mched on Otltstancl111i·, quesi;ions. All
other Wlljor obstael(.;s to the conclusion of the treaty
vJere :resolved at ti>O intensiv!J, three hour closed
sessions of tho treaty conference delegates ye&terday
morn:lns and afternoon. (Daptember 7). Difi'lcL<lties
1i<eNl :reported to have developed on a number of' points.
But compxomises were reached and mos·t dettdls ~>Jerel
settled f'or a paet that >Vill not differ greatly from
the t:rettty proposals the United states sqbmitted as a
.vo:rkinc; dxaft to exrerts of the e~,, ht. po.vers c;ho assemble(! to produce a comnos :its docmnent he.,ro last 1rleek.42

---·--ber

~.>,

42'J?Hlman Durdin, cUr;patch from Manila dated cepteml9b4; in th<> ~York.£~, September e, 1954.
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To wrap up the Conference succet,sfully • it became
necessary that compromises be made.

The Un:Ltcd Statos

compromi<>ed on the insistrmce that tt1e pact be exclusivtlly
tm

anti-CmrllllUtli~\1;

one.

It vJas agrowd to state tl1at us far

as the United states vJas concerned ttHJ pact arplied only
to Collllllunist augrassion.

In return, John :FcltltEi.1.' Dt:ILLes

conceded tho omission of thG vmrd "Communism" ln :reforence
to agg;ression in tlH; operative I!Iticle of thEl treaty.

Advocacy o:t:' a. NA'.i?O-type claut;<'!

deemil:li~

an assault on all. especially by

an attack on one

nale~;;ates

of the

assertedly ilu.d maintained that a proposed caluHa in the
Southeast Asia i;reaty provi6lng for action against

aggression aocordtn;;e; to constitutional processes
v;aake:r than tl1e Atlantic pact provisions.

\~as

not

ln deciding

that ttw erea of the treaty would be "tl1e general area of
Southeast; i\Sla, includinr::; the <mtire ter:rito:ries of ttle
Asian membG:rS of the pact and the South 1.¥est Pacific," but
"not· includ ine; the Pacific area nor til o:f 21 dcgre<ls 30
minut<HJ north," tile United r>tat<>s a.nd Britain actually

compromised since tl1is line .excltldes both Hon6 Kor),;s anu
Jl"ormosa.

Thailand and the United

St~o1tes 0

advocates of

havtng the operative articltl of the ·t;reaty specifically
state thL<t

CL~rnbodia,

Laos

1

and South Vietnam be

protected~

agreed to a J!'rench prc;posal that mention of tiul thxee StatEm
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be made in a protocol. <Jllich is included as a part of Li1e
treaty documento/

lt was deemed inadvisable to include any

spec:!.f'ic montion of Vietnam in the op<lrative a.:rticl(' of
the southHI:lst As.ia treaty ln v.l.evJ of 'theJ

~f:lase-fire

agree·

ments prol.J.ibiting eitrHli of tha tvJo Vietnams from enteninb
into any !find. of mili ta:ry pa.ct untH
in 19bti.

~~lections

a:re held

;Lho, i t l<;ft the proe,rams aud instrumentalities

for econorn.ic assistance mainly d lscretl.ona:ry.
'rhe e.l.ght si tJ;nato:rieo to the

~louttleast

hsia Colloc-

tl.ve Defense Troaty, as the pact became on'icla.l.y designated, as lis·ted in tile of.ftcial directory of the

Ims tralin:
.
'
.

Richard G. Ga.sey • Minister of
fl:xternal Lf'fain> •

Ji'rn.nco:
T. Clifton V!ebb, J•!;inister of
Exter n,.l Af:t'airs.

Pakistan:

Chaudh:r i Hullwmn<l1 ZafJ: tllla JJ1<H1~
M5.nis tc:r fo:r. Fou:llc,n f>.i'l'airs !:llld
C:ol!ll~oni-Jeal th

Philipp:tnes:

Hela tions.

Carlos P. Garcia, Vico Presiden·t

and concurrently Secretary o.f
Foreign Affal.rs.

Prince \-'.ian V!aith~J.yakon, iJiinisttn of
Ji'or<~4,n AHe.:lrs.
UnUed Ktngdoru of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Marquess of Reading, Minister of
State, Foreign Office,
United Stutes:

,John FoE te:r Dulles, Secretary of
State; U. D, senators H. i!J.exander
Smith {Hep. N.J.), and F1ichael J.
Mansfield {Dem. Ntont.)

CHitPTEH V

PROVJ:SIOND OF 1'HE 'THl(,<i'l'Y

The t:r eaty text sp<1lls out in broad terms the extent
to

c~hicll.

ttle United States f'ind s it expedient to under take 9

under its Constitution, to define its oblit-;.ations am thoHe
- - - - - - - - - - - - ----

--------

-- - - - - - - - - -

----

--------

of otilb:r pc<.:rticipating na-t;ions in the inte:res t of ti1eir
common security.

It is u brief and simple docmneut and., as

has been pointed out in a vJhi te paper issued by tho
Department of Stat<-l• its· pov;e:rf'ul impact on world affairs
cle.rives frolll t.l1ese three factors:

the stature f1nd s·tren<oth

_of the states support in,~ the arrangement; the prec.mr:l.ous
security

situ~:~tion

in

souttwast Mia and th::

lt.Jestfo.tn

Pacinc

to which it :i.B Cie:sie;ned to bring collective defense aeainst
open armed a_,"':ression as well as defense against subvorston;
and the improvmnent of economic and social conditions
throue:;h cooperative pro:::;ranw for the &dvancement of' the
peoples of the areu.l
I,

l'iiiiiN PHOVISIONS

continuing i'ai th of the sigrw tory members in tl:10 pur poses
lu;.nsVJ0rs and Questions on the Ei:inila pact
pacific Charter,•• pepartmer!.!;, 2£ .~tate Publication
No. 8 (Viaslllne;ton~ D.C.: February, l>JD:)), 1, 2.

I__ _

lOb
and principles of the United Nations Charter >'lllich embody
their desire to live in peace and amity 11li th all peoples
and governments; desires to promote stability and well•
being in the t:reuty area, strengtl1en peace and uphold
demooxatic principles; promote economic development;

and ttmt the members vli11 coordinate ti1e:lx e:ffoxts for
collective defense; recognition that all nations in
Sot~theast

"sia are entitled to self determination.

Since the CMrter of the United Nations r;et forth
in de tBi1 thcJ mn cllinery and the p:ro cedu:r as availB bl"' for
th<>

settlem~ent

of lnte:rnational disputes by peaceful means.

there was no need to outline
ln the

tr<:~aty.

n~ll;

machinexy or procedures

Hov1e11e:r, the signatories d:id assume certain

definite oblit;;at.ions.

They are as f.ollovJs;

Ar·Ucle I calls :Cor

settl.i~,

internat:i.onal disputb8

by peaceful means under t\1e United Natio.rw Chetrter.

{lrticle II says member nat ions by self-help and
mutual aid ltJill maintain a C<lpaci ty
and to puv1.mt

<HK\

11

to resist armed at'thck

overcome subversive activity d:irectcd

from wi tho tlt. "

promote economic stabill ty and social well being. '1
Article IV agrees that each party vJill meet the
"common dant,e:r:" of armed attack in thcl treaty area o:r
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against any member "in accordance ·with its consti tlltional
processes"; in case oi' aggression members 111111 "consult
immediately :ln order to agree to measures v;hic:h sr10ulcl be
taken .for common defense"; aid >11111 te sent to an attaclwd
nation only on reque<;t.
'I'he rsouth<:H:tst Asia Collective Def'ell_s_e_'.l'l'iiJa_tJI__i§. __not
~------------------

unique among treatiem of alliance.

It provides that any

armed attack and all measures taken in com;equence shall
be reported to t!1c secLuity council of the United Nations
and trvJt suGh atlts s l1all be broue,ht t(l an end ''lhen the

cecur i ty GoqrH:il has taken septs to res to:r e and maintain
int<Ornntional p<laoe and securit.y.
i'~o:reov,,r,

tBy virtue of Article VI).

it dO<.iS not nffect in any »ay th<l rights anti

obligations tl!'l..de:r the Charter oi' the partio<> which are
members of tr1c United Nations nor does it conflict witt1 other

existing treaties.
II.

FUR'rHER PR01/I8IO\I!S

Geog:raphim•.lly spi.H>kin,,;, the 'freaty dELsignates as

"the t:r(;laty ;;;.:rea" thu

<~genera~

area of Southeust Jisla, in-

cluding also the entire territories of the AEian Parties,"
and "the general area of the Southitiest pacific not lncludiu.;
the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north
latitude,'' (Article VIII)
the

state~>

At the time o:C treaty signint;!;

agreeing t.o become members of' the pact wore
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those eight coLmt:ries already listed above.

The txBat

text provides also that the merubar parties may, by
unanimous at;:reement, invit'" any othur "state in a position
to furthor the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute
to the socm:ity of the Area" to becom<l a member of the
pact.

(Article VII)

With respect to o:rganizution, the treaty provides,
under Arti clo V, for the es tablisl1.llHmt of a Council on
\•J:1ich each of the pa:rties will be repl'e.' en't<>d and directs

that this sllall be so constituted as to be able to meet
promptly at any ttme to consider matters concerning the
implementation of the treaty.
Other details of organization and procedure are not
specified in ttle treaty; they are t;o be

basis of practical experience.

~Jorkec:

out on the

It is evident that a

considexable degree of flexibility in the application of
·the treaty v;as intended by tl1ose who draft<>d it ann this
vdll make it all thG more adaptabl<l to unforeseeable
~lituations ~•hie!'!

may arise.

The Treaty shall enter into force botl•een 'tl'le States
Which. have ratified it as soon as the irmt:ruments of
ratification of a majority of the signuto:ries t>h<--11 have
deposited, lmd shall come lnto effect viitil respect to

sach other State on the dat(J of ti1EJ deposit of its
instrument of ratification. (Article IX, :Sect1 on 3.)
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Article X states the treaty is to endure 1rJi thout
time limit, •>i.th any party able to loi.thdl'!l.\11 by c;iving one
year's

no~lce.

Article XI

say~1

that lmg.lish ls the official lang-

uage of the treaty.
i------------------oi-1~1:---.--BJ:-G,\JJ:-F!-cJrNT--1rr£A'1\j}l1~8---------

Th~Jre

degree of

11

---------------------

is considerable evidence o:t' a remarkable

11kemindedness'' among the members of the several

governments respecting both the content of the treaty and
<)

the form it should take under the UnHcod Nat ions Char tGr."'
Since there etas no doubt in arzy qu;:,.rter that without thu

full vlillir..gness of the United States to be a party to the
pact its promotion 1vould be useless, the pr J.ucipal and
probably the extremely s i;snificant question vJtlich arose
du:ri.ng discussions of thcJ txeat draft pertained to t;hethGX

the United States could under its Constitution take action
involving th<J tlse of armed fo:rce in an emergency.

('rhougll

Secretary Dulles rAid make clear' on sever<tl occtJsions in the
past "that one of the conditions which 1tJ6 have aJ..ways ;3tood
on is tl:'lf.1t there mqst be congressional sanction to any such

2Robert Tr~Ambull, dispatch from Manila dated Septembe 9, 1954; in the Ne>v XQ.!.!£ Times, S<Jptember 9, 1954.
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action.'' )3

United States. !!J!il.)!ary

£Q.~i tment ~illl.lh.

The

answer to this question 1;as found in a fornmla tvhich tile
Secretary of Stato presented, first to the delsga.tes at
the Manila Conf'<JrencG and at;ain to the first CounoJ.l

23-2fi, 1955.

meet~

Of the nrs1; instance. he said:

We consider<..>d a.t ~.Janna lw~J to 1mplemen t 'l':he treaty.
One possibility lrJas to create a joint military force,
However • I explained that the United Gtates' responsibili ti<> s were so vast and so fa:r-flun~~ tb.l~ t 1~e
believed that '~>le would serve bast P not by earmarking
!'orcas for particular areas of th(j l~'ar r~ust. but by
devalopinc:, the daterx ent of mobile striking povier, plus
str:ategically placed reserves.
This via11Jpoint l>as accerted. Thus, ·t11e treaty l•Ji11
not requirE~ us to make mb.terial changes in our milita:r;y
plans. These plan,, already cF.lll fox our maint;aining at
all times powerful ntwal antl air forces in the liestern
Pacific capable of st.riJdng at any ug;:;ressol' by means
and at; places of our choosing. 'l"he dete:rrent po>>er
we thu.s creats c~;m protect m~my, &s GffectiV<Jly as it
protects one.
At the Bangkok meeting ot thH Council, Mx. Dulles

unda:rtoolc to give a mox e detailed analysis of

·~he

si tu.ation:

,,0

John Foster Dulles, "United states Policy on rarticipa tion :l.n Collective Defense," ~lepa;r:~! of g;~~ BulleUno XXX (June 7, l9t-l4), 66~'>.
4 F1eprinted in the Q.£!'le~ressiona1 ll.§.~--Genate •
.November 9, 1954, p. 14753.

uo
, • • for military purpose~;; 9 the Chinese C:orrum:mist
f'ront tlhotll.d be :t'B,saxdad as <Ul entirety bt'Hwuse it the
Ctd.nese Communists enG;age in open lotrltad uggresflion this
t-;ould probably me~m that ttlt'ly have decict<'d en g<!tH;rel
~~~1:r in Asia.
'£twy t~ould then l1ave to taiw into vacount

th·s .mLrtuvJ. def,;ns.t; tretttliBH of tl1~;; Unit~a :st,at(is v~ith
the RopubJ.J.c of Koren and this l':epublin of Cl>im,.• and tl1e
1
for c~~s rm:d.ntrJ.ine·;ct t.:H.'lde:c th<~m
!i'lus gBner a1 Wtt.r ~. .u,uld
confront tho Gbimlse conllmmir;t" i¥5.th tasts ut :;llH
D:-\Jt:tth 1 eent(1r HX'id Noxth, ta.sks vttl:tch "'v:JQqJ.d strain t~J.eir
1tlbdGqua te mr:,anB of' transp<>:tt~~~9~_! _
Q

---------------------

'l'he United tltat<Ja in pr21:r ticulu:r l:li'xs sea <m.d aLe
fox <J•SS 1.1()\:o eqtd.pr:·ed \<1 th ne·vi und pcY\,€l:Cfql vwupom; of
p:reois ion. tihitHl mm tJtt<;Xly des tro~1 lll1lithl'Y tn:r g~;tll
t1:1.thwllt <:ndml(:\erine,; uru Glatud cJ:l.Viliun c<:mtHr::;;.

oux ~r.rs::.:~~lty Cr.,P~-~lcilfl <'~J'tex t:~·PJ-·-tv.i::it1>.::.. thG .mili·tcary
!ac'tox s • oonolt:~ded ttw.t the avu:Uabl(; mil:i;~ary J'OI•ar
'"'Y''·'
c)"''
o_-,•-'.'.·''1 •:t·no.v' '"'QW<l•t
'"'''''""'"O'l
Of ''<'""'"' ''''l'li',
....,) .,..__
.,t ..''''t•··•'"'"; ·-,_.
•.
1
agaim>t tklto txoaty aroa.
J..uo~oW'-'t

,~.,~
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'the Philippines propN>ad the paci;fic Chax·te r as a means

of maldnt it clGar that the nations at the Manila

Coni'er~

ence are dedicated to sedcinc:, the "el.fure of th<J "-si<>n
people and \"ill

.!1£.1! promote colonialism.

It viill probably

bH both rHlevant and interestin6 to nota at tllis point

-----------

---

the editorial comments of Life
subject.

ma~;azine

..

on tl1ls -narticular

It reads;

Moreover, a declaration of the r:l.,ghtn of all Asian
nations to freedom and ~;el.f-cloterm:t.nutj_on vms cvatc:recl
do"n by colony-consc:l.ous Britain. It v.;as the A<d.an
memb,1xs of l\li\NPAC (f'or HB,nilb .rnct), led by ttw
Philip nines' far-sighted Pxesident Ramon l0o.gsaysay-vigo:rously supportec! by Dullos-··Who drov<:J through a
separate P<lcific Charter assexting thHse ~iims, t-ihich
all tl:le pm•lBl'S F igned. Thi.s Charter may prove moxe
pmverfu1 than the treaty in taldnti, the onus of colonialism from th<:J \Vast.''; desire to <.a.ve fxeedom. JTi ttingly anolli_,tl H came !'.rom th(;l f:reely elected leader
of a forf:;er colony liltlich Amerioa voluntarily set on
its own~
Dulles explained tr.1e importance of'

tt~<l

Pacific Clmrtor

iu trl<Ose wo rd s :
In my openine_; address to the conference, I empnasized thc:·t:. one of tho mo~. t ef:f'ecti V<:l vwapotlS of col!llnlll~
ism \vas -~o pretend that the Western pov•ers were seekine..
to impose colonialism on t;l1e t\sitm peoples. I said v<e
mllst mal><> :i.t abundantly clear that 111e tnt<md to inVii:orate lndependenc.a. "Only then can t!'JB i-:es't b.nL\ the
East "OXlt to,",eth1.Jr in true fellowsl1ip."

-----6)J:d:!.t.orial 0 "II Treaty 1 s Meanin£; for hsia,•• l:,J£§!. 0
'
,
.
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TrliS Ivlanilu Conference raced up to that issue. It
was the f'i:cst Conference 1r1b.ure :rHprasentative nations
of' .Asia end of the !:lest sat dmvn together to work out
a prog,:ram of' mutual security, 'fhe result 1;as thid
Pacific Chu:r ta :r, uJllich, in ringing tel'lllS, dedic<Jtes all
tt1e signa tor j,es to uphold tl:lkl principles of sGlf'determinat :Lon, self- govor nrMmt • and inl ependonce f'o:r
all countries whose peoples desire :tt and are able to
undertake Us :rasponsibilit:les.

\ihenever there a:r :l[JEIS in i>Sia a povJer that•,;~:~nt_s__t_o.___ _
-------,ccrnq•.rBx--uure-x-s>it-<iCtoptT1ttie -mot to;-- -,, .1\iila -foi the
AsiHns." Tl:ie Japanese, ~o;hen ttwy were dominated by tile
war lol'ds, used that slogan. Today, trJB sov5.et and
Chinese Ccrnmun:l.l;s i1eve adop1;ed it. ThEiy v1ant to prevent !;he free count:ries of' Asia f1•om gettir)6 the help
they need to preserve their tndep•3ndenoa.
The Pacific Ch<lrter, on •~t1l.ct1 tht,; li:ast and the \: o";t
did meet 1nay ~JeJ.l prova to be tho rnor:;t raonmntou.s
product of the conference. 7

In the eyc)S of other Asian

<~ollntries

then, the->

pacific Char·l;er st;ands as a pooJerful refutation of Comumnist
appraisals of \/estern motives.

In a colorful ceremony on ,,september 8, 1954 9 the
secretary·~me:ral

accordance

~>li.ttl

of the Conference announced that, in

the decision of the

Gonf~>z:ence,

"the Pleni-

potentia:ry Hepresantative or H<:Jpresentatlves of oacl:l State

, 7 Address of Secretary Dulle<> deli vexed to th<il nation
over radio ancl telovision on September 15, 195tl, on the
11 Manila Pac·c nnd the Pacific Cha:rtex," in the QeJ~'t! 2f
State Bgll~rt;ith XXXI (Sopt f.ill! b•9I 27 0 1954) • 432-~')3.
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as cand the :ros t:rum to sign the th.ree documents."

Shortly

a!'terwa:rd a certified copy of tllo si 6 ned docuumnt ;vas
placed in tl1<: r11:mds of President l\i.senholier for t:ransmission

••witil a vievJ to l'ocoiving tl1e edvice nnd consent." of tl1e
senate of the United Sl;ates to ratification.

Other copies

111ere being transmitted a_t _t!1_e __~>ll.l!lf>_~j_n)_e __t;() J;M otll<n _sig;na.._______ .. ~===
tory states to be submitted to ttwi:r :rospectiv{; ratification
pro cad ur es.

According to t;rea ty ter·n1s, tl'lo pact

~;as

to be

officially in existence "as soon ns tlHl iD..si;xumonts of r;Jt-

if1cat1on

of'

a majority of the signatories shall have been

deposited Nittt the Government oi:' the Hepublic of the
Pl1ilippinos. ''

Th(:J:r(iUPlltl

thd <i.ll.lance \'us to be I'eady to

function.
I'i;;

appea:red tl11-'t th(lcie tlho drafted til•> t:tc.HJ.ty text

h.ad consida:rabl: con;fidence the,t, once sii;;n<?.d by the foreign

m.inistcu s oi the J:Jar ticlp11 t irli;;

staJ~ ..~fi,

J.t, v.iot:!lil be ratified

lvithout aruendment by the C:>OVerr;ment,s tnvolv<ld.

SEN!.'O 'ias

ratif'ied, to use 1)G(;Ietary Dul1<Hl 1 11<iOH1s • "promptly and >·lith
virtual urr:inimity. ''

! t v1as submi ttt~d by a Rop::;blican

J?:rasident to a Democ.:ratic-co ntrollac\ body • aloUt;

11:1. th

a

simila tre2ty Hith Nationalist China and a :reqU<iS'C for
congrassion~;;l

au tt1or :tty to use thcJ armed fo rc<>s of the

United States :i.n the JSbrmo:;a area.

J1ll treaties 1r1ere rati•

fied and the coni&l'essional authority grant,CJd dsspite tlw.t
poli tic~;l di viB ion.
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The treaty, l<i th the exception of one vote cast
again">t it by Senator :·.illirn;, Langer, a congenital dis<Ji-

favor able action on January 24, 1955. 8

The :report re-

ct::pitulated essent;ially all of the arguments advancetl in
r-------f-'a_v_o_l_·_o_1_'_t_·rw allirHlCG.

ili'ter much ca:r:efl).l

Gt_el_~b":r_a:ti_or~,

_ _ __

the Senate, ty a vot" of 82 to one appxoved ths resolution
of' rutific<ltion on February 1, 1955. 9 Then ln a press
:release on the f.l5th, the State Dape.:rt.ment s tatEld that
"The Treaty enter<:d into force Febx•uury 19, l\Hi5, i'ollovJing
ttte depos:U; of thu inst:ruman'Gtlliti<:w o:t' :rat.i.fit;fl·c:i.on \·d.th

~ile t;;ove:rnment o:f tll·2 he public o::'' tho i:'tlHippines • .,J.O
O.:f the £>p0ed 1tJi th \'Jhicb. SEA~~\) \:;as :r:ntif:t~:d by ths

Congress, D\llles

said~

These events demonstrate a capacity for action rJhich
is certainly ne(j(.1ed in che "o:rld t.od~'Y• Too often
rep:resontutiva p:rocessec> lend t;o nucLt pa:rtisnnsb.:Lp and
such consequent delay:c; tt111t ho::.til~J foraes an; encouraged to tJGliovo that ttlo democn,ci.os ani inhe:cently
ineffective. 1'ho Government of thr; United Statos has
shovm the contrary. )'a:rtisarwl1j.p w<w uholly subordinated ·to the natlon~~J. good, so that action of great
importance could tJe talten vJ;t ttl del:tberatlona, 'bLlt c·Jith
decisivenesrJ.
BQQ_ng:ressiona:},.~£2!.9.:--Senate. Janut;ry 2<1,1955,

P• 514.
9c:or~:ress:i.':2..!:lal

Pecorg_--r.enete, FBb:r;nuy 1, 1955,

pp. 891-92.
Pact,"
371.

lO"Hesults of Meeti!Jb oi' Council or Eot:rtlaeast hSian
g,t :?:tate .Dlllillin, XXXVII (I•iarch 7, 195b),

llit12.ar~msnt
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For this the nation can be grateful to the leooer•
ship and to th<:~ general membership of both purties in
tb.e Corli;,ress. And I know that tney >;ould v~tmt me to
pay special tribute to Wal te:r :F. George, toJho • as
chainn&i.1 of' the Denate Foreign Helations Committe<:~,
carried tllu heaviest agg:re.,ate burden of HlSponsibility.ll

LIMITS Oli'

~rHT<.

DEFENSE AREA

'Xhe tiu:ee ,·;estern Pot<ers, tt1e countries of ttw

>festern Pacific. and their Pacific allies--thHse nations form
the core of' any feasible plan for coll€lctive seouri ty in

L-----------

- - ------

Southeast i·ltiia.

-- ------ -

-

- ----

-----

The i:r in t<Jxest in a pol :!.tical pact desil.;,ned

to give safety :Lu the long run from un"a.rran t<Jd external
attt>ck needs no c>pellil1G out.

Undoubtedly tl1ey believe in

a Sou the us t !ltoia pact as the most practical means of
achieving a measure of collective security in the fac<:l of
intensified Communist activitil:ls in that part of the WOl'ld,
and of making

head~Jay

toward the objectives outlined in the

Charta r of the_ United Nat ions.
Beginninc; in mid-April 111hen Dulles left London and

Paris to confer on the establi,;tlment of a security anang<;ment in the Pacific area, thexa was a good deal of
discussion and sp<JC<.ll& tion as to the logical extent and
11lllits of JUI:ltnbership in the alliance.

Vlhile it is txue

that an (-mlarged group of states wie,;ht represent J;reuter

weight tmd prestige, thid more numerous tlle component phrts
the e,reatl:lr >vould be tlle likelihood of internal disagree-

ment and weakened common purpose.
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EXCEP'l'IONS TO THE: (}l;<;,QGRiiPHICloL HOLE

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense
si~;;ned

o,

on SGptember

as

Tr~;;aty

l9f)4, applied--at lc:mst potentially

--to tbe >1bole of Southeast 1\<Jia and the \iestern Pacific.

li'or one r.tiason or another, however • not all of the states
el igi bl e for in q;L_tlSion_£r om-- ~e og:r a.ph-ic al--point·s------or--vi-av;

have been or are lik<llY to be embraced by the treaty.

I

India. Burma, Ceylon,

~~!'!.·

Arart from

Pakistan the remaining foul' of tho uo-called Colombo po>11e:rs
--India, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia--have indicated
varying degr<ws of unvJillirJGness to joln the anti-Communist
bloc in il<ia.

India has consistently opposed the S'outheast

Asia defense plun, or any other collective security p£1ct for
that mHtter.

Indone~da,

1oh:Lch usually aligns herself with

Indian policy, has t&ken virtuu.lly the
Ceylond tlave been

11

S<itrr!e

lim.

Burma and

less" opporJed to the idea o:f' a south<>ast

Asian defense organization but neither hus shoirm a desire
to join it outright.

This cooln<.,ss on tll<l part of fou:r of

the five Colombo pm<ers (so-called because their PI ime
Ministers met at Colombo in

l~:>te

f1I'r1l, 1954 to concert a

joint policy between the Communist and the anti-Conununist
forces in Asia), has come as a disappointment to the
!''estern Gover.nmentH • especially 13ritain.

---
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From the start of

th<:~

Geneva Conference on

i~pr il

26, l9fi4, l1nthony Eden, then British Foreign Secretary,
has follo>•ed a consistent pol1cy with r<Jgard to creating

a stable Boc<theast Asia.
1'acets:

This policy has had three main

(1) to help stop the "hot vmr" in Indochina;

(2) to as<>od.ate the Colombo pmHns, and other friendly

nations, 11Jith an Indochinese armif'tice;

!H1d (3)

to persuade

them to join Britain and the United Stat<lS in an !:l.ff'ective
de:fense alliance to ht'llt furthGr Conununist aggression.l

·rne

.first t'wO elements of this policy have all eady been

realized.

An Armistice has been <~ttained in Indochina.

On August 10, the :five Colombo po111ers, lad by Sir ,John
Kotela<Jalu, Pr :Una Minister of Ceylon, formally associated
themselves with the armistice agxeenmnt end expressed their
hope that no pa:r ties to the pact 1r1ould breach it.

'.l.11e third

part of the British <•im, llOI<aver • has not been achieved,
though Bri. tuin !:las never entertained higl'l hopes that lndia
--and

1;tv~

smaller Asian

poto~ers

arounc1 her--lvould join a

proposed t3outheast treaty organization.

At the same timEl

British r;tatesmen have maintained that there could be no
successful system of eolleotive defense in Southeast Asia

1)3enjarnin Vielles, 6ispatetl .from I,ondon dated
Aur;>ust 6, 1954; in the ~Xork 'rimes. AUgust 7,1954.
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unless th<> count:r:l.ss of the area ·t;helllselves took part in it
11Jllol~~heartedJ.y

Hnd effectively.

British policy makers

"still re",a.rd India and Burrw..t as the tvJc most important
links in the chain of Communist containmEJnt that

mu~'t

be

forged ln Southeast Asia.,::. and British policy ~cJill probably continue to attempt to attract t.hes.:i t>•Jo p0111ers
gradually into the collective security fold.

I·JO\•Jeve r, "Nehru has consistently ru:gued that
collective secnrity pacts tend to nullify peace efforts by
promoting •tansion 1 " 3 and com;iders ·the ne,; Souttleast Asia
pact "most unfor t01na te.

have gone much :further.

"'*

'l'he .fact is that the IrJdians

'.I.'hey have been wo:rkinl;l; on
I'

influential Bxitons to take a more indapendant a·ttituue
tovoard the Unit oct states hl Asian affai:rs.
;c1me~

.£!:.

'J:J:Iti influential

India said editorially on April 15 1 1954, thut

Britain's acquiescence in the \'iashington program "is dangerously near a spineless appeasBment of an impoxtunate
all;,•." 5

li. predominant measure of Indian newspaper opinion

2tondon dispatch dated August 14, 1954; in the ~

Iork !!!lJ£.§., Augnst 15, 1954•

-----1'

3Nev; York :rim<JS. April 16, l9b4,.

-------

4ctlristian
science IVIonitor • [36p.tembe:r
~~~~~

5Quoted in the

<1

~~

1954.

lli!.! :{or!£ .:gimes, April 16, 19t54.

L
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sa1r1 the propoc.,ed Southeast Ashm alliance as "a ne\11 attempt
by the \1!estern powers to re-impose foreign domination•• in

countries ne1rJly free or struggling to ba free of colonial
:rule. 0

l

,:-,-

In a clpGech before the lov1e:r Chamber of' Parliament

on Aagust 15, 1954, Nehru declared that the forthcorJlill6 talks
- - - - - - - -

.---·-------- -----------

--'----

-

in the Philippines 1rier<J ''lilcely t;o reverse tt1e t:wnct of
conciliation released by the Indocl:lin.a settlement."
Collectj,ve aecurity can come only by
• • • resolving vJorld tensions and developing a
pattern of' coll<~ctive peace • • • • IF:e are appreherw:lve,
th0refore, that the. propm1ed t>out11east il:sian collective
organization, ~Jill in tl'lP present uo more harm than
any good that i t may hope to do in the fLlture.

[

j

He added that his recent talks v1ith Chou En··ll.d., Chinese
Communist Prmnier awl Foreign IUnister, had bxought about

••greatex tmde:rstandilli::;" betvJeen the

I

t•~o

c:mmt1·ie::;; tha·t; the

ChimH%l ltJader 1f; visit to lndia appeared to have helped

him to understand non-Chinese Asia aml to appreciate the
"evolving soutlwa~:t Asia pattern of collective pcace."7

·rne

visit r<lfer:red to occ•nrec, on .;rune 26 at lrJtlicl1 time

India 1 s Nehru antl Hed China's

1-.
9ou

<Jxchane:,ed toasts.

On

---------------6quoted in the ~ ~ 'rim§!!, April 16, 19bt1.
the

"7D:tr:>patch from Nev; Delhi, dated AL'IGI~st 25, 1964; in
York Tim'E.§..• Auoust 26, 1954.

~

'_,___
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that oucasion Nehru sa:i.t:t:

1

tj

Our great lEiader JVJahatma Gandtti led us by peacet'Ul
methods throubh travail and many bitter experi<mces to
freedom. China 1 s catlbe was diffe:nmtly fash:toned.
Both our countries placed Cbe ~;:;ood of the collllllon man
before them and a:NJ almine; in tlleir different ways to
raise the millions tllho suffered so much in the

past •••

Destiny beckons our count;ries and l hope neither of
at thi-s--g:reaXmonletlt :ttfilisto:ry. I nope our two countries ~>ill stand for p<;ace
and will live amicably together a net co ope rate in the
cause of peace and human advancement as tt1ey tl~ve dona
through the past 2, 000 years of human history • l:i

1l---------·tl.i:.,;;m-wi~J:1-be-fouud-wanting

I.

The other point

~:Jell

nott1d in Nehru'::; sp<Hlch in the

lower Chamber "as th<> particular empha!l:l.s tr.a t the lnd:tan
leader laj.d on U1e joint declaration hD had lsstled ;;ii;h

Chou 1rJhich accepted the pr:tnctples of peaceful co-ex1stence
and non-interference.

He CJXpreDsed tile hope that the five

principles "contained the nuclen<J of the pattern of (:ollec-

ti ve pHace, t!w only altar native to 1var prepliiE>dnes:o and ·c11e
only substantit;l approach to I<oal secur:!.ty."

1'lle f'ive

principles are: mutual respoct f'or each other • s tc;r:ri tor iul /
/

integ:ri t;;' and sove:reit,nty, non-aggress:i.on, non-inte:rf'e:r ence ·'

in each othD:r •s lnte:rnal affairs, equality and mutqal /
benefit, ano peaceful

co~existBnce.

5'l'extual exoercts from Prime Mini,;te:r Nehru • s remark.s made in exchange wl th Premier Ct1ou En-lai '"'t Ne~J
Delhi, India; JunH 26. 1954; in tlle lli!!!. ,Xo:r]i Times, ,June 27
1954.

•
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In his speech in

l.lpper Chamber of Parliament

t;iHJ

the follot>iin<;; day, Al.lgust 16, Nehru want further in si1arply
criticizing the United States and European povJars over
their approach to k\":tan probl6rM>.

He said th0ir nout-of'-

place and cut-cf-.data" policies ignore Asia.

Ha rccalled

that al ttwu;;h tile Genewl con1'erenca on lnilocrlina toolr. h.rto

- - - -

account th<:. realitiHs of til(J situat:l.on in.;,utc:, neverthelass it 11as a eonference on Asian problems iHJld in Europe

and "chiefly domlnated by Europeons am] t\mer icans."

He

expressed thG l1op<J that V!estern powers v<ould not pursue

sucl1 a policy in thB futu:r e.

In a s tatem<mt t>i.xrdlar to

the one he made in the lowe.r house a day before, the
P:rime Minlst<H spol:ee of the imperative necellsity to accept
the principle of "peaceful

co~~n:lstence,"

clnimlng that if

co-existence fJ.mone; nations ;.;as not pos:oibl<l the only altex-

grievance:

India, he said, imd gr<w.t respect for the United

states and ocher nations ln Burope but that ''ull the honor
and respect in the tv.orld for th<Jm doos not; make tll<, :::lightest dUf'erenc<l to our ded:s.ton tb.ut
Otlr

t%1

nmst have

destlny and in Jwia•s destiny • • • "

f;t

say in

Fully :c oalizing

that Asian probl<mJs were of the deepest interest to the
United Stat1as and I:iurope,

"~Jhat

I ''JOuld venture to submit

as completely out-of-place and out-o.f'-dace todny is for
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problems to b<e considered by certain Ji:Lu:opean o:r American
po•••ns, forgettirl;;!. or i(::;noring Asia, especially luhGn
0

tho,; e pro blenw are !.is ian, u Nehru said.·'

grzc;at lene;ttl India's opposition to

kind of collG cti ve Ci of'ense

~h<J

forl!HJ.tion of any

~lji;i;.\~~-Z!;l ti().!~ _11~

Asia_,_y_i<O\;I_incs

the meetiQ., in the l?llil:!.ppines for this pllrpou';! as "unfortunatG.''

Villile

acknol~ledgin<>

ttJat the countries >·Jiw

hEl felt ttllit tlle Geneva settlement had brousht a sense of'

hand, he ccmt<mds ttlat tt1e approach adopted in tho
Philippines conference \.JOtlld revive i'<Hl.XS and suBpicions
giving rise to 5,nsecltri'ty; l;h'ltlle:r we agree or not, this
111as Nehru •s vie\vpoint.

Illl.rma has consistently remained ">vary" throushou t
the lrJhole necc,otiation voxiod on
In an interv:tewt U Nu, Prime
that his country

~c;ould

tl1<l

Souttlea!;t Asian pact.

i'~linister,

vms quo·ced as

~Jaying

not join SJl:ATO because "'.'le do not

stop at; non-involvement; "e do our utmost to ::snun any
activit;y

~Jhich.

is likely to create misunderstanding in any

-----9

Dispatch from New Delhi datEJd At~e:;ust 26, 1954; in
the Nev; Yo:rlc 'l.'imes, "ugust 27, 1~)54.

---
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qu<1rter. ulO

'£ho Economist, a London-publ:l.shecl magazine, has

regarded Burma "a pa:rticLllarly v:l. tal test case" in the
task of' the \i:i.plomats of tJ:w .SEATO powers to convince their

]t

neighbors ttla t '"oha tevGr Gl1ina • r; aims, collective security

is r oally more likely to lcw.d to pGace tt1an a field wide

T

~:------o_p_e_n_t_o_J_Jie ce
rl

meal ag8.t et;_·t;_:!_.o:1s ~

1

~--i;;O~Ja:rd

Ceylon's of:l:'ioial att1t•lde and intentions

~
~

'il

j,

l
i

I
I

1
t

I

invite an atornio "Pearl Harbor•• if shG of'ffJHJd herself

mili ta:ry base.

Ho s.lso oontended that the United

~Hi

,c;t~;'CGS

a

vJas

trying ·to promot,;, a Dot\tllea.st l!s:ian defense pact
••irraflpective d' 'chc ultimate decistons at th'·' G·enuva

conf.'srence, '' of the neutra11.st conclusions of tho :roc<mt
fivo-na·tion Asian Premier'" conference, and "even the
conflenslls of Corrmlonwaal th oplnion."
t.;

tatGment t;o

"~wuld

~'llq,

'rimes of Ceylon.

1!Hl not be lnvi ti.ns attacln

:'3enanayake made t1is
"If' \ole \vould offer GeyJ.on

If uucll an attack came

-----·~·-·

lOJJi<Jpat(~h from nangoon, Bttrma datod

--··---

in the New Yo:rk Times
........

'

M~cy

£1, 19b4;

May BiZ, l9f)4.

ll"Recruit for SEATO," Tne };conomis·t, GLXXIII
(Octobe:r 2, l9ti4), 20.
---~·-

----"'

ll3Quoted in the New York Times, .\}J.V 17, 1954.
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As far bacl<:: as 1949, the id.ea o.:f a Doutl1east Ao;ian allian(Jfl

''

l__: _ _ _ _ _

1·u:1s canva:3sod, bt::tt Ceylon strontty resistbd attempts to get

her lnto !;ny

fOliHll'

bloc.UI

Both Ceylon and Bllrma f'ollo\v

Nehru's lead vJi.Hother that lead be valid o.t not.

r-1

Indonoeien. Premier Ali Sa;;; t:coamid ,j(ljo 's dove:rruaent,
tvhioh d ex :tvb~; :.L te p.r inc~_r;a!__~_9_PP.9_.J:'j:;____ t);_Q~l ___~t__ Na_tio_na1i.:"--t~· r;omm.tUl-----1---------ist <loal5.tj.on in Parlianwnt, is of'f'icl~'lly on record agoinst

Only onH gJ:rjup in Indonesia backiJ thd !v1a.nila pact--Hizbullah,
an

Islmnit~

:nganization of fo:rmor gusrillas ;,;ho played an

impor. taut ro1(l in 1945 1n tho Indonesian stru&;.le 1'or

independence; at;ainst Dutch colonial rule.

ln a formal

thG 6Gfensive ch&racter of tho pact ::uii termited it a

peaceful .factor in
soutl1oast Lsir.1.

til(:~

gen£rally serious situution racine,

Hizbt::tllah :furth»X condemne\1 "hat it termed

a.n unxealbt:lc approach to po1ve:r pclit:lcs througtl c11sgui!';ing

Indomwian Government has incli:rec·:;ly hinted that it tiO<lld
be interested- in Howe fen; of non··U&;l'iJSd.on pact wJ.th
Gomn1uni.st Ch1•..na tl 1<'ou

I
I

I_
!
',

.!:!£~ Yo:rk Times, October 1'7, 19b4.

14
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pakistan.

Pnlci:Jtnn ''as tho only nation of the so-

called Colombo pmvars to attm!d th6 Manila Conference and
come out of ttw·t moot1t1(, a pa:rt;y to DEJITO.
Th<; importance of this young Moslem nation in

over~

all strategio cons5.de:rations viiH. continue to be highlighted

by two relevant facts.

'---------

upon Unit<cld

forthrii,:.llt

~;tatds

att~:;.cJts

'I'heso a:r:c. Pak:intan •s geog:rapt!j·CI'J.l

military aid in defiance of h<J:r bigt;;er

on sus;.:x:wted Conmmnist subverslve:J•

particul,<rly ill ·the count.ry'"' 0asterr1 area.

(Incidentally.

different from past actions of the Indian Government when
th(lY vie:te deemed to constitute a threat ·to security.
~rllout>ands

;vere jailed.

On. account of J:akistDn' s geOgJ.'aph:i.eel poni ti.on, h<:JX

membership in SEAJ.'O lvot•ld place a pro-l'lestorn <>nclav(1 :Lnside

neutre.libt India in Pakistan's Pxov1nc:e o:f

l:!~ast Bengal~

and,

as Hobert T:rLUrJJLlll vJziting f:rom tl1e Hanila Conference, stated;
• • • provides a prospective strategic brid¥;e betl';een
the t1rw theaters of' ~,'estern defenso agaim,t Ccll!l;:unism.
':l.'hese thaaters a:;:e southeast Asia and tlli:J li\llddl.e East.
This ls l1o1t1 Pak:ist;ani deleg<~tos viow their couni~ry Bs
:role in the drama lmfoldinL; here.
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Paldstan•s v1este:m I·Jtng acljoms the Middle East.
The eastern province, which is separated f':rom its VJest
by about 1, 000 miles of Ind :l.a.>'l ter:citory but yet contains mote than hali' the nation • s population has a
common bo:rde:r. w:l. th Burma and thc:rcfoxe, can be G.ncompast•e<l tc.ctically in the southeast Asian area.15
l\Joxmally one 1r1ould. not expect Ne;u Delh;i. to be dis-

mayed by ·tho pr'imsnce of a friendly milita1·y bullvf>Ik along

and Paki<l tan are not fri<Jndly

~md

tl!ere appears to be littlEJ

prospect t;bat tt1eix differences$ particularly over the

llS

to factor number

2-~Pa.kistan

's incr ea. sing alignment

1;;;i. tll

tt1e Vies t.

Since Secretary Dtllles 1 M.iddle Eastern an<S Indian
,journey in 19!\3 there have been major sh:Lfts in .American

attitudes.

·,;ashington has decided to risk a cooling of

f'riendship 1rli th Asia 1 s largest non-Communist povJe:r, India,
in order to cement closer tj.es i'liith Pakistan.

P<\l'~istan

has entered into agreements tdtl1 both the United sta.tc:s and
Tu:dc<Jy.

under tho

J;J~:rtual

.Defense Assistance Agreement vdth

the Uniteld states the latter will provide military •Jguiprnent
and ·t:ca:lnitlb io r the Pakistani Armed Forces.

It is

expressly stated, twwevar, that the agreement does net

---------15Robert; Trumbull in a di:Jpatcb f'rom Manila dated
S'lptember 1, 19~~4; in the Nelrl ~f!. '.times, September 2$ 1954.

]J38

establish a rnili tary allianc:e betwaen ·the: tvJo countries nor
does :tt involve any obligation on tl1e pa:rt of Palcistan to
provlde mill ta:ry baseD fox the use of t!m United State!3.
Both col1nt.r:iJ_l r;

agx.~(H;

to utatc:.: such B.ction as may be

n!L1tually ag:r.e<Jd Qpon to elli:dnat.e
tension,••l6

The agreement

1d.ti1

caLl~Gs

o:f int•nuat.:Lcma.l

Turl<·SJ' is ~.ven more g<m,;ral

-------

Ir.t it trw

bctt. it do''" lmpl;y a \\'estern orient.at.ion.

t~oJo

cotlntr ies agree to s tw'J.y method n of achiwvino clmHlr
collabor.ation in pol:Ltical, economlc, ani.\ cultural spheres,
includir.\"' m.eans of st.rengti1dnhlc; peace and H'lou:r ity in the

Iraq.

1 ts

•rtlis developmen'c hac> eme:·ed the most

ne1~

veh~1mant

ra-

al1:lanc.;is, may take a stiffer line anon t Kashmir.

!ndi<J a.l::Jo regards

j

t; as an act of treachery to As.i.a for

Pal<:istan to alien l tself

_______

__

...._._.,.

~1:t

th one of th<J great

]JO\J(~l:'

blocs.

~"'"""""

16u£,1utqal Defense Assistance ,,grocrmmt. \~:i(;tl Pald.s'!;an, 11
Department; of' Bi;ate Bulletln, XX,\ (lVJay l:'>l. 1954).~ eb0-51.
•

..

.,..,._

- -

- - ·

I'
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Paldstan has been Nidened.
Thcne are s:Lsns 1;twt Pakistan and Ceylon, both of
"llloll. have a qua:rr el vJi tr1 India, may
alos~lly.

~IS

t;~;~'

to coope:r ate more

recunt:Ly as April, 19fib, at th-8 eonf(1IEIJ:Hle of

Nahru 's most lnte:rcsc:t:tog cUftarence of opJ.n:!.on

>Ja$

vii th Sir
---

of both

La<>~;

and Gambodia by :flm:ma <md Ceylon.

Burma nor Ceylon 11.1ould go to

Noi th(n:

wmila, but their !l!L.J!lf§.

thotlt;h at presant f_'ollowin::; t.11e !ndlan lead, may be

attraetacl by the force of' J::llam to s>v:!.tctl Us aJ.J.sgi<"nc"'•

India may be d.issuaded f:rmn ll(.dc i.nsi:.s tent neutrality :l.n
the face of its geog:raph:l.e&l VL1lne;ralJili ty ·to ·ttJ.e tlu'"'a t

of Communi :o t

advanct~s

Vias t f.:r:om Inrl ochin.a •

....._,_.............,,..,.,....__..,.. _.....,_,_,,,

17Norman G<.msim:, ''ll<J;;ort from J3anctuns," ~ ~urda;y
P.evietll, EXV:O.l (May Bl, 1955), 8.
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Formosa.

Kore~

and Japan.

At the end of the London

and Paris conversations, Dulles obtained agreement on the
secur~

paragraph in ttw communiques about a f'u tur e mill tary
it;y establishm<mt in southeast Acd.a.

\"ihile the secretaiy

has had a c;;ood press in til<:J Utlited St;a1;es 1 the preva.iling
opinion

beifll;~

ttlat tt1o agreement in London and pa;ri;; marked

an important step fonJard toM:ll'd a uni:fied non-Communist
front and tov;ard collective security measures in southeast
·"lsia, thh; evaluation has not been unanimous.

Among

American politicians of bottl parties critical, estimates b<<Ho

voiced.

Semato:i: lti:l.ll:l.am F. Know land, then tbe majority

south T\o:r<>a,

c~hich

he said, tmve one m:tllion men under arms.

'l'he argument tl1at tl1ese ure nlready and absolutely

commit~

ted again:;lt Communist China >vas mat by ch<>rges that a

"urrender to Britisil Far rt:ast policy <Jas the <>Xplanation for

not incli:td1ng them.l8
defense treaties

~~i tl1

Both countri<>s t1ave bilateral mlltual
the Uni t<:Jd States Government.

the participation o:f Chiang

Kai~shek•s

J>lso,

Nationalbt Chinese

forces vias unlikely because Britain recognizes Communist
Cl11na.

Incidentally, this recognition ooes not give Hed

Chinu a freo hand on Formosa, not <::van on F·ormoHa 1 s cl:1.Gin

18

~ :t:ork Times, April 15, 1954,
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ot steppine;-stone island defenses in Quemoy and J:<1atsu.

For

on December 2, 1954. Britain revealed that "she had
formally wax ned Had C.:hina a.sains t attacks on the Nationalbt•tHlld islands off l''ormosa, '' lvhile at th(? ::>arne time
urging "moderatlon" on th<~ part of all concernect. 19 A
military contribution of__SQuth_Kor~a i';also_tlnlikely____________ _

:-------~-

considering South Korea's ovm military problGms and the
unpopula~ity

of the Syngman Rhee regime in some other Asian

countries, pa:rticula:rly seoul•s attitude tmval'd Tokyo 9 and
In seeming anticipation of "'hat was to come,
seoul had said that South Korea '•JOUld not become a party to

the So:.rti1tHJ.st Ai.;ia defense treat,y <JVen :l.f invited because
of opposition to Britain and France as members.

Th.e South

Korean spokesman accused the tvJo na t:l.on" of partic:l.pa ting
in collectiva opposition to Communism for selfish reasons

alone and not for the betto:nnent of the Asian people.
he said £;outll Korea opposed tl1u possibility of

Also,

Jap~<n 1 s

"1
participation.·~

1 9 stockton Hecord, December 2, 1954.
2

~lilliam J. Jordan, dispatch fl'Olll G"oul dated
April 12, 1954; in the ~ ~ Iimes, April 14, 19G4.
21

Quoted in ths

~

XQ!k ,Iimes, September 16, 1954.
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,Jap~tn~

Jl.~anila

on her paxt, kept very close ,.,atch on tm

Conference.

But h<;r interest was 111ith a closer

economic ti<l-Up with .southeast Asia rather than joining

any :pact that vJOuld entail a military commitm<mt abrcad.22
Ttle reason is ttlat the area involved in the alli'ance and

: - - - -the
-

adjacent__l:18tj_on~

too best

som~ce

lo_ng__hav~ _beetl_h(jld _up _i;o

.Jap<i,,tl_().S _

of raw material and tt10 bes·c nearby market

for Japan which must export and import in orde:r to live.
F.~~! en

before the Manila talks o paned • the powerful

Foreign Policy Committee of the Government's Liberal Party
under !'r<Jmier Shigeru Yoshida had expressed th<• hope that
Japan mi5ht ,join in the "economic phases" of ;·;ha·tever agreeuwnt the Jv;anila meeting might produce.

Dulles' statmnent

soLmded to tho ,Japanese as thougt'l it t;as a plan to bolster
Asian nutions against Communism by aid calcul&tod to

improve their economic status.2~;

J.f such ~;ere the case,

much of the needed aid in tho form of manuf<lctured gocds
for the indus·trial plant of ttld ;southeast .!.sian n&tions
might be

6}(pe cted

to be pur chased in, Japan.

Tllis form of

special procuremen·t <vculd offset tile drop in tt10 purchase

---·-----22Lindsay Parrott, dispatch frow Tokyo dated
AUGUSt 25• 19fi4; in the New York '!'irnes, AU~.>Ust 26• 1954.
23Li,ndsay l'arrott, dispatch fxom Tokyo dated
Suptembex 6, 19b4; in the N<l\v York :J:j,mes .september 7, 195'1.

------'

,1
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of military sllpplies by the United stattJs in Japan since
the end of the Korean

'~ar.

At tl1e time of this

>Vl'i tine;

the Japanese gova:mmant undex Pramie:r Hatoyarna is

en~aged

in trade negotiations with Hed China and Soviet Htlssia.
Since a i'rt>e Japan is mandatory for United States

secu:rHy, ttlun: is not thu slighted doubt that the United
States ••ill stand by Japan in case of attack.
cept

vH.lS

n.

'rhis eon-

gi w.n formal expression in tho mutual defense

THAUAND, I,f,O,S, GAMBODI!l, AND SOUTH VH.:TNAM
'

The clorJeness of the Indochina war to the borders
of Thhiland l:1as made her one of the most entL.'. 1siastic and
certainly the most concerned country of Bouttlaast Asia
insofar as tile Manila

Confc~rence

was concerned.

In his

openill5 spaacr1 to the conference. Prince vlan. r;;inister of
Foreign Affairs for the Kingdom of 'thailand • went to sroat
l<mg·ttt to illustrate the Thai M>y of l:lf'e" vJhich is ohaxacterized by a t;:radi tional conception of peace as including
freedom and ;justice • , • "
~r;as

hith

th<~

Pll.ilippines, T!HJ.iland

equally determined in llar "desire to fJee a commit-

me nt which in substance, is as near as possible to that of

134
NATo.ui?A

£against thEl opposition of all the other delega-

tions Thailand and thG United ,:;tates f·avo:r:ed including
Gainbodia and I.,t>os tc<.nd free Vie ·t;nam in tho treaty area.

To

be su:re, the desire of tho United States to p:ro·tect thec.e

three M;sociated .Stutes from f\u:ther Communist advance by

incorporating them in a collec·cive defense ar :carJt,ement was _____
the immediate cause for calling the Ntanila Gonference.
In expr<;ssing his desire for their inclusion in the treaty

area. Prince Vian sa5.d ~ •1They deservo to be protected on their
o111n

merUs and, as a X<Jp:resentative of Thailand, I should

say, as neigtlbouxs to my oount:ry.u25

In the end 9 a spHcial

compromise arrangement \vas arrived by \·Jhich the pal'tias

unanimously signed a Protocol to the

f!~ACDT

des:te;natine

Laos, cambodia, and Free Vietnam for purposes of Articl.;,s
IV and III of
III,

t);HO

Treaty.

AUSI'HALIA, NB;V./ ZEALllND, JiND TB$ PHILIPPI Nl~S

It 1oas

no~ed

earlier thtlt bilat<>:ral ·trGat:l.es among

Al<stral:ta, NeN :-3enlan6., the PllilippJ.was an:l the United

---·-----

24opening remarks of Prince Van V<'aithay~Jkon to t11e
Manila Conference of 1954; in t'n<j fi_oceedipgs: :;£he ~~
~ ~ §Q.!lt_l},~ ~ Colle~Q. J)i:i'fens<l '.l?:r<latu_ ~
Protocol tv the S:~:ACDT;_ and tile J?acii'lc Cha:r·ter (lS<Jued by
the comm:lt'to'(i(in-Publ!oity. Con.:fe:ranoe secretaxia't o:r tlla
Nanila Conference of' 19ti4, Manila. Phil:lppinesh p. 25.
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States f'ormed the
I1'u:rttler mo:Hl ~

ttl~;

U<ll•J

i"oundations of Pacific security.

proxi.mity of Communist China and Indo-

china .makes it a matter of grave and immediate concern to
ti:l~;se

Pacif:l.n natl.ons to associate themselves tn a wider

networl; of defonse a:nansement for Soutl'Ulast Asia and the
l·iestern pacific so t;h.ctt l:tnitHd,

nol;__llgat;er~, __ 1:t(ll;iol1_l)Jay

_______ _

-------

be effected to meat cxtE>rwll attacl:l:.

Their decision to be

incLuded among the orig,.i..nal members of

~"l~ITO

supplmrents

the series of b:i.lateral treaties with the United tltates.

At l;rw time

~3ecreta:ry

Dulles n<:Jgotiu ted too hnzus

Treaty the United i::tates :ref'usad to inv5.te either Britain

ox France to become part:I.es t.o it becaut:a this J:lould have
'

lncluded both Malaya and Indochina. 1rJhich 1r1ere already
faced vlitil Communist insurrections.

It seems that United

.States' strategy at tho! t time l'Jas to avoid corrllllitments,
~tJit;l:l

the exc<1ptioll of obligations under the United tl!ations

Gtll'l:l.'ter, on the mainland o:f Asia that might 1nvolve Uni·ced

GtatiiJS' ground troops.
The situation has since :rapldly chaflii;tld.
and France are no11J .full partn<)rs in SEATO,

B:r:tt;ain

(Bri t1si:l

participation in 'tile Southeast Asia defense talks vms done
at a risk& oml that may involve a peXlill'.tnent split \vith the

Asian Cmr.rnom•Jeal th countries.)

'rhis is :lnevj.table in vieltJ

,----
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of their stakes in th<J ar<;a.

Also. let us never forget

t11at the most important :factor in the "cold tvar" is
Fig T.h:ree tmlty.

This is tl12 :reason VJh;y the United sta.tes

stands by :Br;l:tain ln th« l•1iddle J:<;ast today.

:l'his is tho

reason 1"t1y the United states stands b;y France in l.<lo:wcco and

Tunis:l.a.

v.'i thout

fn~tmnpting

to axgll.e th<:l e tllics or even

]------------------

tb.(J advisability of sueb. rec<mt moves, lve can only st:J.te

for our purposes at thd moment that tlw task of' tllE. SEA'ID
po';Jers is to convince tilc.ir

m;i~hboxs

tl:nt wllatever China's

aims, collective security is really more likely to lead to
peace than a field ;;Jide open to piece meal aggrest>ions.

Ten

men oa.u overcome a thousand 5.f ·th'J thousam1. say that each
will defend l1im::>elf indivi.dually, for in ttJat cas,,, ttl<-: ten
do not face a thou sand; they face only one.

One at a tirrm.

Novo that tha problems facing thii nations of Southeast

.t\sia are also the problems of the VJestex n poNexs • and no1r1
that the physical c1.istance bet11Jeon America and the South
pacific shoxes • 1neasured in time, is no longer of great

consequencfJ, :lt need not occasio11 great HL1Tpr ise that tha·t
foreign pol ley is ad justine:; itself to

theme of' that policy ls cl.>;ar.

x~~ali ty,

'I:he batJ:tc

It accepts tl:le fact ti1nt, in

the vJo:rds of a polltical scientist:

"Communist ag;srE,ssion

in Europe ancl in soutilaast Asia 1.s insepa:rably linked and

I
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.

[

that defense against Collllnunism, if :i.t is to be ef'fective 0
must be suncessful :tn both area. ,,26

L
rI

26Joseph

s.

Roucek. "Southeast Asia and tho United

States," Q!Jl'1'.!!.!1t £iistor.:l. XXIV (August, 19b2) 9 68.

.

i
I
! : __

1----

..

incomnl<at.e if it did not t,e.ke
'
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li':rom the time the pact gave promise of ma te:rializing 3
C'<Oviet spok.esmen attacked it as merely a tool. devised by
the impel'iaJ.ist ruling cir•cles to preserve

11

coloniali.sm."

A. statement made by V. M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign MinistEJI'o

pally at the emerging .southeast Ad.an collect;ive defense
treaty, contained exceedingly bitter denunciations.
statement, directed to

th~;;

The

Asian cot.mtrie:>, decla.red in

part;
k•t present plans are promoted for a ne~• military
bloc agaj.ns t thE; peoples of ;.;oui;hoas t 1\sia. 'J:tlis happens
to be tile main pl'EJoccupation at the present of tt1e
:rul:i.nc:; dxc:l<lS of somo po1tJars. hee:tded by thd U.uit<:d
statc:s • • • • The main purpose of such military plans is
to p!:eserve :;;mG perpetuatG by every possible means
colon:l.al regimes, to curb nations that strive for
natlonal libe:t'ty and il1dep<mdence. '!hess plarw are the
expression of thu a!J!;gressive aspiJ:ations cf' ttle ruling
ci:roltls of certain ~;tates, but they are in colltradiction
l'llitb 1~11u interests of peace and with t:.he cause of tlw
national liberation of opl?l'GS(O<Jd nations. , , • Plans of'
such a natttre a:re motivated by a desi:re to defend in
e.o~:~theast .M:i.a out\,iorn privilegBs of' non-Asitcn states •
with wl1ich the peoples of' Asia do not v;ant to r econc:i.le
themselVtr3s~~

I>lolotov tolCl .t.!H:: F'a:t: !Jastm:n Gonf'e:retwe that many in tl1G
"imperie.list'' camp >verB
•••

dl~c:pl,Jased 1;1 tl1

Asi.a have at 1as1; stood

the fact that; tile peoples o;f
to defend decisively tlleir

Llp
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rights and int0rests. But; lt is time to unda:rstand
that no policy based on a posi t~on of s t:rength can
turn b:occk tile _.l1eel o:: history.
Ha.vlng ctttacked the ''U&;:ressive" nature of BkJ;A1'0 in
its fol'lJJative roo:iod of development, th<: t:;;oviet Union
p:roce,~d

ed tc pay t.r. :Lbut~o tc tllc

Coll<wtivE> Defense Treaty.

compl<~ted

Southeast Asia

The ;;ov1ct Union o.fflclally _
--- -- -

- --- ------------

----------

- --

denonnced. the pact on rooptemtor 14 as being, directed against
r,emu ity .in i<sia and ae:.a:i.n.s t the freeclom and national

indepenclenc:e of the Asian pee ples.

1'his leng·thy castiga-

tion of the, new agxeemerrt and its initiato:rs, especially
i;ho United Statcw, 1vas deliv<>:red in a statement b;:' the

1.\f! is kmmm, fo:c ;:H;r<Je.t·al 1aontl:~s Oll t.ho init:tative
an<i uncl<>r tlH'. pressure of th'- u.s.A. and under ttH>
pl ~'tc,xt. of defendinc, ttHJ cot.mtxi.:,s oi' Southeast; l!sia
agttinst eoWJmmism, intensive military prepa:r.at1.ons nave
been m!lao f'o:c tho formin;,; of''· nmi aggrBssiv& military
bloc in t;hat area • • • it was prepa:rod • an:l cax ri,Jd
ol):t; • b;i 1:ieste:m powers be11.ind the backs of lwian coun·tries, <lrld tho mtd.n :r:ole ,;as played by the U.U.A. •
althot~gi1 trw f:rontiers of tt:v;, u.s.A, arc eeveral thousand lr.ilomet;ers a1>1ay fl:'(lm southeast !.'lsia.

'l'hls fact alone
J,ntel.·n~·Jts

shoV~s

sui'fioiantly ch,arly in 1rJ!"lose

iJh6 nevJ groups axe being ::Jet upe

u

11

~~

The

new mi.li tn.ry grouping, in actual fact, rep:r m:.><mts a
bloc of colonial J:-O'rltJXS base(\ on :Unperi&lintsl ob,jec··
tives to maintain thei:r economic and political pos:l.tions

---·----

21~:xce:rpts from G<m<;va address by v. lvi. J.ijolotov, soviet
Foreign Min;!.ste:r, at the Gen•ova Conference on l0ay ll$ 1954;
in the NalrJ Xo:rh:. Time[, !ll;.ay 12, 1954.

1-

in bs:tn.~ \-··~hors t~o s:l.tun1~1.on hn.z .:t?.ld:lc#.llly ehnn~?;f:1£1 »

paxticuh,rly in viet'l of tl'k' historic victory o:r the
~:t!·~.H::d:;

Gh.:Lri.CS(; pGoy}lC'

o

o

,..

The" ~:f.Jrtthf&.fit AHi.;\n nountr:l.,ns =sl10l11C thun be th.~1
suppli<lts of d,;xatEJgil} :ra~1 n~atar1~•1s for the nni ted
rteft(_;~:' ~ 'dt't;;: j,x:tdt1f>tty and :tts r;a. :r.trl{;rcs ln ttr:; fl.tlfttlt:tc
l:l1oc. Thoy a.re to cJccnpy 1 in ttJ.c.; ;ft'l·tul'<;J Ha '"ell. tl:Hc
.,_-11-:,r;. ...,
~. . ,..__(....... (,
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thH u,xsHt colonial powers. H~xe. preoi~HJ:Ly, lies l;t1e
::.'ii.1.tl.·-~~J n:::-· ·~tld o~}Ofl<Jn1.c moil£11J.X e[~ v;h:Lc~h fiX·t::: h'·Blng ntf5__________;,., ent~;tl-flS--o.nf-J--c:!"---t'llt:-J----ta,)lts- of' --tlla --pz:..t:r· tlc;:tpants -in t.ne
:t., .. ,;,w <"':'l
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e;;.ctu~l.l f~M-;t

!;I

thi:. tr za<l,ty

;31~.ned.

l.n Me.nLle. ~
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as ag:r<ll~m<mts (Jn t1:!<1 G1'11a t:ton o;l.' Q'th":r closed a,.,t;;l',>!'> •
w'""'
'"'"nl'r<·•>••~
,.<• th•·
'·f'''•n
<\~A l:'l~t"""''u
,_,.4,
lrt:. . ,n·•·····1''U
_~.>,..J~.J... u.:.'-w
t..:;;.s.
,.., ,r;J)...r-,1<."'\.;,·•~ \.tJ~
~ l.r-~
.,\li::'J..t\,.. t••·•n
<.~~- ;;-'~""
::."-\.'::>
'~-r.a t..-....q H.l.,.v
J.n con t ..:e.dio f;ion ·t;o the lJnj. tad N"htions ob,1•wt:l. vos and
prj~ncJ..;ql.-.~s¢t e o
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ti10 craati.on oj.' militax;y ;;l',lUps ot stat'""~ at.t$mpts t·Ja:te
wade t~J Jut:hJ.i}y tht:Jm b:_, ra.f'6.t.tlr~ t.o the ir~tli!'ostr of
uefn<J,;<: ::.~n<l ·to assb;t.ing tt1e "'con orale proc,IBS£' of tho

p~~c~pl~,:; o:f" _
GO~;<n.t.r:tot~ t.H'l:Leh lVE'r-e b~:~5..ng d;:at1n :into
g,X~.iup.i.n~;s.
J:t vlan thus :.-1rwn t. t10 lttlt>ntic bloc
\if1S be
(~:r :·_;_r.ttozJ «
!t -~-J1'lltS t:ot».l~3 '\llfhc·:n planEJ :C'o.1:
;f:'ormDt·ti.<Jn cf tk1G nc;J'~4 eclllipEHlid E$ Dtl Go 'tth:1£'0 bt.Llng
,:_,)laJ.li<J:..;;:;ltti.td. ft. ~.~:~he ~1R.i'l1-~·:~ t;~ b(}:hlz'5 s;f.q:')~tf,,~a 1.n thx)

suc:h
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Necessarily, Communist China•s attitude fo1lo1s
HUs<, ia''' • ouly sesmin;;;;ly bolder.

3~

On September

PeJ.ping

:racio denomleed a publist1ed draft of th<: Bou.theast As:i.an

tantamount to "an ag(;!;ressive alliance tJe>stile to ·the
peoples of China and various Asian countritm."4

On

I

trivct'l by the United States to get Asians fighting i;s:J.ans."

I1

It te1;'med tb.e trEJaty, "a mili ta:ry bloc opposed to the Ashm
peoples."

Ths ag.:mcy further said. 13<: cr e tc:ry of Et.a to Dtllles

"openly listed the aggre:,;sive objectives of tt1e Un;l.t.ed

states in

~o1e:re

attaclrs

1

or,~aniz:tng

t:.~

the southeast As:!.a bloc.""

S:!.mila:r

subsequently :reite.rated alont, 1:1ith 1va:mine,s

that B:ritaln's support of the Un:lt;,:d states has impa:t:rEid
London's X:el ations

1fJi ttl

Peiping and thrEJats to •lliberate"

Formosa.
I_---

--'
"'Quoted
in the Nfl)i xo:rk
<
0

QiJ,OtGd

ln t;tvi ~ X9..t[

X!m£fl.,

____

,...,.
f~~lllS S

~

September 4, 1954.
t~eptemhex

gt 1954.
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III,

Bfl:liUTATION OF' CHAR GE;S

These demmciat:lr.:ms came

t~ittl

poor g:race from the

stat<3 that had been obstruct1.ng much of th!i

111orl~

of the

Secqrl ty Go Lll1cll of the Un:l:ted Nat;ions by an unini1ibited

use of ttl.s veto 0 that l1!'1d :refused to cooperato in .solViJ:ltl
th.c p:r_o_'bl_GmEJ_o.f'_.the- -C 011 t rol--on-- a-tcr.ni-c---.r.;.rma.mentil--,---- -'ctw. t ----nad

sponsored the rape of Ch:!.na, and that had been instrumental

in creatin,; a group o:t' Gommunist dictfltclrsl·l:tps in nBighborlng states.

c:,;::,

a IJl:opaganda line, nowever, it ma.y have

defensive by

acct<sinr~ t!Hl!ll :repeat~edly

of :tmperiroJ.istic

ing ptwllad to :!.ts ext:reme lj,mH;s in evGry di:rec tion.
It 3.ppnared to

hfW<>

little effect on the; line of

mongering" Nere refuted :repeatedly

i:\nCt

on :J.ndisputably solid

grmmc1s by spok.esmon of the United states and by

atives of otll<H treaty nat:l.ons.

J~t

every

s·f~ep

I<:~pxesent-

in ti:J.e

1
for l\nthony Eden at tho i''IaniJ.e. Conference, saic1:

"~~here

is absolutely no reason at all for anyone to he alarmed or
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suspicious ubout the aims of the conference unless they
are designing to be a.gg:ressive. 11 6

His statement was a

conside:red, deliberate rebutto.l to the broadcast of ttle
Pei.;o1ng radio on tile same date.

'l'he mewbers of the alli-

ance v1e:re qu iek to s taud in defense of

~'::'.A TO.

At i;he

opening of the J!1anila Confa:renoe 9 Heading said:
Our objects are purely defensive. We threaten no
one. We seek not provocation but prot.ectlon. l.'ie
desire only to live in prsace vlith our neighbours, and
to see them live .tn peace wi tl:l one another.

Ma.gsaysay has b:r:tefly but emphatically said:

today for no

a~;b.:r.ef; si ve

Australia declared:

any nat.:i.on.

ptlrposo."

•0\r.Je are met

Rlchard G. cas<'lY of

"This ·:r:reaty hl not c!irec·tsd au;ai.nst

It is quite simply d.Lre(:ted against aiGgression."

In refu'cing ti.1e officJ.al sovte t protest, John J!'os tor Dulles
put it this

~;my:

The sovi.et Foreign Of'fj,co has jU:3t :i.clSlHld a lengthy
statement denouncing tl1e Manila l;'hct. It pa:r tic t)larly
complaino of Article IV. lvhi{)h p.rov.i.des fox united
:recJis'ctmce to arm~Jd attack and political subversion.
·rhe eoviet statement says l.;hai; the Grl.i.nesfl communj.sts
also do not 111-ce the pact.

___ ___ __
...,..

,

6Benjamin \i! elles, dis pa toh from London datml
Ser)l;e;:lbe:r ;c;, 1954 ,· ;tn ·trw lHl"tl YoXl£ '£in1es. coientembar 4, 1954.
;.

----

...
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T!le Jvianila Pact is d.i.H~ctad against no government,
against no nation, and against no people, It is
directed only against aggression. The 1'aot that the
COirununis ts find that objeot.;onable is traGically reveal in~, of their ambitions.

It 111as in an international atmosphara of this ldnd
that the rep;l)esantatives of t.hs United states and the
Chinese Collnnurlists met in Gfmeva in April. 195G. to consider
--the "easing of world tensions" especially over the Formosa
area.

Probably no high hopes of rHal aacomplis!llnent <Je:re

entertained L1 ad ''ance by the participan·&s since no g.roum s
for optimism existed, and today the sltuation l'eJllElins
1-11 ti1out any sign of relief in tile future.

·~ense

In such cil:ccun•

stances SJ?.:ATO inevitably will grow in meaning.

7Jolm Fos·te:r Dqlles, "The .Manila Pact and tlw Pacific
Charter," D8P§ItL1<mt of .ctat.e Bulletln, XXXI (Be:t:t ember f~7,

1954), 433:"

l

-- -------

CHAPJ.'Eil VIII
IMPLEMl~NTIN G

THlii TRFA 'l'Y

sect ion 1 of' Article IV or th<; southeast Asia
Collective Def'ense Troaty provides ttw.t.

Each. Par·ty recognizes that aggression by means of_____
---ar-med-a-t-tuck--ih--tha----txea ty ----a;r: ea-- agai~rs t--- !illy-----or --th-e Parties or against any State or terri tory v•hlch ·the
Parties by unanimous agreeioont may hereafter desig·
nate, tvould and anger its own peace and safety, and
agrees that i t tvill in that event act to Jlleat the
common danger in accord<mce <Jith its constitt~tionaJ.
processes.

Ttlis spells the general military commitment.

Article I!I

states:
The Parties under take to strengthen their free
institutions and to cooperate vJith one; anottHH in the
fu:rther devolOplllent of economic m<:asures~ iucludin~;
technical assistance, designed both to promote e r~onomic
progress and social 111ell-being and to .further th~>
individual and collective effor·ts o:f governments tol<~ard
these ends.
'l'h:!.s is thc:1 famous economi<: and technical aid provision.

Article l i of t;he TX<>Uty stat'.;S

thf~·t,

• • • in order to mo.re e1'fac·~3.valy achieve the
objer.:tivas of this Treaty • the Parties, separately and
jointly • by means of continuous and effac·t;:i.ve selfl1elp aM mutual aid lrlill maint;ain aml develop their
individual and collective capacity to :resist armed
attack and to prevent and counter subve:rsive activi·ties
directed from without against thlili:r ter:rito:rial in tege
:r 1ty and poJ.i tical stability,
'rhis is a par ticula:rly euphemistic Nay of indicating the
rna). intentions of the r:estern powers of going into the
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T:r·eaty as "Elquais" with the nations in the a:rea.

And

perhaps, the whole Treaty depends substantially on this
article.
I,

THE 'rR]};Al'Y COONCIL MBE:J.'ING AT J311NGKOK

Tile fil's.t Council

m~Hlting

under the Treaty

~Jas

held

at Bangkok, February 2::'l, to February 2fi, 1955, to determine
What could tle done to implement; the various p:rovisions
of the treaty,

There \vas also need to ,,wrk out more

detailed and precise undorstandi!ll;;s on ho111 tho ·cerms of

title treaty 'dll apply ·to p<:rticular situations.
editorial puts it;

11

As one

'1'he Bangkok meeting put the SJJ:£1'1'0 pact

organization on its feet. It is on its foet and headed in
1
Through it there \1ill be military
the right d1rec·tion."
staff consultatlons and excht1nges of opinion and intelli-

gence.

1> head quarters (}3angkok), a pernJanent staff

includinb

1:1

joint military staiT group and anti-subversion

expo:r ts, a program., and a common approach--th<;se >vera the

solid ach:Levements of -the Bangll:olt

(;>

conference.'~

The three main purposes of the Manila pact have bc,en

mentloned eurlier: defense a;Salnst open and armed aggression;
1" The :eangll:ok MeH ting, " conmomrH:~al, LXII (Ic'Iar ch 25,
1955), 646.

2"Meeting at Bangkok,"

Nqtvsc~eel_i 6

XLV (l'Jarch 7, 1955),
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defense against subve:r sion; an:l the improvement o.f a co nomic
1-------

and social conditions.

In this connection, ••we have taken

decisions •" said Secretary Dulles in his closing statement
at Bangkok February 25, "Hhich vlill make the Council an

effective vJorldng body within the thret:l areas dealt "ith
by the

"/.

pact.,~,

on J>\arch B0 1955, secretary DUlles went on tho air

to report to the American people 'the achievements of the
council meeting under i5Fil::ro. 4 on this occasion the
seer etary said:
.Fox tl:w military defense, we sl:wll rely largely upon
mobile Allied power >Vhich can strike an a0,grossor vJile:rever tile occasion may demand. • • • The United states
in pa:rtieular has soa and air forces now equipped 1•i th
net-! and powerful vJeapons of precision, vlhich can utterly destroy military targets without enctange.ring unre1~~ ted civilian centers.

1
I

our Treaty council, after appraJ.sirl€~ the military
factors, concluded that the available military po11er
offered solid hope of detening open armed aggression
against the treaty area.

I

1

In order to br:l.ng our. power to a concerted pitch,
our military advisers at Bangkok s·l;a.rtHd thei:r \Vo.rk together. • • • In tllis vJay infbrma.tion will be exchanged
about the fornes IHlich could be mad.e available, and
st:rate.;;ias can be a~reed upon.

j

_____

,_ ......

-

3"stater11en~
Meetir.~o."

of Secretary Dtllles at the Close of the
DeJ2a:rtmont g.£ g~ lJ.!&letin, XXXII (Marll 7 • 1955),

374.

4Add:ress report of secretary Dulles March 8, 1955 on the
results of the Treaty Council meetint; held a:t Bangkok,
Thailand, Fobrua:ry 23-2:'} 1 195f,; in "The \Jay of tile A!%resso:r
Has Been Made Harder • '' United States ~ f!.lli1 J!:LS!l!!i Hepor!f.,
XXXVIII (!Jla:rcl.l 18, 1955), 69-7l.

1
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Next; on the agenda is the problem of subversion
which is perhaps the t;;:reatest danger to the area.

Said

Decretary Dulles on this subject in his broadcast report:
Tt~is danger will, I think& be diminished as it is
better understood tl:11 t ·t;(le Treaty nations ll~We tile
po\Hll' and th<; \vill, to strike dovJn an open armed
ae;;;,resso:r.

____________,t.ro-i-1-lus-t-ru-te---this---oonnection--bf~tween- di-re-ct·--anQ-------------indinlct ag;gress:!.on I ma.y mention the situation in
Laos. In two of its provinces there are disloyal
elements, Sllppo:rted by the Chinese and Vietminh Cormnunists. The Laos Government is seeking to re-establish
control over :!.t s own t<lr:ritory. But it is ;>orried
less, if i t suppresses tho Communists lflithin 1 it will
be struck by the Communists from illitrwut. I hope that
thut "ony is n<nJ allayed by their \)etter understanding
of the prot<Jctive nature of th~l Manila Pact.
In other countries also, active subversion is being
promo·t;ed f:rom \v:l.thot<t. J?o deal "itil this ls in each
case prinmrily ·the :rsspons:HJ:tlity of the governments
concernm'l. HovJever • often the nat.ions can tlelp each
otller by exchangi% information, for exsrnple, abot.:rt
the movements and activities of internatlonal communist
agitators. Also, those wtw have dealt successfuly 1dth
this problem can give advice which 1!iil1 help others of
lesser experience. The Philippine delegation did this
at Bangkok. They told ho\'1 their Government had dealt
decisively v1i th Communis t•inspired revel t of the socalled d:ults e

:n- 11as 11greed there "ould be meetings of experts to
:facilitate exche;.nges of vie1111:> ubou t th<.:ise problems of
su bve:r s ion,
The Council meetitl;;;> also dealt ;,;i·!;h the third treaty
task., that of improving economic and social conditions.
'rhi.s problem divides itself into two parts.

F:l.xst is

general irnprovemGnt of economic oonditJ.ons in ·the a:rea.
This calls for capital developnwnts • industr ial:tzation.
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better roads, more irrigation ·works, and imtlroved port
faoilitios. greater. trade among the countries of' south and
southeHst .Hsia, and the v:ester.n Pacific.

Again quoting

Gecr<:tary Dulles:
'J.'his problem of economic improvement goes beyond
the immediate Treaty area. 'fhe 'J.'reaty a:t:ela is not and
nevex can l)EJ a self~contained economic tmit. :rhe
--------;g-x-raa-t-bul-k----of---1t-s---t£a<Je--·ts---~~ith- out·std"<-J ·ax-e-as·-;---- 1 ifSJie ___________ _
is ne,;d f'ol' pro,~:raJus to develop broe.dly the •>conom:tc
posflibil:l.ti<Js of all ttw free li•~>i&.n countx:!.es. '£l'le
Treaty nat:Lons vd.11 stu<ly thei:r prob].(;ms from tl1is
vie'c;point.
1

Ai; tho Bangkok confer e nee • I took occasion to raemphasize ·President !Eisentlower 3 s desire that atoJnio
energy should be used to benefit • • • en:l'ich the lii'a
of' the e,:reat ma::oses o:r· humanity, • • • 1 c1etHlribed our
programs f'o:r education in this field • and 1 extended
a special. invitation to the !JlaniJ.a .Pf.ict nations to send
:reprosentati ves to tlld United States so tllwc they eould
lJegin to s tu.dy th<J ,; ood uses to 1tJili.Cl:l atomic •m.ar (.;y
may beput.

The Sli!Cond pllase of the eoonomicl p:roblem is ti10
p:robl0rx1 of uu,,,;,ting the cost of more effective security
forces. 11

some sort o:r United f3tates troop commitmfmts,. if only l;oken,
to discou:rago ag,s;ression.

13ecretary

Dt~lles

a:r.gued that

southeast Aa:ta 1 s defense was linlced to that o:r I\.o:r.Nl, ,rapan,
and Formosa.
highly mobile,

Unitecl Eitrltes forces, therefore, must remain
But just in case anybody ·thought ttds v;as

an admission of "eakness, Dull.es declured tt.JLit United :states
p01rilar in trw pacific is

gr~jater

novJ than at the heigh·c of

the second 111o"ld 111ar.

His i'it,llres--foL1! hundred vmrships,

i'i ve di vls.i.ons, and tt1i:rty sql.ladrons of f';!.ghters and

bombe:rs--t•e:re not too st;u.rtline;; but he meant, of course,
tncludil'l.t, atomic ;veapor:s. 6

(Britain has approximately

flfty thousunc1 ground troops in the Far itas t--tni:rty

thous ani\ of til<1m in sou ti1eas t Asil;l.--plus _abou_t__ ~l:ll'_eo __
hundred comba·t aircraft and a. Fa.r Eastern f1.eet based
aroun.r?. a car.rler and two cruisars. 6 !''ranee has been IIlithdrm-;ing the bul!t of ller expeditionary corps from Indochina.)

The request tor an l;J.w:;:r:tcan comxnit:ment 1r;as soon

dropped bLtt there is need of moc1est national forces 11/hich
are >iell eqt;tippE;d and loyal. which can sLtppo:rt the au thor-

ity of the gove:rnment tru:oueo>hout its tex:ritory and fight
initial defenzive &Gtions if tllere be attack. from 1rli thout.
United Gtlcl tss NevJS and \.;orld Hepo:r t quotes an unidentified
American plmmer in Asia 111ho explains United states
strategy as folloW> 1
1iitmt 1•e 1ro aiminc; at :ts to make Oil! allies strong
enough to :resist infHt:ration and 'to lJoJ.d init:l.ally

against outside aggression. '!'hat will. give us time to
deploy our a:l...r and. !11.Wal fo:r.ces to stop or discourage
the age;X<:Jss:ton by puttint; the ene!¥y 1.:mde:r attacl:';: at many
points-~and cdth nuclear \1ea}.Klns.
O"Doutheast Asia: A
XLV (Ma:r:c:h 7, 19[\5), 39.

l\l54.

6)3enjamj.n \1olles in the

York 'l'imes,
-------Ne\~

7"l,Jianeuvers :tn Asia," United ;3tates
Heport, XLVI (February i£;4, l9So5, 17.

6eptembe:r 3,

~lhls

woti t5~nc:; h€!.!3 r~·l'O vld sd thu iX*(lwbex-;i of t;i:tc Goun(!il
o py,or t·..:tn~,;ey for bx in£J'.ing .£..t1.::i~1ut cJ.osf.rr t~.t tJS
,,,,~. ,., . .
~·.,
... -., o•~ 1·t.<S" b'l•
•. ,•rn~n"'·•n'·r·
o~J1.<~•r•n··
'"'ftJ"'
"
~-,-~Ja\.#"'e~
1,.!/,.,.~;; .•t~,J,
t ~·.;.~.
kl.n.; b .. .l ,,., .._:t..,,o
J...''-' ".t~t.*:i;j. ·th•1"
·~c,~o.t.Jt~,..h
t.:tt,JJ:i !.·.:· .~,..
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Al t;hough tt.1e~~ tepxcsent cU. ,rars?J; n~ti~1n~ ;;:~,n£1. pGop.l~3~1 !)_
th<:J me;tlba:rs of tl1e G<lUU<:il W1Ue umm:l.mous ln the b;c;lief
tiwt th:i.s lll'-'"ti!':l<;'; has ;mabl.::d th<llfl to L1ru1e:r.staud o.nd
appr<:~cinta the pxoblemu fa.o:i.ll& til# 0 0'IIe:r.rw,;mt,s o:r th<J
oocmt;xies covered by tha ·ruJuty in t\le common e!.i'oxt to
ensUHl peace and :H:lOOl':i:ty under the 1'J:Ga-t.y • :J:he; pxo,;,;;oss
achi<NGd ~l.'l:; this .f ill>t council ;i)EH>i.;:tn:;; p:rovidas <wlid
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hope for closer coope1:ation among the liJ<arnbe:c g;ovE~:rn~
ments for the bOOd o:r the region as a whole. The members of' the Council are unit-ed in t.heir conviction that
the common ef'f'orts of' thaix governments are oon tribl.lting
positively to the peace and security o:f tlle area. both
~·or the mei~bex governments and for other free nations
ln th<3 .reg:ton.

l?inany. thr,; Coummnique expressed the hope that
11

free nati.ons

~.I.Ul

assotdate themselves _j.!}_j;l1e _nea.r future __---·-

II,

11

0PE:RA'l'ION J.iiRI'I LINK"

"Ope:r:ation F.:l.rm Linl:e. ''

·~he

first jc:lnt mllitaxy

lza tion pxodcwed r1eva1'al late -J:a.!l;:,e effects:

{1) The Comwun-

i

'

1

even

am.on~;;, nHmi..be:rs

of the alliance

milita:r y comrai tmont.

cl!nvs,

(2)

\~no

After the a11ied

~~he rnil.lta:~;y

supported a st:ron;o';e:r
kJil;r g&ultlS

thG "paper

exorcises demonstrated to the Tllaia

that a Dl.:';I\'..W foxoe can reach tl1eir coQntry in a hurry 9
tllereby assuring tl1em thEtt

tilEi~l

vJill not huve to fight alone
,-

i

if real

\olt\X

comes.

It may

rHHVe

to o.ffsat growing drift

-------

&r~xceJ.:pts from thB text of a cornr,mniqu.a is;med nt
Bangkok, ~("m:ilanrJ, on F'ebrtlm:y ;:~5 at the close of tho meeting of thH Council of the s>J~CDT; in the .Q:.J.ll§;rtl.Jl'Ul~..9f .§~
Bul.lati£)., XXXI! (!!ja;rcl1 7, 19155) • 371.
·
9uc:r<>aky Tiger," ;J;ime. LX'Ifiii (February 20, 1%6) 9 32.
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toward "nen t:ra1lsm•1 in TlHJi1anc1 or he:r neighbors •10
nanstJ.VHXS also gave Ai.iians a pxev:Lon¥ of the modern

1,;eapons tl18 United

s·t.ate~o

allies in the Plld.f.i.o.

has ava.ilable to defend its

(4)

li'inall)/, the s!10\v t·;as counted
pact~;.

on to liUderline ·i;he basic valuE; of r:eg:l.onal defense

!t 15 nov1 generally accepted thut the Uni te(J Nations cannot.___ _

;--------

an internal takc,•ovnr by tho GoJmnLmists

u.n:t"~Jl1o:re

in Asia.

T:lc!Ss:ta ':> 1mto can blocll: a.<Jt:l.on in the Security Council.
~the

"nen'G:rals •" the Arab bloc and i:ha sov:i.et bloc na t:i.ons

Felix. B. Et;ump, Unlted St.at.es Paci.J:'ic Fleet Commander,

i

III.

CT~l\TO

N'1!IDS A i:.lTHOl\JG l·liLI'.rAl1Y

~ILLJ.iir>!G.E

Nevertheless, ti'BATO does not yet cax:ry a big stick.
\1htit follmvs ir> tb.e latmJt

--

size~up

of' tho s:i. tuation by the

---·- ....

United :'Otates Ne<ls and i:'o:rld Heno:rt in its Fob:rua:r.y, ?,A.
-,..;

~-

1956, iSSLV3•

lO,. Fointz'ld. Maneuve:r:s, 11 ~~!!;_, XI,v:r. (J•'ebxuary 27,
1955) 0 48s

11 Quoted in "Allied .[vJanellveJ:s in Asia," 2.£•

P• 76.

£!1.,

,_
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Bas as

few and \llidely scattered in the area.

O.l'(-l

United States

[~avy

~rhe

is st:l.ll building its big ne-w base at

Subic Bay in the Philippines.

It bas only ti:UEl<-l air bases

in the PhUippines capable of iaandling jets.

:Che Br.it:Lstl

enEJd to include F'o:rm<Jsa 9 ,Japan, arul. Korou, all th•s allles
except the u:nHed f)tates and trw Philippines cold-"houldm:ed

le.ft oi'

TO •s ground forces:

Pklil.ippines has
divisions;

'i;ho

<Ul

'l'he H<lpublic of the

army of' forty thou1Jand men :tn

ttc~o

othGr t:rainirlt:: divisions are :ln process.

Tha:lland has an army of' some ninety 'thousand

uncertain vvlue."

l11Gn

"but 5.s of

The l:\Xi'i:;ish lu.we r:tbout f'lfty tr1ot1sand rntm

Hnd the Malayans themselv<lS have a 'ten thousand•

man Army.

'£he French no'iPl have fewex than twenty-five

i'if't;y ttlotwand about a year
tNenty-ttuee thousand, and

~:tgo.

1\us·tral:la lws a f'o:r:ce oi'

Nev; zee~ani.i,

twenty-nirre thousand.

156

Pakistan 1 s one hundred eighty thousand ground troops are,
for the most part. pirmad do1rm along the borders \vith India
and Afghanistan.
troops 1n l•sia,

Bven th'" United states is short of ground
It has t>vo divisionl'.l in Korea arx:i oua in

J!:lphn, but all a:re

Uncid'

strength.

division stationed in HattJaii,

'l'he:re is an Army

The 'Xllird Marine Division

has tmits in Japann Okinenva, and Havwii,
"SIGATO ns sea-pmver • mostly Ameriorul, is far superior

to an,yttlins the communists have in southeast Asia."

Also,

tomong the ['.i;fl:J.'O partners, the United Staks has the only
air potver of any consequence in that part of the

WOl'

ld,

Guam is back in business as th<l st:rateg:l.c JU.:r Fo:rce •s main
Pacific base.

JIJlost of the United Stat<>S' tactical aircraft

are in Japan, Okina1va• and Formosa.
si.UTicient mobility to shift 1 ts
bases are available.
little to contribute.

Tl:le I<ir F'orce has

po~1e:r

at tv ill v1herever

The other nations • be wever, have

CHAP'rER IX
Rl~TROSPECT .AND PROSPECT

Nations that possess f.:r ea &'ld democratic ins t;i tutions

and desire to live at peace a:r<J placed at soma disadvantage
in the \·JorJ.d "hero exist totalitarian s ·bates

tvh~se

_leadiill:'ll_. _ __

concerned 1?Jith their own po1ver and pres·tii;e. are not too
scrupulous as to th<i methods by which their goals a:re
<~ttained.

Too frequently in this t>Ventieth centu:ry

1~orJ.d,

the offensive is held by those ;.Jho vJoUld least hesitate to
employ it in th<? use of fo:ree 1'o:r materialistic reasons.
The f'ormula tion of defensive pacts by

~l tates

app:r el:lensi vc

of agg:res:cion does not a.lona compensate for the disadvantage.

A superior ,,;:J.ll by free peoples to preserve th"ix

freedom and a lviJJ.:l.ngness to make any sacrifices in t.hat
cause must help balance the scale of' :relative advantage.
"Thus the

st:rL1~le

goes on," to quote the lvords used by

secretary Dulles in a major address to the ,l<"oxe:!.t;n J?olicy
Association in New

Yor1~

CitJ' ~ February l6t 1955.

Thus the struggle goes on. We dare not relax
because ttw moment of relaxation is the moment of peril,
Treaty declarations must be packed by a purpose tlll•t .i.s
ever sustained, by un intelli6ence that is 0ve:r alert.
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and by po;;er Which is ever ready and able to punish
ags;ressors so that aggression will not pay.l
1--

Whenever nations that possess free and democratic institutions and desirine;; to live at peace laclt these qualities.
then that desire to live in peace is in jeopardy.

To the .free >-Jo:rld, SJ!;I\TO represents anothe:r collec·
ti ve seour ity pact. anothcH' regional arrangement, another
deterrent to aggression.

There is a Pacific Charter that

voices certain noble sentiments: self-determina tione
independence, freedom,
tb.e

I~ast

For the first ti.nle free nations of

and free nations of the vvest voluntarily join a

multilateral militaxy pact.
previous bilateral deals

It is an advance over the

desi~ned

to bxing security to the

It is

Pacific area--tllough no all-in Pacific pact as yet.

a collective defense a:r:rant;,ement >vith teeth, <wen if th<>
teeth do not ope :rate aut;omatically.

It gave Iitle free

11Jo:rld tlle diplomatic off'ensive 8 something wt:dch counts a
lot in psychological •;a:ref'are, especially in Asia.

SFiA'l'O

cvas unquestionably a victory fo:r Becreta;ry of 13tatG John

Foster Dulles and a badly needed victory at a time when

lnuulles seeks Risk in Retreats," United states
-

~ ~ ~Q.. Reno:r:h XXXVlli (February ~38, 1955).

,

1:: -
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his "liberation" and ••massive retaliation" policies had
raacb,ed a dead and.

SEA'l'O >1as W.so a victory for the West,
For tt1a loss

wh.ich was also badly in need of a victory,

of North Vietnam and the defeat of EDC in th<l French
Assembly, O(Jming in rapid
prl.wt:tge to a

ne~1

Here then

~mccession,

lovl throughout the

axo the

llad brought

V~estern

freo_~Jo~lci._

major vW.ues of DEA'fO:

lt thro1r1s the free 1tJorlc!ls
I,aos, Caml.Jod5.a, and south Vietnam.

:protective~

mantle over

The C:onununis ts are

no~J

formally vmrned that aggression thore may bring about
collective retalia t:ton.

defense fol'

It skips the thorny issues of

South Korea. and Japan.

Fo:r.mos~.

actually provid ad for

elset~here

T:'lese a:re

in unilateral and bilateral

'

ar:nmgements

bett<~een

the united states and these countries.

To have d:rac;ged them into the Mani.la
d:ra""ged out. if not e:t.'.feotively

tal!~s

1>1ould have

dis:rup·~ed 0

the talks.

It

gives tile :Philippines the substance of 1\.m•>:rioan mil.itary
sqppor t

VJi tl:wt<t

t!w lt:c tter t£qa:ranteeins mil:l. ta:ry assistance.

Jlctually the Phll:l.ppines have this gua:rantles

verba~.ly

from

President Bisenhower and formiilly in the United StatesPhilippines treaty, so they do not need it in E.1£A TO.

CEA1'0

also makes it clear tl:lnt to the Uni tHd States "COllllllunism"
is

t;h~a

enfJmy to be opposed., fought, defeated throtlghout

Southeast Asia; that \riashington 1 s obligations are confined

1- - -
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to Commun:tst-:tnspirml o:r Communist-led agE,ressions 9 and
hope that the United States will not be committed to
support French or British colonialism in Sou·theast Asia.
m~Am

assLu•es the United states Gongress of a voice

in <:ny fighting tbEtt is to be done in ttH3 Pacific.

Without

tlmt prov:ts ion ."'BA'£0 's chances of' getting congresstonal
- - - - - - ---------------- -

-

-

-----

approval v1ere nil. in the first place.

-----

SE;1 TO is an open-

end &g:reement--tl1a.t is, other nations are free (in fact,
invited) to join.

While tt1ere is little

ct!l~nce

of getting .

India or Indonesia to sign uny such (:ollect:l >m sactu ity
ar:raJ:'Ii;ement, it might be uosstble to inte:rest Gtlylon ana/or

and secu:ri ty; but i.t enhances 1 ts chance f'o:r peaceful
existence and independent living.
:ri1:ron,:)1 NATO. the UnHed states has automatic

commitments reach:tng across Europe to Greece and 1'urkey and
tho borders of Iran.

Through SE.ItTO :tt no1rJ has another set

of collllllitmmrts rea.chlng across the Philippines i .r..ust:ra.lia,
NevJ Zoal!Jnd • on to the contiuen t of As :I. a into 'lhailand
and nearly meetifl!.; the Nf>TO commitments via Pakistan.
Because the <Jo:rl<l. is a globe, if one starts :from any
given point and proceeds far GnoucJ1 in any one dixection,
he v<ill end up just where he started.

For example, the

United s·tates started 1vi th the probll:lt!! o;J.' its own de fens a,
drif'ted east to \iiestern Etuope 1 thu Balkans 0 the No:rtl1 Sea.
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the laoob:ddge to the Middle Bast, Southeast Asia, the
China :road e and now she is back considering her defenses
in the Far East;.

from thG Bast; aga:l.m;t ·che il·es·t Coast o;t' thCl United states
depEmds upon the holding of' the paoit'ic portion ot'

Mackinc1er •s ••outer Croscant."

'J.'he:refore, to d afend

Cat. i for nia, Oregon, and Washington, the United .states has

to have

isl~:Jnd

defense outposts thOi.:Wands of miles fJ.•om

the ·,·,est Goast of the United States.

The land areas of this pacific region Cfm :rougl1ly
La divided into two tiers:
defenses.

an inner and outer tiu:r of

'l'b.e inner tier consists. as

of fiustralia.

~HJ

obse:rva a globe,

Nelv Caledonia, Indonesia. the Solomons,

the

caroline Islands, the (;la:rianas, the Philippines, Formosa,
the Bonins, ,Japan, the Kurnes, and thll Aleutian Islands.
In the

m~ter

tier

~le

can place l\letv zealend, samoa, th(;;

Islands • ':Jake, HI;:J.W"li.i 1

l\'lid~my,

and • a6 ain, the eastern end

of' the Alou'tians.
\'then a. geopolitician looks at

i t in

t110

tt1e CnJscent he sees

diffe:rent lit;;hts 1 if lle is tm American.

The

fi:rst is the role of far-flung outposts of defense against
invasion from the east.
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en~a~ements fou 6 l1t 1n ttw outer ti<Jl' \Vould be
~l1g!'.lgl:>!ilCV.t5 until ttJBy J:tilllCh<:id tb.e c:<:~:>s tt•l
~~ate:rs o;f the Unitoo. St~cltos; wh.<;J:Ie 1and .. b~1sed ai.rc:raft and t~rtillery lM.\Y tal.;:.a p~ltt. l:c7tll;<li;!;~>lll!:lllts ;fought

Any

pUl'ii'JlY na'\nll

in the inn!i:r tim: %o uld be oombitled l!llld 1

sal'!~

bnd air
two-fold
!J.1W; first. to contain the f.ign.t ltJi thin tll<! inna:r "Ci<J.r
antt ::;<H!cndly 0 to hold tltCJ litlo o! lslands >illich mcd<e up

f.tc.:;llts i"l'<>m the Vi£il:· y start.

ttle 1nncx

of'

I>Q<H!t.
w
<o.;..,:J-..,

..._,

t~lGr o

L;lltl

•··~ct· p,.,,,,,d'·!tii.

>;;w,.&,

1

,;'C,UJ:!.;-<

must do

<>

•!
.J,.,,~

q<"<f'K•
~A'.:.<-

f"P''j'
.;a,VlA

thl'<·~' thine:-~;

«t't''·"l<'
..... -,... ~

(.:;0-~

f:.,_~

:tl.r<>tg destr.oy

our control o:C th0 inner t:!.or; s8contl1y 0 :ro:nHl ·the
flght into tb;,; nroa of ti.1a OQt<jJ: tit;;:q and th:trdly,
inva<le mu: <Jest oonst. Inasmuch as this ·whol~• plan
'l''"'t "t·v;·• "'""lJ· M"'"'·'""' "'t· "''~t~"1
"'''" ''t't"'•"t•,
M•r·<·rn'l
.!. v - v.:.
}':..;;" ""'""li , .,,-,
v,..,..,. """
or thH :tnnex ·t:ter"l it is ttl.ls s.:t'flU tn~•t .1.l:i most :Lm;;xa:tanl:
to t~S f:> t pt·~}fH~H'ltk G.._,,~
~ ~""'""

I

Ho 1. ott-4.S (15 tf:t1H ann be (:;.one, th . f ¥4ast

•kl'"''' '"'''
iHIY~~·
... f:J.

cbviou~>ly.

our pro l:ll.~J!Il :l.<l a

")

,IQ;,t _,_

~A.~,)~

j

~.;v~•u.·Jvt-'.«J...>:.i

4'"Y~il

-~-· ·'~

""'"''~"'

j

-;~n.
i.Jv

l

-----

;)'l'~"
. !f. ··<:-lk't{~·i.f.\t. "-:::. t~t"'.!E1
"""l.".; -/k,'*..,.,..:,."'"" ~· v .. lj;..~

s'1
..-.•~i1 ....
~ ~•ii;o'•·lf""
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that perimeter on the continent of Asia around the borders
of Thailand and pakistan.

I
t

United states defense pe.rimeter has· been sL'!if'ted soma
t>velve htmdxed miles 1fJestvJa.t'd.

jj

I

In o·che:r •'ords, H'.ld China

is not> completely :r ingHd to tt1e south and southeast by a

lt'-------~ --defensive
li

'l'hus the soutl:'ie.rn and of the

a):'i~llt

alliance of f:reo nations 1r1h,o llJ.lVG __

to

exy;0ct United L;tutes military assistance in tile avant of
an attack.

'l.'n'" one gap in the :ring is Burma. and even

there an attack: i"JOt:tld undoLlbtedl.y meet with resistance and

i,:

evoke a call for help.

Of course, Sec:r etary Dulles l1as an. "out." since the

l

l
t
]
I

l

United States does not have to do anyttling in Sou'triiHJ.St
Asia unti.l Congress acts in the case of any aggression.
America's prus'tige is at stake in
Congress coL11d

.t'~l pudia'ta

SEATO~

But

and vJtlila the

Dulles and President Eisentlo<mr or

any futLua administ:ration, it would not only confuse, but
dismany, United Stt1tes allies :Ln southeast Asia.

It

<~OUld

certa.il'lly end any influence v·.asllin?;ton may have wi ttl the
free peoples of Asia.
II,

TilE f'O.i:.ITlCAL FIELD

lvtost of \'hat >vill be said :tn the political field vJould
me:rely be a reiteration of vllwt has been stated previously.
1.

Let it be nailed do1rm once and :for all that the

--

colonial exa in Asia is dead.

i~e:ricans

have recognized it.

164
And in their hearts • so have the Br-itish, too French, the
Dutch. and Portuguese.

However. they ara still trying to

hold on to u few remnants ot their "empires."

1iS

long as

they do, the tGeming millions oi' Asia-.. non-Communist
Asians~-lvill

lmep \Jorryirlg mor. a about oclon:l.alisra than

Communism,
To hold that tile main conflict confronting the

entire •.;o:rld today is the conflict between Democracy and
Communism is a cJ.iche that must be cleared.

Insofar as

the Uni tod stat,>s is concerned it may be the m2ii.n conflict.
But for J,sia,. Africa, the Arab ,;orld, t;i1e main probl(:Jm is,

l

J

aside from me:re subsistence, t;ha problem of colonialism.

To

many 11sians, Communism is something abstract, unknoNllo
Colonialir:wl is knovm and hated.

Lisians win ·take Communism.

Given the choice man,y

'l'he big job is to prove to

them that the choice is not be tween colonialism and Commun·

ism but bet1ueen freedom and a nec; kind of'

imperialism~-

Communist impe :r:J.alism.
Tho I•':rench, for o.xmnple, must stop ta:Hdng about
getting out of :Indochina and get out.

Only ·che sight of

French ships pulling out of Saigon will convince the
Vietnamese that South Vietnam is independent.
'"ithdra~!al

True, the

of the Frencll may cuue:e administrative chaos,

but it is a l'if3k that l1as to ba taKen.

'.!:he same goes for
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th-e othc:r vestiges of colonialism

~o;hich

give the Communists

such good talking points.
In tlle Nordings of

too

Pacific Gh!; rter all the

si.sna:toriGs dedicate themselves to upl'lolding the pJ: inciple

o:e self-o,etermina tion,

3el:t'~gov0rnmen t,

and independence;

ancl :tt :ts an historic documt'lnt ti1at pledges_t/:l(O_colonieJ. _______ _
- - - - - - - ----

--------------------------- ----- --

~

poNers to give f'reedom to non-solf-gove;rn:l.ng peoples.

As

such, :lt must be follovJed to the lattet,
2.

1'his is vi tal politically.

To milU.ons of

hungry, :Llliterate Jlsians, talk of tl.l<J nH.mace of Communism
is meanitl.;:,lesB.

l•iestern propaganda should not be

exclusively to the id aa of n Communist menace.

~;;E:a;;;ed

Eu t the

menace of old·..fashioned Chinese ilupe:rialism is somctl:lil1g
tt1ey do understand.

l''ear of' un expanding China has been

ir>.,sralned in eve:ry Southeast Asian count:ry i'o:r

c~mtur:l.es.

seems to have J"'o:rgottan.
3.

Also on the political f':ront. VJhil<> fighting the

l.l.dmission of Had China to ths United Nations, the free
Norld must be r<1alistio

~mough

to get plann :ready ll(;!;ains t

the possibility tL!a t Psiping mcy be voted in within a fmv
years.

Hed China's udmis"ion

1rJOU1d

be bitter tea.

But to

pull out of the United Nations if it, happens v1ould be leav-

ing

t;hEI

o:r,;aniza tion to the Co!lllaUnis ts and fo:r the United

166

Btates to cut its

o1~n

throat.

One solution if Peiping

gets in is to continue to :recognize Formosa as an irldependent, sovereign state,

Wi'l;h

its

O'Wn

seat in the United

Nations.
II!.

'l'Hf ECONO!Vll C !l'!I'LD

The !'<Jason mucl1. has bean said on tl1e e conomie field
in ttle; early pages of this paplilr is t.hat
may Nell tell tho story for

~;oLltheast

:l.s done 11ere

toJtw·~

!csia.

A hungry man

listens to acybody who promises to fill l1is belly.

It is

as simple as thut: though Amerioa is tired by no1:1 of

rolling out billions.

l

But if. the t'all of southeast; Asia

v1ill undermine American seour :l:ty, then the United states

treasury may have to kGep taking a beating.

Ttlis also.

:l.s one of th<o :responsibilitiGs that goes w:tt.h the. p:rivilege
of' free \vOXld leaderstlip,

Southoast .i1Sia 1 S !rldeocu:;ly

depressed areas present t.he &,reatest cnullenl:!;<> to :tree

economies,

That challenge can be turned :tnto un asset by

making the :region an economic stwVJ-vJindow,

jl~st

as an
i

independent Phil:i.ppines has become a political
~rimes

sho>v~I,Jindov;.

move slowly in Asia, lind a beginning is

dif'f'i<:lult to achieve.

But nothing can

is started, and it has been star·l;Hd.

110

gained unless it

i3:51>T0 is an evo1L1-

tionary step in tho free 1!ior·lc\ •s rElvolut:tonary murch totm:rd

i

J.67

unity and sGcurJ.ty

$

At tL1e tipeed Ht \'llh.ich secu:ri ty a.:n:ange-

monts a.ro o vol ving :~ SEATO could cl:l.ane;o more in
five year

show that .i

than NATO has in the la:=rt f ve ..
cl':~n

ttl~l

next

Histo:r:y VJill

ant; as an sff.e cti ve sa..fegue-rd that vu a

can again more ft-eely on the ear-th vtalk lil{e men secure
in :right;s that

ar~

deare:r than life ..
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